The Master Plan to Crush America in a War: Attack the Supply Chain?

James Hasik

September 30, 2015

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Defense Secretary Ashton Carter would like to stop buying and launching navigation satellites—at least as a military project. Sure, Lockheed is testing GPS III, and a team at the University of Texas is working on centimetric accuracy without differential. Through the MEOSAR project, the Canadian military will even use the new satellites to update the Cospas-SARSat system for geolocating search-and-rescue beacons. But GPS is looking more vulnerable to spoofing than we previously figured. So during a podcast hosted by venture firm Andreesen Horowitz in April, Carter argued that future forces would want their navigation on micro-electromechanical chips with inertials and precision clocks. Even just by reducing the need for constant updates from above, that sort of technology could improve the systemic defensibility of satellite navigation. 

At the same time, Carter pretty much wants to wrap electronics around everything, proliferating precision and combat-networking down to every Iron Man suit in the force. But does that make navigation and communication and everything else more or less secure? Note the contrast with the US Office of Personnel Management—after losing all the data, new management decided that all new security clearance work would be done with pens-on-paper. I can guarantee that the Chinese can’t hack my slide rule or my notebook, and to follow Patrick Tucker's recent advice, anything more “could get you killed”. So which is it?

There’s a long litany of scary stories to take for inspiration. Recall that opening scene of Tom Clancy’s Red Storm Rising (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1986), in which saboteurs destroy a Soviet petroleum facility by hay-wiring the control center. Think about the possibly less fictional story, from former Air Force Secretary Tom Reed, about how the US did that to a Soviet gas pipeline in 1982 by booby-trapping the control software the KGB was stealing. Or forego the stories, and just think about the havoc Stuxworm wrought on a uranium enrichment plant. Or how those two characters hacked into a moving Jeep Cherokee back in July. It’s enough to make you want to throw away your smartphone, and grab some paper maps and ledgers.

Adversaries with long view might thus be well advised to aim upstream, in part because the new Western war of war is so predicated upon protection. Fighting in southwest Asia has been greatly constrained with judicious rules of engagement. Profound concern for collateral damage has almost returned the micromanagement of the Johnson Administration in southeast Asia. With 98 percent of JDAMs and Brimstones hitting their targets, the statistical noise of occasional guidance failures rises to flag officer attention. But as bad as the Hanoi Hilton was, when allied aviators go down now, they get torched in a cage. One side here is playing total war, but the other isn’t and shouldn’t.

That means that a savvy adversary could try to muck with that kill chain by invading Boeing or MBDA’s supply chain. There are plenty of entry points—physical attacks against plant and personnel, cyber attacks against production equipment, or corrupting the operating software of the weapons themselves. With the JDAM and Brimstone lines working at full burn, interruptions could propagate quickly. What then, if the Coalition air forces could only use unguided bombs? Or even just laser-guided bombs? Either the rules of engagement would need to change—with a concomitant surrender of that moral high ground—or the adversary would gain sanctuary in time and space.

Safeguarding the global commons of the 21st century is a big job. Just safeguarding Mount Sinjar or lifting the Siege of Kobanî can seem a harder job, if you’re trying to do it entirely from the air. Pondering how long Volkswagen’s bogus engine control software escaped regulatory gaze can lead to a certain queasiness about the potential distribution of zero-day exploits. These sorts of problems aren’t going to get easier, and realistically assessing the threats is challenging. But it’s probably time again to consider the robustness that comes with multiple weapons, multiple sources, backup production sites, backup operating modes, and all sorts of Pearl Harbor file manual interventions for shaking off the unexpected. 

James Hasík is a senior fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security (where this first appeared), and co-author of Precision Revolution: GPS and the Future of Aerial Warfare (Naval Institute Press, 2002). He thanks David Foster of Naval Air Systems Command for insights which led to this essay.

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President Obama Will Veto Defense Policy Bill

Staff Report

September 30, 2015

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WASHINGTON — In a dispute with Republicans over how defense would be funded, President Obama plans to veto the 2016 defense policy bill due for a vote in the House on Thursday, a White House spokesman told reporters Wednesday.

