Friday, 2 October 2015

A New Dawn in Japan: How China Is Empowering Its Greatest Rival

October 1, 2015

For the past seven decades, Japan hasn’t fired a single bullet for offensive military purposes, nor has it established a standing army with the mandate to engage in war. The northeast Asian powerhouse has been bound by a legendary pacifist constitution, Article 9 of which compels Japan to "forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes." Today’s Japan, unlike its imperial predecessor in the early twentieth century, is a curious case of a “rich country, no army” nation that has no parallel in modern history. But this is bound to change, as Japan reorients its foreign policy towards what it calls “proactive pacifism.”

One of the most significant implications of China’s territorial assertiveness, which has often translated into outright aggression and threat of use of force, is the empowerment of hawks in Tokyo, who have called for a more independent, capable and self-reliant Japan. Beijing’s unabashed quest for maritime dominance in the Western Pacific, with some of its top officials brazenly declaring that the South China Sea “belongs to China,” has raised alarm bells in Tokyo, which is grappling with Chinese maritime adventurism in both the East and South China Seas. For Tokyo, Beijing isn’t only aggressively staking claim to a group of largely uninhabited islets (Senkaku/Diaoyu) that Japan considers its sacred territory, but it is also undermining freedom of navigation in one of the world’s most important Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs).


China’s brash pursuit of maritime hegemony in East Asia has inadvertently ended the decades-long strategic stupor of its archrival, Japan. Yet, far from transforming it into a militaristic nation, as China’s propaganda machine constantly declares, Japan is instead morphing into a more credible anchor of regional stability. The recent passage of a landmark security bill, which allows Japan to engage in collective security operations, paves the way for a new era of Japanese foreign policy. The northeast Asian powerhouse will no longer be confined to “checkbook diplomacy,” since it will also be able to leverage its modern armed forces to shape and preserve international order. 

Man of the Hour

Under the stewardship of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the country has progressively recalibrated its defense policy and relaxed restrictions on Japan’s ability to project power beyond its immediate shores. Abe’s return to power, after a decisive parliamentary victory in late 2012, has coincided with an end to eleven years of budget cuts, exports of advanced military hardware (e.g., submarines) to allies such as Australia, provision of Japan’s largest postwarsecurity aid to weaker Southeast Asian nations such as the Philippines and therevision of bilateral defense guidelines with the United States. And thanks tothe recent passage of a controversial security bill, for the first time in its postwar history, Japan will be able to dispatch troops for overseas military operations under the principle of collective security.

By no means has the reorientation of Japan’s defense policy been an easy task, requiring Abe to expend much of his political capital along the way. Pacifism is deeply ingrained in the Japanese public psyche, with major opposition parties, especially the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), committing themselves to the preservation of Japan’s pacifist foreign policy. Imperial Japan’s brutal legacy of subjugation and colonization in Asia, and the traumatic conclusion of the Second World War that saw the usage of weapons of mass destruction against Japan’s major cities, has instilled a profound popular aversion vis-à-vis any expression of militarism and/or participation of Japan in overseas military operations.

Abe recognized the near-impossibility of garnering the two-thirds parliamentary majority support needed to push for amendment of Article 9 of the constitution, not to mention the broad public opposition that will surely sink any eventual referendum on the issue. Displaying political astuteness, he instead pushed for a reinterpretation of constitutional restrictions on Japan’s defense policy. Under the principle of collective security, Japanese leaders canauthorize military force if "the country’s existence, the lives of the people, their freedoms, and the right to seek happiness are feared to be profoundly threatened because of an armed attack on Japan or other countries.”

