Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts

Friday, 2 October 2015

A New Dawn in Japan: How China Is Empowering Its Greatest Rival

October 1, 2015

For the past seven decades, Japan hasn’t fired a single bullet for offensive military purposes, nor has it established a standing army with the mandate to engage in war. The northeast Asian powerhouse has been bound by a legendary pacifist constitution, Article 9 of which compels Japan to "forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes." Today’s Japan, unlike its imperial predecessor in the early twentieth century, is a curious case of a “rich country, no army” nation that has no parallel in modern history. But this is bound to change, as Japan reorients its foreign policy towards what it calls “proactive pacifism.”

One of the most significant implications of China’s territorial assertiveness, which has often translated into outright aggression and threat of use of force, is the empowerment of hawks in Tokyo, who have called for a more independent, capable and self-reliant Japan. Beijing’s unabashed quest for maritime dominance in the Western Pacific, with some of its top officials brazenly declaring that the South China Sea “belongs to China,” has raised alarm bells in Tokyo, which is grappling with Chinese maritime adventurism in both the East and South China Seas. For Tokyo, Beijing isn’t only aggressively staking claim to a group of largely uninhabited islets (Senkaku/Diaoyu) that Japan considers its sacred territory, but it is also undermining freedom of navigation in one of the world’s most important Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs).


China’s brash pursuit of maritime hegemony in East Asia has inadvertently ended the decades-long strategic stupor of its archrival, Japan. Yet, far from transforming it into a militaristic nation, as China’s propaganda machine constantly declares, Japan is instead morphing into a more credible anchor of regional stability. The recent passage of a landmark security bill, which allows Japan to engage in collective security operations, paves the way for a new era of Japanese foreign policy. The northeast Asian powerhouse will no longer be confined to “checkbook diplomacy,” since it will also be able to leverage its modern armed forces to shape and preserve international order. 

Man of the Hour

Under the stewardship of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the country has progressively recalibrated its defense policy and relaxed restrictions on Japan’s ability to project power beyond its immediate shores. Abe’s return to power, after a decisive parliamentary victory in late 2012, has coincided with an end to eleven years of budget cuts, exports of advanced military hardware (e.g., submarines) to allies such as Australia, provision of Japan’s largest postwarsecurity aid to weaker Southeast Asian nations such as the Philippines and therevision of bilateral defense guidelines with the United States. And thanks tothe recent passage of a controversial security bill, for the first time in its postwar history, Japan will be able to dispatch troops for overseas military operations under the principle of collective security.

By no means has the reorientation of Japan’s defense policy been an easy task, requiring Abe to expend much of his political capital along the way. Pacifism is deeply ingrained in the Japanese public psyche, with major opposition parties, especially the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), committing themselves to the preservation of Japan’s pacifist foreign policy. Imperial Japan’s brutal legacy of subjugation and colonization in Asia, and the traumatic conclusion of the Second World War that saw the usage of weapons of mass destruction against Japan’s major cities, has instilled a profound popular aversion vis-à-vis any expression of militarism and/or participation of Japan in overseas military operations.

Abe recognized the near-impossibility of garnering the two-thirds parliamentary majority support needed to push for amendment of Article 9 of the constitution, not to mention the broad public opposition that will surely sink any eventual referendum on the issue. Displaying political astuteness, he instead pushed for a reinterpretation of constitutional restrictions on Japan’s defense policy. Under the principle of collective security, Japanese leaders canauthorize military force if "the country’s existence, the lives of the people, their freedoms, and the right to seek happiness are feared to be profoundly threatened because of an armed attack on Japan or other countries.”

By adopting such broad legal language, and given the relatively open-ended nature of justifications for authorization of military force, Abe has empowered himself and his successors to dispatch the Self Defense Forces (SDF) with greater regularity and ease, specifically if it involves aiding an allied nation against a third-party aggressor. Any international conflict that affects Japan’s “right to seek happiness” or is perceived to threaten “other countries,” specifically allies such as the United States, can be used as justification to dispatch the SDF. Abe has had to use his parliamentary majority in both houses of the Japanese Diet to push through the security bill that permits collective security operations, even though, according to a poll published byAsahi Shimbun, a majority of voters (54 percent) oppose the bill, with an even greater number (68 percent) seeing no need for its expedient passage under the current parliamentary session. By sailing against public opinion, Abe has seen his approval ratings suffer a dramatic decline in recent months, now standing at only 36 percent.

Having comfortably secured his leadership position within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Abe is expected to remain Japan’s prime minister until 2018. This gives him ample opportunity to progressively recast the country’s foreign policy. Committed to recalibrating Japan’s postwar defense posturing, a cornerstone of his policy agenda, Abe seems unperturbed by popular opposition to his vision of a more self-reliant and capable Japan. He has displayed tremendous determination to achieve this goal, and his ruling coalition party is relishing a decisive return to power after years of perceived ineptitude under the rule of opposition DPJ party (2009-2012).

Reverse Tectonic Shift

In Tokyo, there is a genuine sense of urgency, if not panic, over the rapid shift in the balance of military power between China and Japan in the last decade and a half. In the year 2000, Japan’s defense spending was 60 percent larger than that of China. By 2012, China’s defense budget was almost three times bigger. Even in qualitative terms, China was able to rapidly close the gap. While the bulk of Japan’s defense spending went to maintenance of existing hardware, China began investing in cutting-edge technology and new acquisitions. Today, China, for instance, is the only country aside from the United States that has two fifth-generation jetfighter prototypes, the J-20 and J-31, while its burgeoning Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) capabilities are putting it in a position to dominate adjacent waters, particularly the First Island Chain stretching from waters off the northern coast of Japan all the way to waters off the coast of Vietnam.