All but one conference committee Democrat refused to sign the conference report, which reflects a compromise months in the making between House and Senate armed services committees conferees over differences between their two versions of the bill.

Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John McCain, R-Ariz., and House Armed Services Chairman Mac Thornberry, R-Texas, with the ranking Democrats of each committee — Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., and Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash. — announced the report was finalized at a cordial Capitol Hill press conference late Tuesday afternoon. Reed and Smith collaborated with Republicans on the measure, but said they could not support it.

Republicans have sought to meet Obama’s military budget request through the use of the wartime overseas contingency operations (OCO) account, which is exempt from sequestration budget caps, and which is part of the bill. Smith said this creates a disincentive to reach a deal on the federal budget that removes the caps.

“The lingering problem … is the OCO funding,” said Smith. “The budget caps are still in place. I agree that this is an appropriations issue, but it’s in our bill.”

The bill does not appropriate funding, but sets policy, creating authorization to spend money on a wide range of acquisition programs across the services. The bill also contains measures meant to provide lethal aid to Ukraine, ban torture, keep open the Guantanamo Bay detention facility, reform troop pay and benefits and overhaul acquisition rules.

After White House spokesman Josh Earnest said Wednesday Obama would veto the bill, Thornberry and McCain released statements blasting the president.

"It is unbelievable to me that an American president would threaten to veto a defense bill that supports our troops and gives him additional tools to use against aggressors, especially at a time when the world situation is spiraling out of control from Eastern Europe to the Middle East and South Asia," Thornberry said. "This is a time to stand together for our nation’s security, rather than play cheap political games."

McCain accused the White House of putting "politics ahead of process," and as in the past, said the veto was ill-conceived. "It does not spend a dollar, and it certainly cannot raise the budget caps or deliver an agreement to fund the government," McCain said in the statement. "It is absurd to veto the NDAA for something that the NDAA cannot do."

Defense Secretary Ash Carter recommended the president veto the bill and he reiterated his objection to the bill over its “attempts to evade responsibility with the so-called OCO gimmick” during a Pentagon press conference on Wednesday.

Should the president veto the bill, what will happen to its substance is unclear. Senior aides for the House and Senate armed services committees acknowledged there were no plans at the staff level on how to deal with a veto.

In the event of a budget agreement that raises the top line, on the other hand, the bill contains language that would allow OCO funding to be moved into the base.

The conference report authorizes $515 billion in base funding, including $496 billion for the Department of Defense and $19 billion for national security programs outside the Pentagon’s purview. In line with the Senate budget resolution, the agreement authorizes $89 billion in OCO funding, $38 billion of which is made up of operations and maintenance funds that support readiness and troop training.

Air Force 

For the Air Force, lawmakers reduced cash for F-35 joint strike fighter procurement by nearly $100 million over concerns surrounding combat capability. Lawmakers limited funds to buy the service’s F-35As to $4.3 billion until the secretary of defense can certify to congressional defense committees that the 13 planes planned in fiscal 18 will have full combat capability, including the latest Block 3F hardware, software and weapons carriage.

Responding to the controversy surrounding the Air Force’s plan to transition its A-10 close-air support aircraft to backup flying status, lawmakers prohibited the service from moving more than 18 A-10s from the active component. The bill's language also bans the Air Force from using funds to retire any A-10s, EC-130H Compass Call aircraft, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System planes or KC-10 tankers.

Also notable, lawmakers slashed funding for the Air Force’s Long Range Strike Bomber program by $460 million due to an over six-month delay in the contract award. The bill also decreases funds for the beleaguered KC-46 tanker recapitalization program by $200 million.

Navy/Marine Corps

Perhaps the most significant plus-up for the Navy is the addition of unrequested 12 F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet strike fighters, plus another six F-35B joint strike fighters for the Marines. The additional Super Hornets mean the Boeing/Northrop Grumman production line is likely to remain open another year.

Authorizers approved the full shipbuilding request and also provided the authority to purchase an additional Arleigh Burke-class destroyer.

The conference agreement also prevents the Navy from retiring any more cruisers or amphibious ships, only allowing the ships to be taken out of service for modernization or upgrades.