By adopting such broad legal language, and given the relatively open-ended nature of justifications for authorization of military force, Abe has empowered himself and his successors to dispatch the Self Defense Forces (SDF) with greater regularity and ease, specifically if it involves aiding an allied nation against a third-party aggressor. Any international conflict that affects Japan’s “right to seek happiness” or is perceived to threaten “other countries,” specifically allies such as the United States, can be used as justification to dispatch the SDF. Abe has had to use his parliamentary majority in both houses of the Japanese Diet to push through the security bill that permits collective security operations, even though, according to a poll published byAsahi Shimbun, a majority of voters (54 percent) oppose the bill, with an even greater number (68 percent) seeing no need for its expedient passage under the current parliamentary session. By sailing against public opinion, Abe has seen his approval ratings suffer a dramatic decline in recent months, now standing at only 36 percent.

Having comfortably secured his leadership position within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Abe is expected to remain Japan’s prime minister until 2018. This gives him ample opportunity to progressively recast the country’s foreign policy. Committed to recalibrating Japan’s postwar defense posturing, a cornerstone of his policy agenda, Abe seems unperturbed by popular opposition to his vision of a more self-reliant and capable Japan. He has displayed tremendous determination to achieve this goal, and his ruling coalition party is relishing a decisive return to power after years of perceived ineptitude under the rule of opposition DPJ party (2009-2012).

Reverse Tectonic Shift

In Tokyo, there is a genuine sense of urgency, if not panic, over the rapid shift in the balance of military power between China and Japan in the last decade and a half. In the year 2000, Japan’s defense spending was 60 percent larger than that of China. By 2012, China’s defense budget was almost three times bigger. Even in qualitative terms, China was able to rapidly close the gap. While the bulk of Japan’s defense spending went to maintenance of existing hardware, China began investing in cutting-edge technology and new acquisitions. Today, China, for instance, is the only country aside from the United States that has two fifth-generation jetfighter prototypes, the J-20 and J-31, while its burgeoning Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) capabilities are putting it in a position to dominate adjacent waters, particularly the First Island Chain stretching from waters off the northern coast of Japan all the way to waters off the coast of Vietnam.

Dispensing with any ounce of diplomatic correctness, Japan’s latest defense White paper portrays China as a dangerous revisionist power that “has been continuing activities seen as high-handed to alter the status quo by force and has attempted to materialize its unilateral [territorial] claim without making compromises.” Japan’s Defense Minister Gen Nakatani warned that “China’s military development is of concern to the regional and international community, including our country,” reflecting how China’s behavior and military modernization has been a primary factor for Japan’s defense-policy recalibration in recent years. Despite a measure of diplomatic thaw between the two rivals, particularly since Abe’s high-profile meeting with Chinese president Xi Jinping in late 2014, Tokyo and Beijing continue to flirt with confrontation in the East China Sea, while China’s aggressive posturing in the South China Sea is undermining freedom of (military and civilian) navigation across an artery of global trade.

Over the past two years, China has reclaimed more than 1,170 hectares of land across the disputed Spratly chain of Islands, building a sprawling network of military facilities and advanced airstrips, which will allow Beijing to project power from the occupied features to the detriment of freedom of navigation and overflight in a critical SLOC and the security of Southeast Asian claimant states such as Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. China’s network of military bases in the area constitute the skeleton of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), since it will allow the Asian powerhouse, which claims the area as a “national blue soil,” to more effectively restrict the movement of vessels and aircrafts in the South China Sea. In short, China is transforming the South China Sea into a domestic lake.

Since 2012, the United States has stepped short of piercing into the 12 nautical miles radius of China’s artificially-created islands in the South China Sea, even though most of these features were originally low-tide elevations that aren’t entitled to their own territorial sea. But there are indications that the United States Navy is now preparing to extend its “freedom of navigation” operations well into the territorial sea of China’s artificially-created islands, challenging what Adm. Harry Harris, the head of Pacific Command, calls as the “great wall of sand”. As the South China Sea becomes more contested and congested, the potential for a Sino-American confrontation has become ever more likely.