Dispensing with any ounce of diplomatic correctness, Japan’s latest defense White paper portrays China as a dangerous revisionist power that “has been continuing activities seen as high-handed to alter the status quo by force and has attempted to materialize its unilateral [territorial] claim without making compromises.” Japan’s Defense Minister Gen Nakatani warned that “China’s military development is of concern to the regional and international community, including our country,” reflecting how China’s behavior and military modernization has been a primary factor for Japan’s defense-policy recalibration in recent years. Despite a measure of diplomatic thaw between the two rivals, particularly since Abe’s high-profile meeting with Chinese president Xi Jinping in late 2014, Tokyo and Beijing continue to flirt with confrontation in the East China Sea, while China’s aggressive posturing in the South China Sea is undermining freedom of (military and civilian) navigation across an artery of global trade.

Over the past two years, China has reclaimed more than 1,170 hectares of land across the disputed Spratly chain of Islands, building a sprawling network of military facilities and advanced airstrips, which will allow Beijing to project power from the occupied features to the detriment of freedom of navigation and overflight in a critical SLOC and the security of Southeast Asian claimant states such as Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. China’s network of military bases in the area constitute the skeleton of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), since it will allow the Asian powerhouse, which claims the area as a “national blue soil,” to more effectively restrict the movement of vessels and aircrafts in the South China Sea. In short, China is transforming the South China Sea into a domestic lake.

Since 2012, the United States has stepped short of piercing into the 12 nautical miles radius of China’s artificially-created islands in the South China Sea, even though most of these features were originally low-tide elevations that aren’t entitled to their own territorial sea. But there are indications that the United States Navy is now preparing to extend its “freedom of navigation” operations well into the territorial sea of China’s artificially-created islands, challenging what Adm. Harry Harris, the head of Pacific Command, calls as the “great wall of sand”. As the South China Sea becomes more contested and congested, the potential for a Sino-American confrontation has become ever more likely.

In an event of a conflict between Chinese and American armed forces, Japancan provide logistical and rear-area support for the United States under the principle of collective security. With Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano, chief of the Joint Staff of the Japanese SDF, expressing his country’s willingness to partake in joint patrols in the area, Japan is poised to have a more constant and precarious military presence in the South China Sea. Japan can also indirectly support its chief Southeast Asian strategic partner, the Philippines, if the latter is involved in a military confrontation with China. Under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States is obliged to come to the Philippines’ rescue if the troops and vessels of its Southeast Asian ally come under attack within the Pacific theatre. This means, any Chinese armed conflict with the Philippines could involve the United States as well as Japan, which, under the principle of collective security, can provide auxiliary support. No wonder then, top Filipino officials openly welcomed the recent passage of Japan’s security bill.

As Japan (once again) assumes a pivotal role in preserving regional security, it has become more important than ever for the Abe administration to unequivocally dispel any fears over a remilitarization of Japan and push back against any expression of historical revisionism among his political allies. This is why Abe’s apology statement in August -- which admitted that Imperial Japan "took the wrong course and advanced along the road to war", used terms such as "deep remorse" (tsusetsu na hansei) and "apology" (owabi), and called Japanese people across generations to “squarely face the history of the past" – represented a crucial step in normalizing Japan’s role in the region. Although a lot more is still to be desired, especially when it comes to appeasing Japan’s neighbors in Northeast Asia. But one thing is clear: China’s ostensible quest for regional hegemony has ended Japan’s strategic oblivion, paving the way for a new era in Japanese foreign policy. 

Richard Javad Heydarian is an Assistant Professor in international affairs and political science at De La Salle University, and previously served as a policy advisor at the Philippine House of Representatives. As a specialist on Asian geopolitics and economic affairs, he has written for or interviewedbyAl Jazeera, Asia Times, BBC, Bloomberg, Foreign Affairs, The New York Times,Wall Street Journal, The Huffington Post, The Diplomat, The Financial Times, and USA TODAY, among other leading international publications. He is the author of How Capitalism Failed the Arab World: The Economic Roots and Precarious Future of the Middle East Uprisings (Zed, London), and the forthcoming book Asia’s New Battlefield: US, China, and the Struggle for Western Pacific (Zed, 2015). You can follow him on Twitter: @Richeydarian.













DNI Clapper ‘Not Optimistic’ That US-China Deal Will Prevent Further Chinese Economic Spying

September 30, 2015

US intel official not optimistic about cyber deal with China 

WASHINGTON (AP) — The nation’s top intelligence official said Tuesday that he’s not optimistic that an agreement the U.S. recently struck with China will effectively deter state-sponsored cyberattacks on business emanating from the communist nation.

President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping met last week and agreed not to conduct or knowingly support cyber theft of trade secrets or competitive business information. The White House said the agreement covers cyber theft where the intent is to provide a competitive advantage to a country’s companies or commercial sectors.

At a Senate hearing, Armed Services Committee Chairman John McCain asked Director of National Intelligence James Clapper if he was optimistic that the agreement would result in the elimination of such attacks from China.