The agreement also supports the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF), an account set up by authorizers to pay for the ballistic missile submarine Ohio Replacement Program. According to Rep. Randy Forbes, R-Va., primary sponsor of the fund, additional authorities are being provided to the fund that would authorize incremental funding authority, economic order quantity, contract authority, advance construction authority and the transfer of unobligated funds into the account.

The conference report supports development of an unmanned carrier-based aircraft “able to perform a broad range of missions in non-permissive environments,” providing further support for an aircraft capable of long-range strike.

Army

The NDAA conference negotiators plussed-up the Army’s Stryker combat vehicle funding $411 million above the president’s budget request for lethality upgrades. While the House version of the bill would have increased Stryker funding by $79.5 million, conferees aligned with a Senate amendment that further increased the funding.

The conferees’ decision to upgrade 81 Stryker vehicles is based on a request from US Army Europe to field upgraded Strykers to the 2nd Cavalry Regiment as security concerns rise due to Russia’s continued incursions in Ukraine. The conferees, however, expressed concern over the unit cost of the upgrades and urged the service to find ways to reduce that cost.

The negotiators also fully funded procurement of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program and increased funding for AH-64 Apache attack helicopter survivability against new threats. The NDAA authorizes $26 million in additional funding for Common Missile Warning System enhancements for the helicopters as well as an additional $24 million to develop its future Common Infrared Countermeasure system. Another $60 million would fund Apache survivability development. The Army had designated the enhancements as unfunded requirements.

The negotiators settled on House bill language that would limit the transfer of certain Apache helicopters from the Army National Guard to the active component until June 30, 2016.

Both the House and Senate agreed in their versions of the bill that the Army should not be allowed to transfer Apaches beyond the 48 authorized in fiscal 2015 until after the National Commission on the Future of the Army issues its report by Feb. 1 next year.

The National Guard has fought to keep its Apaches since the Army first proposed the move as part of a larger plan to restructure its aviation assets. The Senate originally wanted to halt further transfers until six months after the commission’s report is sent to Congress.

Ukraine

The bill also contains $300 million over two years in aid for Ukraine under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, $50 million of which is specifically designated for “lethal aid.” The NDAA authorizes “lethal assistance of a defensive nature” by the US.

“The Conferees remain concerned that the President has not done enough to provide military training and assistance to Ukraine to allow it to defend itself and increase the costs to Russia for engaging in such aggressive behavior,” the conference summary states.

According to McCain, that aid could include anti-tank weapons, such as the shoulder-fired Javelin guided missile produced by a Raytheon and Lockheed Martin joint venture.

— Joe Gould, Lara Seligman, Chris Cavas, Jen Judson and Andrew Clevenger contributed to this report.

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Australia: Change at the Top

By Helen Clark

September 30, 2015

http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/australia-change-at-the-top/

Tony Abbott lost his job as Australian prime minister to Malcolm Turnbull in the fourth leadership “knifing” in a decade. Though media in Australia and worldwide reacted with shock, was it always inevitable? Abbott’s confusion and poor planning were responsible but so was his status as a figure of ridicule. It is his ridiculousness that people will remember most and it was that which often helped to drive down his ratings in opinion polls. Turnbull, the urbane millionaire, stands in contrast.

Before memes categorized and explained politics, people still kept track of George W. Bush’s varied and excitingly original aphorisms. Bushims, if you remember. How, so many in America and across the world asked, can this man be in charge of anything? The more cynical wondered whether the missteps and maladroit gargles were intentional: Distract the intelligentsia with a carnival of stupid and maybe they won’t notice what he’s really doing. They noticed both.

Comedian John Oliver’s sketch show Last Week Tonight profiled Tony Abbott with a gag reel of his gaffes and called him “President of the USA of Australia.” Despite his policy flip flops (“rhetorical consistency” according to Oliver), broken promises, a disastrous first budget, and questionable metadata laws that neither Abbott nor his attorney general could ever explain coherently, and despite tightening national security at the expense of freedom whilst repealing sections of the Racial Discrimination Act to promote freedom, it was Abbott’s “captain’s calls,” missteps, and strange behavior that many will remember him for. He even managed to insult the Irish on St Patrick’s Day, in a kind of digital Guinness Diplomacy gone wrong. Abbott went because he was incompetent but in the public mind it was also because he was ridiculous.