In an event of a conflict between Chinese and American armed forces, Japancan provide logistical and rear-area support for the United States under the principle of collective security. With Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano, chief of the Joint Staff of the Japanese SDF, expressing his country’s willingness to partake in joint patrols in the area, Japan is poised to have a more constant and precarious military presence in the South China Sea. Japan can also indirectly support its chief Southeast Asian strategic partner, the Philippines, if the latter is involved in a military confrontation with China. Under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States is obliged to come to the Philippines’ rescue if the troops and vessels of its Southeast Asian ally come under attack within the Pacific theatre. This means, any Chinese armed conflict with the Philippines could involve the United States as well as Japan, which, under the principle of collective security, can provide auxiliary support. No wonder then, top Filipino officials openly welcomed the recent passage of Japan’s security bill.

As Japan (once again) assumes a pivotal role in preserving regional security, it has become more important than ever for the Abe administration to unequivocally dispel any fears over a remilitarization of Japan and push back against any expression of historical revisionism among his political allies. This is why Abe’s apology statement in August -- which admitted that Imperial Japan "took the wrong course and advanced along the road to war", used terms such as "deep remorse" (tsusetsu na hansei) and "apology" (owabi), and called Japanese people across generations to “squarely face the history of the past" – represented a crucial step in normalizing Japan’s role in the region. Although a lot more is still to be desired, especially when it comes to appeasing Japan’s neighbors in Northeast Asia. But one thing is clear: China’s ostensible quest for regional hegemony has ended Japan’s strategic oblivion, paving the way for a new era in Japanese foreign policy. 

Richard Javad Heydarian is an Assistant Professor in international affairs and political science at De La Salle University, and previously served as a policy advisor at the Philippine House of Representatives. As a specialist on Asian geopolitics and economic affairs, he has written for or interviewedbyAl Jazeera, Asia Times, BBC, Bloomberg, Foreign Affairs, The New York Times,Wall Street Journal, The Huffington Post, The Diplomat, The Financial Times, and USA TODAY, among other leading international publications. He is the author of How Capitalism Failed the Arab World: The Economic Roots and Precarious Future of the Middle East Uprisings (Zed, London), and the forthcoming book Asia’s New Battlefield: US, China, and the Struggle for Western Pacific (Zed, 2015). You can follow him on Twitter: @Richeydarian.













DNI Clapper ‘Not Optimistic’ That US-China Deal Will Prevent Further Chinese Economic Spying

September 30, 2015

US intel official not optimistic about cyber deal with China 

WASHINGTON (AP) — The nation’s top intelligence official said Tuesday that he’s not optimistic that an agreement the U.S. recently struck with China will effectively deter state-sponsored cyberattacks on business emanating from the communist nation.

President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping met last week and agreed not to conduct or knowingly support cyber theft of trade secrets or competitive business information. The White House said the agreement covers cyber theft where the intent is to provide a competitive advantage to a country’s companies or commercial sectors.

At a Senate hearing, Armed Services Committee Chairman John McCain asked Director of National Intelligence James Clapper if he was optimistic that the agreement would result in the elimination of such attacks from China.

Clapper replied: “No.”

The agreement was not supposed to eliminate all cyberattacks, only state-sponsored ones that target businesses. Obama also said he told Xi that cyber threats from China have to stop.


The Office of Personnel Management recently was the victim of what the U.S. believes was a Chinese espionage operation that affected an estimated 21.5 million current and former federal employees or job applicants.

McCain, R-Ariz., said the Obama administration has not been aggressive enough in responding to cyberattacks or taking steps to effectively deter them.

“We are not winning the fight in cyberspace,” he said. “The problem is a lack of deterrence.”

Robert Work, deputy secretary of defense, acknowledged that the Defense Department needs to improve deterrence. “We do believe there are some things the department is doing that are working, but we need to improve in this area without question,” Work said.

Clapper said economic sanctions might be the best way to curb cyberattacks from China, which he said are “pretty pervasive.”

“I think there is a question about the extent to which the (Chinese) government actually orchestrates all of it or not,” he said.

Clapper added that when discussing penalties, policymakers also must remember that the U.S. conducts cyber spying, too.