Clapper replied: “No.”

The agreement was not supposed to eliminate all cyberattacks, only state-sponsored ones that target businesses. Obama also said he told Xi that cyber threats from China have to stop.


The Office of Personnel Management recently was the victim of what the U.S. believes was a Chinese espionage operation that affected an estimated 21.5 million current and former federal employees or job applicants.

McCain, R-Ariz., said the Obama administration has not been aggressive enough in responding to cyberattacks or taking steps to effectively deter them.

“We are not winning the fight in cyberspace,” he said. “The problem is a lack of deterrence.”

Robert Work, deputy secretary of defense, acknowledged that the Defense Department needs to improve deterrence. “We do believe there are some things the department is doing that are working, but we need to improve in this area without question,” Work said.

Clapper said economic sanctions might be the best way to curb cyberattacks from China, which he said are “pretty pervasive.”

“I think there is a question about the extent to which the (Chinese) government actually orchestrates all of it or not,” he said.

Clapper added that when discussing penalties, policymakers also must remember that the U.S. conducts cyber spying, too.

“We, too, practice cyber espionage and in a public forum, I’m not going to say how successful we are, but we’re not bad,” Clapper said. “I think it’s a good idea to at least think about the old saw about people in glass houses should not throw rocks.”

U.S. Has Pulled Intelligence Officers Out of China Following OPM Data Breach

Ellen Nakashima and Adam Goldman
September 30, 20154

CIA pulled officers from Beijing after breach of federal personnel records

The CIA pulled a number of officers from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing as a precautionary measure in the wake of the massive cybertheft of the personal data of federal employees, current and former U.S. officials said.

The move is a concrete impact of the breach, one of two major hacks into Office of Personnel Management computers that were disclosed earlier this year. Officials have privately attributed the hacks to the Chinese government.

The theft of documents has been characterized by senior U.S. officials as political espionage intended to identify spies and people who might be recruited as spies or blackmailed to provide useful information.

Because the OPM records contained the background checks of State Department employees, officials privately said the Chinese could have compared those records with the list of embassy personnel. Anybody not on that list could be a CIA officer.


The CIA’s move was meant to safeguard officers whose agency affiliation might be discovered as a result of the hack, said officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive matter.

The CIA declined to comment.

The disclosure comes as senior defense and intelligence officials on Tuesday tried — not always successfully — to explain to a committee of frustrated lawmakers their policy on deterring foreign governments, such as China, from carrying out cyber-intrusions.

Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr., testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, sought to make a distinction between the OPM hacks and cybertheft of U.S. companies’ secrets to benefit another country’s industry. What happened in OPM case, “as egregious as it was,” Clapper said, was not an attack: “Rather, it would be a form of theft or espionage.”

And, he said, “We, too, practice cyberespionage and . . . we’re not bad at it.” He suggested that the United States would not be wise to seek to punish another country for something its own intelligence services do. “I think it’s a good idea to at least think about the old saw about people who live in glass houses shouldn’t throw rocks.”

That drew a sharp response from Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), the committee’s chairman. “So it’s okay for them to steal our secrets that are most important because we live in a glass house? That is astounding.”

Clapper protested that he did not say it was a good thing. “I’m just saying that both nations engage in this,” he said, referring to China and the United States.

Several lawmakers were not satisfied with the lack of a punishment for the OPM theft, despite Clapper’s explanation.

“This is a pretty significant issue that is going to impact millions of Americans,” said Sen. Kelly Ayotte (R-N.H.). “But it seems to me they are not seeing a response right now from us, and therefore we’re going to continue to see bad behavior from the Chinese.”

At another point in the hearing, Deputy Defense Secretary Robert O. Work seemed to stray off-message when he asked what response he would recommend if the Chinese were to carry off another OPM-like cybertheft.

“Sanctions? Retaliation?” asked Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-Alaska).

“Could be any of those, Senator. Maybe all of the above,” Work responded.

In fact, largely because of the concerns that Clapper outlined, it is unlikely that the administration would impose sanctions or retaliate overtly for the OPM intrusions.

During the Cold War, Sen. Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.) noted, a foreign agent who was nabbed trying to steal U.S. secrets would be kicked out of the country if he or she had diplomatic cover or thrown in jail otherwise.

In the OPM breach, he said, “the U.S. government seems uncertain about what a proportioned response would look like.”

The counterintelligence risks of the OPM breach are significant, Clapper said. He noted that the intelligence agencies do not know specifically whose records were taken. But the scale of the compromise — more than 22 million individuals’ records breached — “has very serious implications . . . from the standpoint of the intelligence community and the potential for identifying people” who may be undercover.

“Unfortunately,” he said, “this is a gift that’s going to keep on giving for years.”

Thursday, 1 October 2015

China Detains 2 Japanese Suspected of Spying

October 01, 2015

Japan announced on Wednesday that two of its citizens have been detained in China, and Beijing confirmed media reports saying the two Japanese citizens were suspected of being spies.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said on Wednesday that two Japanese nationals were detained by Chinese authorities in May. The two citizens, both men in their 50s, according to Suga, were being held in Zhejiang and Liaoning provinces respectively. Suga said that neither man was a Japanese government official, but were both from the private sector. He denied that Japan sends spies to China (or any other country, for that matter).

“Absolutely, our country hasn’t done such a thing,” Suga said, according to Kyodo News Agency.