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US, Vietnam Eye Deeper Coast Guard Cooperation

By Prashanth Parameswaran

September 30, 2015

http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/us-eyes-deeper-coast-guard-cooperation-with-vietnam/

The head of the U.S. Coast Guard has expressed interest in deepening cooperation with Vietnam, local media outlets reported last week.

According to the People’s Army Newspaper, Admiral Paul Zukunft, the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, made the comment during a September 21 meeting with Lieutenant General Vo Van Tuan, the deputy chief of the general staff of the Vietnam People’s Army.

The areas reportedly being considered include information sharing, delegation exchanges, and training.

As I have noted before, the United States and Vietnam have been looking to strengthen their security relationship as the two sides commemorate the 20th anniversary of the normalization of their ties this year (See: “What’s Next for US-Vietnam Relations?”). In line with a 2011 memorandum of understanding, U.S.-Vietnam defense cooperation has been proceeding in five areas: high-level dialogues; maritime security; search and rescue; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and peacekeeping.

As part of this, the United States has been strengthening Vietnam’s coast guard, which has had to contend with several challenges, including Chinese vessels encroaching into the country’s waters. This has included not only training and curriculum development, but the provision of actual equipment. Most recently, as I pointed out in a previous piece, when U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter and his counterpart Phung Quang Thanh inked a Joint Vision Statement on Defense Relations in June, it was announced that Washington would provide $18 million to the Vietnamese Coast Guard to purchase American Metal Shark patrol vessels (See: “US, Vietnam Deepen Defense Ties”).

The news about U.S.-Vietnam coast guard cooperation also comes as Vietnam undertakes several domestic measures designed to boost its coast guard. Earlier this month, Hanoi introduced a new rule allowing coast guard forces to use weapons to chase away foreign vessels illegally entering the country’s waters. The rule, which will take effect on October 20, will allow coast guard vessels to pursue intruding boats until they are completely out of Vietnamese waters.

In late August, the Vietnamese and Indian coast guards jointly conducted a search and rescue drill in southern Vietnam in what defense officials said was a boost for the country’s capabilities. Hanoi has carried out similar exercises with other Asian partners as well, including Japan and South Korea.

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U.S. Criticizes EU Legal Finding That Facebook Passed Private Data to U.S. Intelligence Services

September 29, 2015

U.S. urges EU court not to scrap data pact, criticises adviser

The United States criticised an EU judicial opinion on Monday that called into question the Safe Harbour transatlantic data privacy system and Washington urged European judges to reach a different conclusion.

The U.S. mission to the European Union said an opinion last week by an adviser to the EU’s top court, backing an Austrian who alleged Facebook passed private data to U.S. security services, “rests on numerous inaccurate assertions about intelligence practices of the United States”.

The original case, brought in Ireland where Facebook and many U.S. tech firms have European headquarters, was partly based on revelations in 2013 by contractor Edward Snowden about U.S. intelligence agencies’ spying on global communications.

In a statement, the U.S. mission said it was concerned about damage to trade and privacy in Europe and the United States and so urged the Court of Justice, which usually follows its advocate general’s advice, to reach different conclusions when it finally rules on the case.

In a trenchant opinion that fuelled American concern about European hostility following a series of antitrust investigations and difficulties in trade negotiations, court adviser Yves Bot said the 15-year-old Safe Harbour agreement did not do enough to protect EU citizens’ private information when it reached the United States and should have been suspended.

But the U.S. mission said: “The United States does not and has not engaged in indiscriminate surveillance of anyone, including ordinary European citizens.”

It added that Bot, who concluded Ireland’s data protection agency was wrong to dismiss Schrems’s complaint on the grounds that the EU said U.S. privacy rules were adequate, did not take account of changes in U.S. policies and efforts by Washington and Brussels to strengthen protections under Safe Harbour.