“We, too, practice cyber espionage and in a public forum, I’m not going to say how successful we are, but we’re not bad,” Clapper said. “I think it’s a good idea to at least think about the old saw about people in glass houses should not throw rocks.”

U.S. Has Pulled Intelligence Officers Out of China Following OPM Data Breach

Ellen Nakashima and Adam Goldman
September 30, 20154

CIA pulled officers from Beijing after breach of federal personnel records

The CIA pulled a number of officers from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing as a precautionary measure in the wake of the massive cybertheft of the personal data of federal employees, current and former U.S. officials said.

The move is a concrete impact of the breach, one of two major hacks into Office of Personnel Management computers that were disclosed earlier this year. Officials have privately attributed the hacks to the Chinese government.

The theft of documents has been characterized by senior U.S. officials as political espionage intended to identify spies and people who might be recruited as spies or blackmailed to provide useful information.

Because the OPM records contained the background checks of State Department employees, officials privately said the Chinese could have compared those records with the list of embassy personnel. Anybody not on that list could be a CIA officer.


The CIA’s move was meant to safeguard officers whose agency affiliation might be discovered as a result of the hack, said officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive matter.

The CIA declined to comment.

The disclosure comes as senior defense and intelligence officials on Tuesday tried — not always successfully — to explain to a committee of frustrated lawmakers their policy on deterring foreign governments, such as China, from carrying out cyber-intrusions.

Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr., testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, sought to make a distinction between the OPM hacks and cybertheft of U.S. companies’ secrets to benefit another country’s industry. What happened in OPM case, “as egregious as it was,” Clapper said, was not an attack: “Rather, it would be a form of theft or espionage.”

And, he said, “We, too, practice cyberespionage and . . . we’re not bad at it.” He suggested that the United States would not be wise to seek to punish another country for something its own intelligence services do. “I think it’s a good idea to at least think about the old saw about people who live in glass houses shouldn’t throw rocks.”

That drew a sharp response from Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), the committee’s chairman. “So it’s okay for them to steal our secrets that are most important because we live in a glass house? That is astounding.”

Clapper protested that he did not say it was a good thing. “I’m just saying that both nations engage in this,” he said, referring to China and the United States.

Several lawmakers were not satisfied with the lack of a punishment for the OPM theft, despite Clapper’s explanation.

“This is a pretty significant issue that is going to impact millions of Americans,” said Sen. Kelly Ayotte (R-N.H.). “But it seems to me they are not seeing a response right now from us, and therefore we’re going to continue to see bad behavior from the Chinese.”

At another point in the hearing, Deputy Defense Secretary Robert O. Work seemed to stray off-message when he asked what response he would recommend if the Chinese were to carry off another OPM-like cybertheft.

“Sanctions? Retaliation?” asked Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-Alaska).

“Could be any of those, Senator. Maybe all of the above,” Work responded.

In fact, largely because of the concerns that Clapper outlined, it is unlikely that the administration would impose sanctions or retaliate overtly for the OPM intrusions.

During the Cold War, Sen. Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.) noted, a foreign agent who was nabbed trying to steal U.S. secrets would be kicked out of the country if he or she had diplomatic cover or thrown in jail otherwise.

In the OPM breach, he said, “the U.S. government seems uncertain about what a proportioned response would look like.”

The counterintelligence risks of the OPM breach are significant, Clapper said. He noted that the intelligence agencies do not know specifically whose records were taken. But the scale of the compromise — more than 22 million individuals’ records breached — “has very serious implications . . . from the standpoint of the intelligence community and the potential for identifying people” who may be undercover.

“Unfortunately,” he said, “this is a gift that’s going to keep on giving for years.”

Why Iran’s Bellicose Foreign Policy Is Unlikely to Change

October 1, 2015

As the deadline for Congressional action against the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran has passed on September 17, the agreement is finally about to be implemented. Some supporters of the deal have argued that in the absence of a stalemate over Tehran’s nuclear activities, the West can now engage Iran to stabilize the Middle East, most notably with regards to rolling back the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). John Kerry fueled these hopes when he said that Iranian foreign minister Zarif had told him that thanks to the deal he would be “empowered to work with and talk to you about regional issues.” Federica Mogherini, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, even voiced hope that time might be ripe for an entirely new “regional framework […] based on cooperation rather than confrontation.”