Meanwhile, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei briefly addressed the report in a regular press conference. “Relevant authorities of China arrested in accordance with the law two Japanese on suspicion of acting as spies in China,” Hong said. “The Japanese side has been informed of that.”


An unnamed “high-ranking Japanese official” told Kyodo News that Japan decided to publicly announce the men’s plight because they had been held for so long – over five months. Other cases have been resolved far more quickly. In 2010, for example, four Japanese nationals were detained on suspicions of photographing a military base; all were released within three weeks.

“There are many cases of detaining [Japanese nationals in China]. But the two have been held for very long,” the official told Kyodo.

The announcement comes as China and Japan continue to try to right their bilateral relationship after years of tensions over historical issues and a territorial dispute. After an ice-breaking meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Chinese President Xi Jinping in November, the two sides have been restarting political and economic talks. A trilateral summit, including Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean leaders, is planned for late October or early November.

The detentions are putting a damper on ties. One official told Kyodo that China’s accusations of espionage were only an “excuse” to detain the men. He didn’t speculate as to what the ‘real’ motive might be.

Kyodo, citing unnamed sources familiar with China-Japan relations, said that one of the men had been detained near a military facility in Zhejiang. The other man was detained in Dandong, Liaoning, close to the China-North Korea border. Both are sensitive areas.

Chinese media previously reported that “fake tourists” were spying on China’s military bases. “Fake companies or sight-seeing tours are often used as pretexts by outside entities to approach sensitive Chinese facilities for the purpose of gathering military secrets,” an officer told China Daily. China passed a law in 2014 to strengthen PLA control over military restricted zones.

Meanwhile, China has arrested several foreigners near the China-North Korea border since 2014, including two Canadians who were detained on suspicion of stealing state secrets and a Korean-American missionary.













It's Official: China, Not Japan, Is Building Indonesia's First High-Speed Railway

October 01, 2015

After months of speculation, Indonesia has chosen China over Japan for a lucrative high-speed rail contract. The high-speed rail line, estimated to cost from $5-6 billion, will connect Jakarta and Bandung, the capital of West Java province. It will be Indonesia’s first high-speed railway.

Japan and China have been vying for the contract since Indonesia announced that China submitted a bid in April 2015, much to Japan’s dismay. Things took a strange turn in early September, however, when Indonesia scrapped the idea altogether. Minister Rizal Ramli said Jakarta had decided not to request a high-speed train at all, but a “medium-speed” one that allows for more stops along the route.

Ramli also said that the Indonesian government did not want to use any state funds for the project. According to Bloomberg, Japan’s bid was based on getting funding from Indonesia’s government and a low-interest loan offered by Japan; China offered to provide a loan and have Indonesian state-owned firms provide the remainder of the costs.


In the end, it appears it was the financing question that decided the issue in China’s favor. Indonesia’s National Development Planning Minister Sofyan Djalil told Japan’s chief cabinet secretary, Yoshihide Suga, that Indonesia’s wish to see the project completed under a business-to-business model (without any guarantee of funding from the state) precluded Japanese involvement. Japanese companies would not be able to meet that requirement.

“Japan’s business model and regulations have made it impossible [for Indonesia] to give a concession credit to Japanese companies,” Sofyan said, according to Indonesian media.

China, meanwhile, submitted a new proposal – still for a high-speed train – that would not require a funding guarantee from Jakarta. That proposal was accepted, winning China the contract. An Indonesian minister told the Wall Street Journal that a Chinese team is already in Jakarta and will break ground on the project by the end of the year. The railway is scheduled to begin operating in 2019.

China’s proposal, at an estimated $5.5 billion, was also significantly cheaper than Japan’s $6.2 billion bid.

China welcomed Indonesia’s choice, which meshes well both with Beijing’s call for Chinese companies to “go global” and for increased infrastructure investments from China along the planned “Belt and Road routes.”

“The Chinese side has a wealth of experience in building and operating high-speed railways and enjoys an edge in terms of cooperation model, financing conditions, technology transfer and construction period,” Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei explained in a press conference on Wednesday. “The Chinese side looks forward to deepening practical cooperation with Indonesia on infrastructure facilities and production capacity.”

Japan, predictably, was disappointed with the decision. Suga called the choice “extremely regrettable,” and cast doubt on the feasibility of completing the project as designed, on a purely business-to business level.

“It defies common wisdom” to undertake such a massive project without government funding, Suga said. “I doubt if it would be successful.”

Indonesia, meanwhile, sought to reassure Japan that its investments were still welcome on other projects. Sofyan told Suga that Indonesia would still welcome Japanese cooperation in building the Cilamaya port in West Java. Indonesia’s presidential chief of staff, Teten Masduki, also told reporters that Japan could still invest in another high-speed rail project linking Jakarta and the capital of East Java, Surabaya.













What US Experts Get Wrong About Economic Espionage

September 30, 2015

In reporting on the recent agreement between China and the United States not to undertake commercial espionage against each other, many leading commentators, such as those at the Washington Postand in Council on Foreign Relations blog, have referred to this as an agreement not to undertake economic intelligence collection. It is not.

The CFR blog went so far as to claim imminent global application of a norm against economic espionage. There is no international legal norm of any kind against economic cyber espionage if the act is confined to merely collecting of information. There are international legal agreements that apply penalties or redress options for unauthorized commercial applications of intellectual property (often called industrial espionage).