“We hope that the final judgement of the European Court of Justice takes note of these efforts, inaccuracies in and far-reaching consequences of the Advocate General’s opinion, as well as the significant harm to the protection of individual rights and the free flow of information that would occur if it were to follow the Advocate General’s opinion,” the U.S. mission said.

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Cambodia and the Australian Asylum Seeker Deal

By Clothilde Le Coz

September 29, 2015

http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/cambodia-and-the-australian-asylum-seeker-deal/

Almost a year after it was signed by both governments, the controversial “refugee deal” between Cambodia and Australia resurfaced in late August when Reuters published an article reporting that Cambodia did not intend to accept any more refugees from Nauru. The article quoted a spokesperson for the Ministry of Interior saying that Cambodia could only accept “a limited amount” of refugees coming from Nauru. In fact, that news should hardly be surprising.

When both governments began to negotiate back in 2014, the Cambodian government was clear: Cambodia could only accept a “limited number of refugees.” According to the agreement signed last September, “[t]he number of Refugees settled, and the timing of their arrival into Cambodia under this MOU, will be subject to the consent of the Kingdom of Cambodia.” And although the Cambodian government backtracked from its first comment, it maintains that the fewer refugees it takes the better.

This, Sophal Ear says, “shows that money talks.” An associate professor of Diplomacy & World Affairs at the Occidental College of Los Angeles and the author of the book Aid Dependence in Cambodia: How Foreign Assistance Undermines Democracy, Ear argues that the 55 million dollars in aid money Cambodia will receive for the next four years in exchange was the only incentive for the Cambodian government to accept such a deal. He adds that bilateral deals “are always about getting something and giving something. […] The only hope here is that it’s public, unlike when China makes a deal. The money is public, but the details are not. […] It seems to me Cambodia has a lot of room, especially if it chooses to say no to anymore refugees and refuses to revise operational guidelines.”

Playing by Its Own Rules?

In Asia, bilateral agreements are accorded much greater significance than they are in many other regions. Dr. Markus Karbaum, an adviser for Southeast Asia at the Heinrich Böll Stiftung, explains that “most governments fear a loss in their national sovereignty when binding to multilateral agreements/organizations.” As such, Cambodia recently broadened its horizons for bilateral agreement as part of its struggle for self-assertion in the region. “Cambodia needs alternatives to its traditional partners China and Vietnam to gain flexibility in its foreign relations,” Karbaum says. To him, the “refugee deal” with Australia is part of this self-assertion strategy.

And since the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991, Cambodia also developed good skills in telling Western donors what they want to hear. Sebastian Strangio, journalist and the author of Hun Sen’s Cambodia, says that “Prime Minister Hun Sen and the Cambodian People’s Party have become experts at mirroring Western narratives of democratic progress and human rights. Too weak to openly resist the demands of foreign donor countries, they have instead simply learned to adapt—by saying all the right things, and then continuing to run the country in much the same way as before.” Based on past precedent, however, he said it would be no surprise if Cambodia walks out of the agreement, or if it comes unstuck in some other way.

Echoing his statement, David Chandler, an American historian and a fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities, notes that “it seems […] that Cambodia has pulled the wool over the Australians’ eyes by letting Australians think that a genuinely beneficial arrangement had been made. The Australians were I suspect hasty, trusting, and naive. […] I am sure [the text] had escape clauses which the Cambodians have now used.” Phil Robertson, the deputy director of the Asia division for the US-based NGO Human Rights Watch, added that “Australia is now getting what it paid for, Cambodia-style – which is to say, not much of anything,” arguing that “there is a huge implementation gap for almost every sort of government project in Cambodia and this refugee deal is no exception,” giving a bitter outcome to this diplomatic precedent.

While Cambodia is no exception to the relative respect of bilateral treaties worldwide, the notion of respect of the rule is another particularity to Cambodian diplomacy. Raoul-Marc Jennar, a Cambodia historian and political scientist explains that the singularity lies in the fact that “the rules governing relationships with other states are the same as the ones governing life in society. As long as there is no precise interest to justify them, there is a general lack of taking the other into account.” He also notes that there is little change from the 1960s diplomacy when the late King Norodom Sihanouk adopted the strategy “to make friends.” To Jennar, it also seems that all the decisions come directly from Phnom Penh, leaving only small room for Cambodian Ambassadors abroad to play a diplomatic role.