This optimism, however, underestimates the anti-American agenda and the influence of Iran’s self-declared guardians of the revolution. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the key figure in the Iranian political system, is a case in point. While President Hassan Rouhani has been very committed to concluding the nuclear deal, Khamenei was the one who has always expressed reservations about engaging the United States. He once compared his attitude to the negotiations to the behavior of a wrestler who sometimes “shows flexibility [for] technical reasons,” but “should not forget who his opponent and enemy is.” From his perspective, the compromise on the nuclear issue was a tacit concession to get much-needed sanctions relief and by no means a blueprint for reconciliation. After Rouhani cautiously expressed his interest in expanding Iran’s cooperation with “various countries,” the Supreme Leader immediately pushed back and told his fellow citizens to “prepare for the continuation of the fight against America.”


Some analysts have dismissed such statements as empty words to appease radical groups within Iran. Unlike the Supreme Leader’s red lines regarding the nuclear negotiations, this kind of rhetoric is, however, backed up by action. Iran’s Qods Force––the wing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is running the IRGC’s external operations and was instrumental in supporting radical Shiite militias during the insurgency in Iraq––has reportedly plotted terrorist acts against targets from Israel and the Gulf states, the key U.S. allies in the Middle East. Most notably, the Qods Force was behind the attempt to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States on American soil in 2011. Apart from plotting its own attacks, the Qods Force has also encouraged and supported Hezbollah in its endeavor to follow suit.

The Qods Force––and not the comparatively moderate forces that negotiated the nuclear deal––is also in charge of coordinating Iran’s current military and diplomatic engagement with respect to the region’s hot spots, such as Syria, Iraq and Yemen. In its capacity as primary Iranian stakeholder in regional affairs, the Qods Force has dramatically stepped up its activities and undermined regional stability in recent years. When the Assad regime was under increasing pressure from the Syrian insurgents, the Qods Force teamed up with its long-standing proxy Hezbollah to keep the regime from falling. To this day, Hezbollah militants and IRGC forces fight alongside Assad’s army. As a result, the Syrian regime has continued its brutal attempts to suppress the popular revolt and thousands of foreign fighters have flocked to Syria to join Sunni insurgents, including terrorist groups. In addition, the Qods Force has doubled down on its support for the Houthi rebels in Yemen, who drove American forces out of the country a couple of months ago.

It is particularly noteworthy that the Qods Force increased its involvement in Syria and Yemen, although the United States and Iran simultaneously narrowed their differences on the nuclear issue. In other words, the idea that a compromise on the nuclear file can undo the severe conflicts between the United States and Iran on other issues has so far been powerfully disproven. The odds that Iran is going to change its behavior in the future are quite low. Things are rather likely to get even worse. In a recent speech, the Supreme Leader vowed to keep up the support for the “oppressed people” of Yemen and––mentioning another potential trouble spot––Bahrain. The continuation of the alliance between Iran and its only governmental partner in the region, the Assad regime, is also pretty much a given.

It is true that Iran and the United States have demonstrated that they can find common ground, if both countries deem collaboration to be in their interests. Supporters of deeper engagement with Iran are right to point out that efforts to roll back ISIL fall into that category, but that should not overshadow the strikingly discrepant goals, values and interests both sides have. The United States should not act under the assumption that a long-standing foe, who has turned out to pursue an extremely aggressive agenda that runs counter to its own, can be flipped into a friend. Instead, it should now focus its efforts on containing Iran’s regional ambitions and preventing Iranian-inspired terrorist attacks. In both cases, it will be crucial to seek new international allies to isolate and weaken the Qods Force.

Sven-Eric Fikenscher is an Associate with the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.