And there are norms against disturbing the peaceful domestic order of a sovereign state but no state interprets this to prohibit, in international legal terms, covert espionage where the domestic disorder that results is confined only to the theft of the information and unauthorised access to buildings or networks.


As noted in my recent commentary in The Diplomat, it is declared U.S. policy to undertake economic intelligence collection against other countries, especially when it relates to their science and technology (S&T) capabilities and advanced industrial designs.

This can be contrasted with “commercial intelligence,” defined by the White House last week, as intelligence collected “with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.” This differs from economic espionage, which most states undertake to protect and advance national economic interests. But the distinction may not be so black and white.

In the case of the United States, one purpose of S&T intelligence (which includes obtaining the design secrets of foreign governments and companies) is to “to provide a comprehensive picture of global scientific and technological advancements.” This is laid out in the 2013 Report of the National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community, Unclassified Version. This report on U.S. S&T intelligence (S&TI) called out the high priority to be attached to this:


Failure to properly resource and use our own R&D to appraise, exploit, and counter the scientific and technical developments of our adversaries—including both state and non-state actors—may have more immediate and catastrophic consequences than failure in any other field of intelligence.

The report opens with the statement that “the global spread of scientific and technical knowledge challenges U.S. national security.” The United States officially acknowledges that it pursues S&TI to “counter” the scientific advances of other countries. Since the main S&T research efforts are in private hands in the United States, then it is inevitable that the government would have to pass S&T intelligence to them so that they could counter the foreign advances.

Additional research today throws more light on the scale of this practice. In a report by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence on industry partnerships, “Industry Snapshot: Summary of Partner Responses to the Fy2015-2019 IC S&T Investment Landscape,” the intelligence community observed that some 10,000 “cleared companies” are its potential partners in collecting foreign industry-related intelligence. While this report relates only to technologies relevant to the intelligence community, this covers a vast field not only in collection methodologies but also in content-related exchange of information on strategic technologies.

So in economic espionage by one state against another, there are really few holds barred.

Key U.S. documents repeatedly refer to foreign technologies as a potential threat to the country’s strategic pre-eminence. They can be a threat, but it may be time for the United States to contemplate whether it can make a re-assessment on that front against the certainty that “knowledge has no flag.”













US CIA's Operations in China Take a Step Back in Wake of OPM Breach

October 01, 2015

Yesterday, the Washington Post reported that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has pulled its officers from the U.S. embassy in Beijing. The move was undertaken by the agency a “precautionary measure,” the report notes, to avoid any possible retaliation against these officers in the wake of data acquired by Chinese hackers in a breach of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM).

The OPM breach, announced earlier this year, resulted in the theft of over 20 million records, includingfingerprints and SF-86 security clearance forms. The source of the hack has been widely attributed to the Chinese government, though the United States has not officially said so.

The CIA’s move is necessary to protect officers who may be discovered by a simple cross-referencing of the State Department records obtained in the OPM breach against declared U.S. Embassy personnel records in Beijing. “Anybody not on that [State Department] list could be a CIA officer,” the Post report notes.


Over the summer, Michael Hayden, a former head of both the U.S. National Security Agency and CIA, noted that the data stolen in the OPM breach could be of immense counter-intelligence value to China. Hayden speculated that China could use the information to recruit spies. Hayden—and others—have described the OPM data as a “legitimate foreign intelligence target” for Chinese hackers to pursue, and clearly, the breach is proving to have deleterious consequences for U.S. human intelligence capabilities inside China.

The United States and China, at the conclusion of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s inaugural state visit, agreed to refrain from attacking each other’s critical infrastructure with cyber attacks and to not “conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property.” U.S. officials note that the OPM breach, as disastrous as it is for U.S. national security, was not a cyber attack per se. James Clapper, the U.S. director of national intelligence, described the OPM breach as a “form of theft or espionage.”

The U.S. and China have disagreed in the past on the acceptable limits on legitimate state-sponsored espionage. The United States, though it notes the legitimate value of espionage against state targets, has suggested that espionage against private entities and the theft of intellectual property in particular should be ”out of bounds.”

The United States most frequently accuses China of the latter—indeed, reports leading up to Xi’s visit that Washington would impose sanctions against Chinese individual and entities were primarily concerned with that sort of cyber espionage.

The OPM breach, however, is a reminder that China also practices good old fashioned cyber-enabled espionage against state targets. Clapper, during a testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, highlighted the difficulties in retaliating against China for this sort of behavior: “We, too, practice cyberespionage and … we’re not bad at it,” he noted.

Clapper may be right that the United States isn’t bad at espionage, but it needs to get better at keeping its own information secure. China is getting better at the world’s second oldest profession at an alarming pace.













The Trillion-Dollar Question: Who Will Control the South China Sea?

September 29, 2015

Recent developments in the South China Sea have lumbered U.S. strategic planners with a number of pressing quandaries. Should the United States send warships through sea lanes claimed by China as territorial waters? How can Washington signal resolve and reassurance to its allies in the region without unduly antagonizing China’s political and military leaders? What is the right mix of diplomacy, military, and political engagement?

These short-term decisions will rightly preoccupy teams of Washington-based Asia hands for months and, perhaps, years to come. But focusing on the short term alone risks obscuring the true nature of the strategic problem facing the United States. Properly understood, the future of the South China Sea is a long-term geopolitical question of perhaps unparalleled significance in East Asia. Policy should not be made in response to short-term exigencies but rather with long-term strategic objectives in mind. In turn, this means a full and frank understanding of what exactly is at stake in the South China Sea.