Or Solving a Domestic Issue? 

Australia signed an agreement it knew could be doomed. Opposition MP Richard Marles called it “an expensive joke” and Senator Hanson-Young also said the government has ignored the signs indicating that the agreement was a sham. To Sophal Ear, Australia is killing the chicken to scare the monkey. This Chinese idiom is used to refer to a tactic that makes an example as out someone or something to warn others. To him, Australia by showing refugees coming by boats what will happen to them, is trying to deter them to reach Australian shores.

But this only has a limited impact, Professor Carlyle Thayer tells The Diplomat. An emeritus professor at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, in Canberra, he states that the Australian strategy is “to tell refugees ‘you will not end up in Australia, but in another country’ to dissuade asylum seekers to come to Australia.” To him, the real political issue is a domestic problem. “Australia should still be able to control who is coming to the country. However, instead of putting more financial efforts into determining whether asylum seekers have a well-founded fear not to return home, Australia is actually evading the UN Convention.” And to Thayer, Cambodia is welcoming too few refugees for Australia to manage to dissuade asylum seekers.

Therefore, the recent Cambodian disruption of the Australian government strategy is rather a symbolic setback than a political one. Thayer also says he would have trouble understanding why Cambodia would accept asylum seekers. “Usually, they go for the money. What can you offer to a corrupt regime? But, this is also a delicate situation for Cambodia. If they accept asylum seekers from Nauru, why don’t they accept Montagnards or Uighurs? I do not believe that the Cambodia government has any genuine interest in accepting asylum seekers.”

And on September 11, almost a year after a few hundred Montagnards fled Vietnam to request asylum in Cambodia, the ministry of Interior stated that they would all be repatriated to Vietnam. There are now 200 awaiting their asylum application in Phnom Penh.

To Dr. Karbaum, Cambodia is now stuck in difficult situation for its image. “If the Cambodian government terminates the agreement without refunding Australia’s pledges, it runs the risk to ruin its reputation a bit more. I am sure that Prime Minister Hun Sen is fully aware of this obvious consequence and will undertake everything to avoid being perceived as an unreliable partner by other leaders.”

Clothilde Le Coz is an independent journalist based in Cambodia and covering social and technology topics.

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New Ambassador Holds Key to US-Thailand Relations

By Shawn W. Crispin

September 26, 2015

http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/new-ambassador-holds-key-to-us-thailand-relations/

New U.S. Ambassador to Thailand Glyn Davies arrived in Bangkok this week after the senior post remained vacant for nearly a year amid troubled times for bilateral ties. The seasoned envoy, a 35-year veteran in America’s diplomatic corps, will be tasked with steering relations in the wake of last year’s military takeover and rising perceptions that China has stolen a march through overtures towards Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha’s rights-curbing government.

Thai-U.S. ties are arguably at their lowest point in decades, crucially at a time when Washington is bidding to marshal regional support for its China-containing ‘pivot’ policy. Outgoing U.S. ambassador Kristie Kenney staked out a hard line against the coup, a position the State Department has maintained on democratic principle to the detriment of the wider strategic relationship. Kenney’s stance has so far outweighed the views of Thailand specialists in Washington who have called for a more nuanced approach to guard the United States’ considerable economic and strategic interests in the country.

Critical remarks made by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel at a Bangkok university in January saw Thailand’s Foreign Ministry reciprocally summon and upbraid charge d’ affaires W. Patrick Murphy. The diplomatic dressing down, reported widely in local media, was viewed as unprecedented for the long-time strategic allies. Murphy, a Myanmar specialist who has ably acted as the United States’ top envoy in Bangkok since Kenney’s departure in October, has maintained Washington’s drumbeat call for a speedy restoration of democracy and a reversal of curbs on rights and liberties.