5 ISIS Weapons of War Russia Should Fear in Syria

October 1, 2015

Reports out of Syria indicate that Russian fighter-bombers have begun airstrikes on rebel positions. However, the extent of Russian commitment remains unclear. At the very least, we can expect that the troops and aircraft will forcefully protect Russian installations in the region. At the maximum, Russia may fight to preserve the Assad regime, and restore its control over parts of Syria.

Either way, Moscow will see pushback. While ISIS hasn’t focused its rhetoric on Moscow, we can expect that the presence of Russian troops in Syria will concentrate the group’s attention. Here are five weapons that ISIS can use against Russia:

Infiltrators:

In September 2012, a group of insurgents penetrated Camp Bastion in Afghanistan, and destroyed eight Marine Corps AV-8B Harriers. The attack gave the U.S. Marine Corps a huge black eye, and represented the greatest operational loss of U.S. aircraft since the Vietnam War. Ironically, if the F-35B had been close to on schedule, the attack could have cost over a billion dollars.


We can expect that the Russians will manage security at the Latakia airbase. Nevertheless, the dozens of combat aircraft at the base will prove a tempting target for ISIS infiltrators, potentially working with base personnel. Damaging or destroying Russian aircraft on the ground would provide the same kind of propaganda coup for ISIS as attacking Camp Bastion provided the Taliban.

Rockets:

ISIS has not yet demonstrated much capability for hitting targets at long range. A Sinai group affiliated with ISIS claimed to have fired a pair of rockets at Israel, but beyond short-range mortars, indirect fire weapons have not played a very large role in ISIS offensives.

Some other opposition groups in Syria have, however, seized control of medium and long range rockets, and used them in combat. Some of these rockets (many built to Syrian design) can hit the Russian positions in Latakia. Russia hasn’t yet indicated much concern about these systems, but if ISIS manages to capture (or manufacture, or transfer) similar equipment to the vicinity of Latakia, it could give parked Russian aircraft a very bad day.

SAMs:

ISIS has not yet developed much in the way of surface-to-air capability, despite the efforts of the Syrian Arab Air Force and of the Coalition carrying out attacks across Syria and Iraq. Moreover, rugged Russian aircraft can sustain damage from the light anti-aircraft weapons that ISIS has managed to acquire.

Nevertheless, ISIS has some weapons that can damage Russian helicopters, and potentially slow-moving Russian attack aircraft. If Russian air attacks prove particularly effective, ISIS may have more incentive to put into service some of the SAMs it has seized along the way. Given that the Russians will operate with better equipment and training than the Syrians, and presumably with looser rules of engagement than the Americans, ISIS may well feel a need to improve its air defenses.

Chechens:

Rumors abound as to the number of Russians serving in the ranks of the Islamic State, but government sources suggest between 1,800 and 5,000, with most hailing from Chechnya. These fighters can hurt Russia in two ways. First, they likely have greater familiarity with Russian military tactics and procedures than anyone else in Syria (even the Syrian Arab Army). If they can apply lessons learned from the Chechen Wars, they could provide a serious threat to the Russian deployment.

More seriously, these Chechens could, if they return to Russia, re-spark the devastating war that occupied Moscow’s attention for much of the past two decades. Indeed, returning fighters could spark conflict along much of Russia’s southern regions, and in the Central Asian countries that Russia regards as within its sphere of influence. Western European countries are afraid of returning fighters, but Russia has much more cause for concern.

Propaganda:

The threat of ISIS has loomed large because of its effective propaganda machine. The organizations has displayed an unusual degree of aptitude on social media, generating attention that has, consequently, generated flows of new fighters and recruits. Much of the group’s efforts have thus far concentrated on Western countries, as well as on the Assad regime.

ISIS began stepping up its anti-Russian propaganda efforts in late spring of 2015. The deployment of significant Russian forces to Syria make it all the more likely that ISIS will concentrate on these efforts in the future. The ISIS propaganda machine has the potential not only to increase the number of recruits coming from Russia and Central Asia, but also for encouraging “independent” terrorist activity within Russia itself.