Robert Kaplan has argued that control of the South China Sea is as central to Asian geopolitics as the Mediterranean Sea has been to Europe and the Caribbean Sea is to the Americas. The point of Kaplan’s comparison, of course, is to suggest that the question of “who governs” from the Taiwan Strait to the Strait of Malacca be taken very seriously. For if any single power can claim mastery over this vast oceanic expanse then that power would wield enormous leverage over its potential competitors: strategic, military, and economic.

At the moment, the United States Navy certainly has a commanding presence in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific more generally, but it falls far short of complete control. The U.S. has precious little influence, in fact, when it comes to dictating how China and the various other littoral states will go about settling their territorial disputes. Moreover, America’s relative power would appear to be waning (at least vis-à-vis China). So what should America’s long-term policy be? Which power, or group of powers, should the U.S. throw its weight behind? And what kind of future should U.S. policy be ordered towards bringing into fruition?

When it comes to answering these questions, Kaplan’s comparison with the Mediterranean and the Caribbean can only help so much. Certainly, the comparisons offer nothing by way of policies that the U.S. might emulate. Take the Mediterranean, for example. Since at least the Battle of Trafalgar (1805) onwards, one naval power has always been able to establish and maintain control of the sea. First, it was the British who were in command, London’s control underpinned by the size and strength of the Royal Navy and the effective stewardship of the Strait of Gibraltar and (from 1882) the Suez Canal.

Britain, of course, was went to great lengths to maintain this naval primacy. It took colonies in Malta and Cyprus, for example, and fought the brutal Crimean War against Russia in order to prevent the Dardanelles and Bosphorus from falling into hostile hands. It is not that Britain never faced challenges to its primacy, then—it most certainly did—but by maintaining a sizable fleet and being active in diplomatic coalition-building (and coalition-breaking), Britain proved willing to pay the price of maintaining maritime dominance. And by and large, this investment in maritime supremacy paid off: British mastery of the Mediterranean was critical to maintaining British influence on the continent—allowing Britain to fulfill the function of “off-shore balancer,” for example—and would later prove decisive in both World War I and World War II.

After World War II, it was the United States Navy that moved to assert control in the Mediterranean, its massive Sixth Fleet intended to deter Soviet aggression and maintain peace and stability in the wider region. With Britain in terminal decline and communism seemingly on the march in the Eastern Mediterranean (particularly Greece and perhaps Turkey), President Truman even promulgated his famous “Truman Doctrine” to declare that the U.S. would defeat communism expansionism wherever it might occur—but especially in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Eisenhower Doctrine to bolster anti-communist regimes in the Middle East can also be considered as a geostrategic move to bolster U.S. control of the same region.

But the U.S. in Asia cannot replicate either Britain’s or its own history of controlling the Mediterranean. For all its naval power, the U.S. nevertheless lacks a strategic asset in the South China Sea of the same caliber as Gibraltar, Malta or Cyprus; it does not control the Malacca Strait or Taiwan Strait as Britain could credibly control Suez and Gibraltar. And whereas Britain fought and won (and America threatened to fight) wars to prevent rival powers from muscling in on the Mediterranean, China is already building island bases of its own in the South China Seaaltering, in fact, the very geography of the sea in order to make Beijing the primary power in the region. Unless America wants to fight a Crimean War of its own, China will not be stopped.

Nor has the U.S. cultivated the kind of ties with China that would allow Washington to happily cede influence to Beijing in the way that Britain ultimately relinquished maritime influence to the United States (first in the Caribbean and later in the Mediterranean). Britain and the U.S. were of a like mind when it came to governing the maritime commons, something decision-makers in London could be fairly sure of. By contrast, Chinese intentions are the subject of heated debate in the contemporary United States. For better or worse, conciliating China over the South China Sea would look like appeasement at home and abroad—it would antagonize America’s allies, embolden China, and cause great embarrassment in domestic politics.

The model that the United States seems to be being followed is Britain’s pivot to the Mediterranean in the 1890s and early 1900s, when Royal Navy squadrons were redeployed from the Caribbean and East Asia in order to counter the Franco-Russian rapprochement in European waters and later Germany’s growing naval might. This rebalance—essentially a move to prevent the balance of power in Europe from being upended—succeeded in extended British naval hegemony in European waters for several decades, and could be considered an early prototype of the Obama administration’s own “pivot” to Asia.

But Britain was only able to undertake its strategic rebalance to the Mediterranean (and North Sea) in tandem with strategic retrenchment elsewhere. In turn, this was only possible because the U.S. and Japan were only too eager to pick up the slack in the Western Hemisphere and East Asia: the United States Navy kept a watchful eye on the Caribbean, South America and the all-important Panama Canal, while Japan took on the burden of balancing against Russian (and later German) naval forces in the Asia-Pacific. Today, who can the United States rely upon to contribute to policing the global maritime system? Which friendly nation will maintain a serious naval presence in, say, the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf while the United States pivots to East Asia?