Yet some Bangkok-based observers have sensed a softening of Kenney’s line under Murphy’s watch. While high-level strategic dialogue is still suspended, a September 1 meeting between U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) administer Charles Bolden and Science Minister Pichet Durongkaveroj aimed to resume bilateral cooperation. A NASA request in 2012 to conduct a regional climate study from Thailand’s U-Tapao air base was cancelled during the Yingluck Shinawatra government amid partisan accusations of possible ulterior motives involving her self-exiled former premier brother, Thaksin Shinawatra.

Reports at the time also speculated that China had weighed against the project on concerns that U.S. satellites, beyond measuring weather patterns, could be trained to spy on Chinese territory from Thai air space. U.S.-Thai intelligence sharing, ranked by a leaked National Security Agency document as among the U.S.’s top dozen or so partners in the world before the coup, has since been downgraded significantly, according to people familiar with the situation. That was apparent in Thailand’s refusal to accept offered U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation assistance in investigating the still unexplained bombing attack that killed 20 people in Bangkok on August 17.

Davies, a former special representative for North Korea policy and to the United Nations’ International Atomic Energy Agency, is widely respected in Washington for his diplomatic management of high-stakes political imbroglios. His appointment has signaled to some that the U.S. may give higher priority to the relationship, after dispatching a series of less distinguished and sometimes disinterested envoys. Many officials and analysts in Bangkok argue that former U.S. Ambassador to Thailand Ralph “Skip” Boyce, a fluent Thai speaker with top connections across the political spectrum, was the last top American diplomat to see clearly through the country’s complex, personality-driven politics.

Government advisors have bid to manufacture a soft-landing for Davies. Prior to his arrival in Bangkok, Davies received personal calls from Privy Councilors, royal advisors to King Bhumibol Adulyadej, welcoming his appointment, according to a source familiar with the communications. (In one of his first moves as ambassador, Davies on Friday visited the Grand Palace to pay respects and wish good health to the king.) That royal treatment contrasts with Kenney’s initial reception in 2010, where she was scolded by Privy Council President and long-time U.S. ally Prem Tinsulonanda for the leak of confidential U.S. cables, including one that detailed a meeting he and other royal advisors held with Boyce to discuss sensitivities around the royal succession. It’s unclear if that meeting, which Kenney later described to confidantes as among the toughest of her career, colored her diplomacy in favor of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and her family clan’s affiliated ‘Red Shirt’ pressure group.

If Davies aims to recalibrate relations towards more engagement to counter China’s post-coup advances, he will be hard-pressed to justify the policy U-turn. A military-appointed council’s rejection of a draft constitution on September 6 will further delay the junta’s roadmap to new elections from 2016 to 2017, undermining Prayut’s earlier pledge to quickly restore elected civilian rule. While vowing to institute “democratic” reforms, the military is simultaneously building a police state bent on ferreting out and squashing dissent. The recent three-day detention of journalist Pravit Rojanaphruk, where the outspoken scribe was blindfolded and held incommunicado by surgical mask-wearing plainclothes commandos, signaled a turn towards more hard-knuckled repression of critical voices.

Many fear that style of repression will intensify as the royal succession draws nearer amid mounting signs it may be contested by competing military, political and royalist camps. While the United States has publicly pushed for a rapid restoration of democracy, it has no doubt by now dawned on American policymakers that Prayut intends to stay in power until the succession is secure. While many in Bangkok call for stronger measures against Prayut’s assault on rights, including a new whisper campaign led by pro-Yingluck soldiers calling for an arms embargo, Davies will simultaneously need to counter perceptions in Washington that his predecessor’s style of diplomacy pushed Thailand towards China at a crucial strategic juncture. How Davies strikes that policy balance will go a long way in determining whether the United States is on the right or wrong side of Thailand’s post-succession history.

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Is Australia's New Prime Minster Bad News for Japan’s Submarine Bid?