Parting Thoughts:

Russia is in an extremely tenuous position in Syria. If it wins, it gets a permanent alliance with the most hated man in the Middle East, the leader of a broken country. If ISIS or the other rebels win, Russia loses its foothold in the region, not to mention suffering the humiliation of defeat. Indeed, the risks either way seem so large, and the benefits so small, that many have wondered about the quality of Russia’s strategic decision-making.

Either way, Moscow will earn ever greater enmity from Islamic radicals around the world. One of the key insights of the U.S. strategic community in the late Cold War was that, however problematic Islamic radicalism might prove to the West, it could hurt the Soviets much more. Much has changed, but this remains true; ISIS has the potential to hurt Russia in a way that it can never hurt the United States.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is author of The Battleship Book. He serves as an Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs atLawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination and The Diplomat.













Moscow's War in the Air: Russia Sends a Message in Syria

October 1, 2015

The start of Russian airstrikes in Syria—two days after Vladimir Putin listened to Barack Obama's UN General Assembly speech, which warned against Russian action in defense of the Bashar al-Assad regime (and then had such warnings reinforced in their one-on-one meeting)—is the Kremlin's answer to the questions that have been posed about Moscow's true intentions and interests.

First, the choice of targets in the first wave—with reports that the strikes hit non-ISIS Syrian opposition groups, including some affiliated with the Free Syrian Army and those who have been deemed credible to receive Western aid—is a message to the region as a whole that while Russia is prepared to use deadly force to defend its interests and to defend its clients, those who have accepted Western patronage will not enjoy such support. The fact that some Russian outlets have also begun to take the line that there is no such thing as a "moderate opposition"—only groups that have varying degrees of support for and affinity to the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS)—suggests the promulgation of a narrative that the conflict in Syria is now binary and one is either with Assad or "with the terrorists" and groups that continue to fight against Assad are de facto allied to ISIS. (On a separate note, it will be quite interesting to watch how the Russians deal with the Syrian Kurds, who have fought ISIS, but have often reached an apparent modus vivendi with the Assad regime to be left alone to enjoy a de facto autonomy).


Second, the speed at which the strikes have started is meant to convey to other countries in the region as well as to the Europeans that Russia can move quickly and with determination, in contrast to the Hamlet-like indecision exhibited by the United States. Having identified its interests, Moscow is willing to act and to take risks. Just as Russia intervened in Ukraine last summer to prevent the eastern rebels from being overwhelmed—and created "new facts" on the ground leading to the Minsk-II agreements—the gamble here may be that Russian action could stabilize the Assad regime and force other players in the region, starting with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, to negotiate with Moscow over Syria's future.

The image of Russian decisiveness stands in contrast to the takeaway from the anti-extremism summit convened by Obama in New York on Tuesday—where,as Margaret Warner noted, leaders of the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition “couldn’t say they have achieved much...almost none could point to a real accomplishment. Then they didn’t have any frank discussion about the fault with their own strategy and what they should do.”

Finally, the timing of the strikes—within hours of Putin's return from New York—is meant as a slap in the face to President Obama and to the United States as a whole. U.S. presidential candidates may outdo each other in calling Putin a thug, a gangster, a criminal or a dictator; they may give long eloquent speeches about how Russia is on the wrong side of history—but Putin believes he can create facts on the ground that challenge the U.S. narrative. The implications of the Iraqis joining with Iran, Syria and Russia to form an intelligence coordination unit and Iraq's decision to allow Russian overflights of its territory—after all the funds spent to train and equip Iraqis—suggests that Putin believes that things are breaking his way.

Of course, it is early days yet. Russia may be risking being sucked into a Middle Eastern quagmire by its actions in Syria, and further straining a weakened economy. But there is no question that right now, the Kremlin has taken control of the narrative.

Nikolas Gvosdev is a contributing editor at The National Interest and co-author of Russian Foreign Policy: Vectors, Sectors and Interests (CQ Press, 2013). The views expressed here are his own.