Overall, then, Kaplan might be right that the South China Sea is to Asia what the Mediterranean is to Europe and the Caribbean is to the Americas, but the comparisons only achieve so much. Very few lessons can be gleaned from the British and U.S. experience of maintaining naval supremacy in Europe and the Western Hemisphere. A new approach to maritime order-building will be required, one that recognizes the strategic centrality of the South China Sea to Asian geopolitics but which is also commensurate with the current state of U.S. influence in the region.

It remains to be seen whether U.S. policy will take the form of a grand bargain with China—of the sort advocated (albeit to varying extents) by Hugh White, Lyle Goldstein, Charles Glaser, and indeed Kaplan himself—or whether it will involve a military showdown similar to how Eisenhower and Clinton sought to “resolve” the Taiwan Strait Crises (1954-1955, 1958 and 1995-1996), although the former certainly looks more likely than the latter given recent improvements to Chinese naval and coastal defenses. An alternative model, of course, might be to encourage multilateral governance of the space, although it is doubtful that China would accede to such a solution—or that it would stand the tests of time and geopolitical rough and tumble.

The Obama administration often has been criticized for lacking long-term strategic vision when it comes to foreign policy, but this accusation has always been at its weakest when applied to Asia. Indeed, if there is one region of the world for which the Obama team has articulated a “grand strategy” then Asia would be it; the rebalance and the upgrading of U.S. political and military ties in the region can be considered a major strategy of embedding America’s presence in East Asia and, ultimately, forestalling some of the more worrying possible implications of China’s rise.

So far, however, the pivot to Asia has not produced a clear enunciation of U.S. objectives regarding the South China Sea. The administration would do well to put such a plan in place, and articulate it to friends and potential foes alike. Simply responding to short-term diplomatic crises and provocations—although necessary—is no substitute for a proper long-term design, and may in fact undermine whatever strategic goals the U.S. might want to put in place. It will be a political challenge of epic proportions to turn the South China Sea into a reliable anchor of security in East Asia and not a cause of conflict, but Washington should not lose sight of that as an objective.

Peter Harris is an assistant professor of political science at Colorado State University. You can follow him on Twitter: @ipeterharris.













The South China Sea Showdown: 5 Dangerous Myths

September 29, 2015

Myths about the South China Sea and related U.S.-China strategic interaction have been multiplying in Washington like fruit flies of late. There is the curious notion that China’s recent actions in the South China Sea portend a spasm of aggression spanning East Asia, spilling into the Indian Ocean and then through the Middle East, Africa and beyond. Almost as fanciful is the idea that Beijing is about to erect figurative toll barriers around the South China Sea, only admitting the ships of nations that agree to perform the infamous 磕头[kowtow]. Presumably, naval vessels requesting admittance would require either multiple prostrations or at least some very fat 红包 [red envelopes].

Some delirious neo-liberals may have actually thought that Beijing would go along with, or at least not react negatively to the decision of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Seas regarding the Philippines arbitration. Another all-too common analytical blunder has been the belief that China’s recent economic “hiccup” will cause it to soften its approach toward the South China Sea. Also comical is the now fashionable notion that U.S. aircraft or vessels patrolling ever closer to China’s reclamation projects would finally bring the Dragon to heel. All “Dragon Tamers” of the increasingly similar neo-liberal or neo-conservative stripe may cease reading at this point, but fellow realists are invited to press on to consider five really dangerous misconceptions regarding the evolving South China Sea cauldron.



According to Administration critics, this episode was one of the Administration’s most significant blunders, giving Beijing a “green light” to push hard against various maritime claimants such as the Philippines. It is actually true that Chinese strategists have studied this case and attempted to draw sweeping conclusions for Chinese maritime strategy, including the delineation of a so-called “黄岩模式” [Scarborough Shoal model]. Is this a grave blow to U.S. national security? Or did Beijing succeed in adding another rock to it's not particularly impressive marine geology collection? Even if China can profitably exploit the marine resources in and around this new “prize” – a rather dubious proposition – they most certainly will spend more to protect it than they will gain from drilling next to it. President Eisenhower famously said that he would not take the U.S. to war over the shape of a helmet (during the Berlin Crisis). American leaders must make such grave decisions. It seems likely that Obama faced a somewhat analogous dilemma during the 2012 Scarborough Crisis and perhaps at other junctures as well. And like Eisenhower, Obama appears to have concluded that he should not take his country to war with another superpower over relatively trivial matters, such as fishing practices or offshore drilling rights. That wise decision was a message to all adventure-seekers in the South China Sea – not least those in Manila – that the U.S. has far more urgent matters to concern itself with.

Myth #2: China’s building projects in the Spratly’s amount to new “bases” and are extensive enough to alter the regional balance of power. 

Serious military strategists will find this supposition quite preposterous. In the age of precision strike, any and almost all fixed targets can be destroyed with ease, even by lesser militaries. Much has been made of Beijing’s new opportunity to fly surveillance aircraft, anti-submarine warfare aircraft and even fighter aircraft from the airstrips now being built. Supposedly, China could base small frigates, fast attack craft and even submarines at these new facilities, but that approach still seems far-fetched. Never mind that it would be nearly impossible to store a strategically significant amount of fuel and munitions on these reefs, but such forces would have little and more likely even negative war-fighting value since they would be so exposed to hostile fire. In other words, a squadron of Su-27s flying out of Fiery Cross Reef “base” would most likely be smoking wrecks within hours of the start of any South China Sea conflict. To this author’s reckoning, a facility can be termed a “base” when it has some prospect of playing a useful operational role during armed conflict. By that definition, these facilities are not bases, but rather outposts of a merely symbolic nature.