ISIS Has Become Sprawling Global Terror and Finance Network

September 30, 2015

New US sanctions illustrate sprawling Islamic State network 

WASHINGTON (AP) – The U.S. government announced sanctions Tuesday against 25 people and five groups connected to the Islamic State, disclosing intelligence that depicts a sprawling international organization with tentacles across Europe, Asia and the Middle East.

The moves by the Treasury and State departments are aimed at disrupting the activities of Islamic State financial, logistical and recruiting operatives who may not be suitable targets of American bombs or drone strikes. Many of them reside outside the theaters of war in Iraq and Syria.

The sanctions, the largest such effort against the Islamic State, also serve to demonstrate how far and wide the group’s ideology has spread.

The State Department designated as foreign terrorist organizations Islamic State regional spin-offs in Russia’s Caucasus region, Algeria, Indonesia and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. Among the individuals designated as terrorists was Sally Jones, a British native and the widow of an operative killed recently in an American drone strike.


The State Department also designated as terrorists three French nationals and a Russian. Russia, France and other countries cooperated with the U.S. in supplying information that contributed to the sanctions, officials said.

Also Tuesday, the State Department announced a reward of up to $5 million for information leading to the significant disruption of commerce in oil and antiquities by, for, on behalf of, or to benefit the Islamic State. It was a first for the Rewards for Justice Program, which typically offers rewards for information leading to wanted individuals.

The Treasury Department, meanwhile, slapped financial sanctions on Islamic State officials who operate in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Yemen and Tunisia. Among the individuals it sanctioned in Syria was British national Aqsa Mahmood, who is accused of recruiting three British schoolgirls in February to flee the United Kingdom to become wives of Islamic State fighters. She is believed to be in Syria.

Previously, Treasury had sanctioned just four Islamic State officials, one of whom was killed in a U.S. drone strike in June.

Some of those sanctioned by Treasury are also expected to be placed Tuesday on the United Nations’ al-Qaida Sanctions List, officials said in a news release.

The announcement came before a meeting between President Barack Obama and other world leaders on countering the Islamic State on the margins of the U.N. General Assembly meetings in New York.

The financial sanctions are designed to make it harder for the Islamic State to use its immense wealth, Daniel Glaser, Treasury’s assistant secretary for terrorist financing, said in an interview.

“These sanctions will prevent them from engaging in financial transactions and make it harder for them to travel,” he said.

Financial institutions around the world tend to honor U.S. sanctions, he said. The State Department designations mean that anyone who supports the individuals or groups can be prosecuted under U.S. law.

Much of the Islamic State’s income is generated internally, Glaser said, from oil sales, taxation and extortion, so sanctions can’t cut that off. Instead, they are meant “so that they can’t get supplies, parts, things that you need to run a state, things that you need to engage in a war,” he said.

Given the extensive smuggling networks across the region, it’s unclear how effective the sanctions will be in doing that.

In July, Glaser said the Islamic State is clearing as much as $500 million per year from oil sales, more than enough to meet a payroll he estimated at a high of $360 million a year.

The public announcement of sanctions, which draws on intelligence gathered by the CIA and other agencies, offers a window into insights the U.S. has garnered about the Islamic State.

Notably, the U.S. believes al-Qaida and the Islamic State have been working together on a tactical level, despite official hostility to one another.

Yemeni national Mu'tassim Yahya `Ali al-Rumaysh, for example, is described by Treasury as “a financial and foreign fighter facilitator” for the Islamic State “who also has held membership in al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).”

He helped an Islamic State member procure funds for the travel of foreign fighters from Yemen to Syria transiting Turkey, Treasury said in a news release, coordinating AQAP and the Syrian al-Qaida affiliate, the Nusra Front, to facilitate the travel of Islamic State members.

In November 2013, al-Rumaysh sent a group of Yemeni extremists to Turkey, Treasury said, and they made their way to an AQAP facilitator in Syria.