Myth #3: The U.S. must stand shoulder-to-shoulder with its treaty allies and partners on the issue of the South China Sea. 

Despite the good common sense that prevailed in the spring 2012 “crisis” as discussed above, the notion persists that U.S. national interests amount simply to the aggregate of interests of all allies and partners. Thus, as Beijing has often complained, Washington’s eagerness to please and to allay all concerns has created perverse incentives for allies and partners to press for maximalist positions within various disputes with the hope that Uncle Sam will have their backs if push comes to shove. In a risk/reward matrix, some Philippine nationalists could come to the seemingly far-fetched conclusion that it is really worth it for Manila to risk World War III in order to secure drilling rights on Reed Bank. The Philippines would likely suffer enormously in such a conflict, of course, and very few Americans would try to make a similar case. Indeed, the example shows how Philippine and American interests could logically go in quite separate directions. One might even say that Manila enters a zone of serious moral hazard in hoping that Washington would take such risks for the sake of just another oil patch. It turns out the major diplomatic error has been to give The Philippines the wrong-headed idea that the U.S. would actually entertain such grave risks. Alternatively, the alliance could be much strengthened if it remained grounded within the scope of common sense. That is to say that the U.S. defense commitment to the Philippines should be defensive in orientation and cover the main islands, including Palawan, Luzon, etc, but no ill-defined and unexplored “grey zone” claims. Why the U.S. should entertain any conflict, let alone major hostilities, with China over maritime disputes with U.S. “partner” Vietnam is completely mystifying.

Myth #4: The dynamic East Asian economy determines that the South China Sea is a “core” U.S. national security interest. 

One of the most common, but silliest ideas floating about on the South China Sea is that the area’s economic dynamism implies that the U.S. must maintain unchallenged military supremacy in these waters. Taken to a bizarre extreme, this logic even claims that the entire global trading system (the “rule-based order”) is under grave threat from Chinese actions in the South China Sea. In short, stand up to China or watch the global economy come crashing down. Good luck finding a credentialed economist or even a Wall Street analyst, who would agree with this assessment. What makes this line of argumentation so specious, of course, is that China has been the major driver for this region’s extraordinary economic dynamism. The argument that maritime trade (and with it the global economy) will crash if China gains additional strategic influence in the South China Sea is, at best, a 19th century anachronism in our collective discourse. At worst, it is simply foolish drivel that makes for fine-sounding political rhetoric. Washington would be better served taking a page from Beijing’s playbook and attempting to turn its own backyard into a dynamic force in the global economy. The U.S.-Cuba rapprochement is a hopeful start towards such a project.

Myth #5: If it comes to a fight in the end, the U,S, will “clean China’s clock.” Among all the myths outlined above, none is quite as dangerous as this one. 

If one believes in this highly uncertain notion, then it follows that there are few risks and little need for restraint. One need only parade some hardware about now and then – even daring to come up to within 500 meters of China’s built up outposts – and Beijing will surely stand down, overawed by Washington’s legendary military prowess. There are so many reasons to doubt the veracity of this conventional assessment (China’s anti-ship ballistic missile, a plethora of new classes of advanced supersonic cruise missiles, plentiful strike aircraft, surface combatants, submarines, sea mines, hardened bases, etc.) but the most basic reality of military strategy very simply holds that a “home game” is infinitely simpler than an “away game.” Chinese Navy unofficial spokesman Admiral Yin Zhuo (PLA Navy, ret.) made this point when he said recently: “如果未来中美发生冲突,可能就是在中国家门口打. 不客气的说, 在家门口打仗, 我们谁都不怕.” [If in the future, there is U.S.-China conflict, then it will likely take place on China’s doorstep. Speaking bluntly, fighting on our doorstep, we fear no one.] Other supposed advantages for the U.S., for example combat experience, also fade away for the most part when it is realized that counter-insurgency and anti-terrorist operations have little in common (and may indeed be at cross-purposes) with high intensity air-sea operations that would be at the heart of any hypothetical U.S.-China war. This is not defeatism, but rather a clear-eyed understanding that a U.S.-China war is absolutely not a “cake walk” for American forces and really nobody knows for sure how such a conflict would end.

Not surprisingly, there has been little appetite on the campaign trail to talk sensibly about the South China Sea or U.S.-China relations. Don’t expect much from Hillary Clinton in the way of presenting creative diplomatic solutions to the Gordian Knot of the South China Sea, since one of her main legacies as Secretary of State seems to have been a dramatic increase in tensions in the South China Sea and elsewhere along China’s periphery after she focused on the issue in mid-2010. Interestingly, Donald Trump seems to have offered one of the most sensible comments on the issue recently, as summarized in theEconomist:

Shooting wars appeal less. Asked about China building runways on reclaimed land in the South China Sea, he calls it a hostile move. “However, it is very far away, and we have a lot of problems, OK? And they are already built.”

In other words, he seemed to be saying that these moves are objectionable, but hardly a ‘big deal’ given other pressing issues. Maybe part of Trump’s appeal is his pragmatism and refusal to buy into neo-conservative and neo-liberal orthodoxies.

Lyle J. Goldstein is Associate Professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, RI. The opinions expressed in this analysis are his own and do not represent the official assessments of the U.S. Navy or any other agency of the U.S. Government.