By Ankit Panda

September 28, 2015

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The recent unexpected leadership shake-up in Australia raises several questions about how the country’s foreign affairs will be conducted under a new prime minister. After a leadership spill in the Liberal Party, Tony Abbott is out and Malcolm Turnbull is in. For Japan, whose Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. and Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd. are in the running for Australia’s largest-ever defense contract—to replace the $20 billion Collins-class submarine—the change will be a topic of great interest. The Japanese firms, manufacturers for the Soru-class diesel-electric attack submarines, are competing with Germany’s ThyssenKrupp AG and France’s Direction des Constructions et Armes Navales (DCNS) Group.

On first glance, it appears that Turnbull’s ascent to the helm of the Liberal Party and, consequently, the prime ministership, will not factor in Japan’s favor. Malcolm Cook has a helpful post over at the Lowy Institute’s blog in which he highlights the close personal rapport that Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister, and Tony Abbott had established over the past two years. Abe returned to power for a second term as prime minister, leading the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, in December 2012, and Abbott became prime minister in September 2013. Turnbull, of course, isn’t the only new figure to appear at the top of the Australian government — Abbott’s defense minister, Kevin Andrews, has been replaced as well, by Marise Payne, the first woman to hold the post.

Strategic bilateral ties between Australia and Japan were better than ever during the two years of Abbott’s prime ministership: the two countries concluded a free trade agreement (JAEPA) and consulted on security issues, both independently and trilaterally with the United States. Japan even participated in this year’sTalisman Saber U.S.-Australia military exercise, held in Australia.

Despite Abbott’s personal affinity for the Soryu and the option of working with Japan, domestic political factors led to the early 2015 announcement that the Collins-class replacement project would be open to a competitive international bidding process, with the possibility of constructing the new submarines in southern Australia. Incidentally, ahead of the announcement of the competitive bidding process, the Liberal Party held a leadership spill that ultimately failed to displace Abbott. Though the Collins project wasn’t a major cause of the leadership turmoil within the party, Abbott’s reframing of the issue was ultimately designed to assuage domestic constituents that the $20 billion defense deal wouldn’t lead to a hemorrhaging of jobs out of Australia. As Cook recounts, after the failed February spill motion, “the process for choosing submarines was hurriedly revised at a rushed news conference in Adelaide where the defense minister was surrounded by the Liberal members of parliament from South Australia, the self-named ‘Defense State.’”

It wouldn’t be a great surprise if Turnbull were more sensitive to domestic political factors than Abbott. Of course, this means that the Soryu could be in trouble. Recently, both members of the Liberal Party and the opposition Labor Party wrote the new prime minister to emphasize that the Collins-replacement must be built in Australia.

However, in a sign that may be encouraging for the future of bilateral Japan-Australia strategic ties (if not theSoryu bid in particular), Turnbull has kicked off his term as prime minister by citing China as one of the greatest security threats to the Asia-Pacific region. Turnbull additionally said that, in the South China Sea, “China would be better advised, in its own interest frankly, not to be pushing the envelope there.” The Abbott government continued the measured approach to China that had been laid by his predecessors. Turnbull hasn’t suggested a major strategic shift, but his comments didn’t go unnoticed in China; the Chinese foreign ministry described his remarks as “counter-productive” and suggested that Australia stick to its tried-and-tested approach of not taking sides on territorial disputes.

Beyond Australian politics, Japan isn’t doing itself any favors with the Soryu sale lately. As I’ve written before for The Diplomat, though the Soryu appeared to be a technical slam-dunk for Japan, outclassing its German and French competition on most counts in a spec sheet comparison, Japan still has a challenging task ahead of it. First, after emerging from decades where it did not sell offensive weapons to other states under a self-imposed weapons export ban, Tokyo’s sales savvy has been somewhat lacking. In a competitive bidding process, Tokyo’s French and German competitors, with more experience on the sales side of these sorts of deal, may be gaining an advantage. Second, the cost of the Soryus has become an issue lately. Coinciding with the leadership spill in Australia, reports emerged that several prominent former Japanese military personnel had cautioned Australia that the costs of the Soryu would balloon beyond current estimates. Many of these same officials questioned the ability of Australian shipyards to handle the construction of the Soryus.

Australia is expected to award a contract for Collins-class replacement project either by the end of this year or early in 2016. For Japan and Abe, seeing the contract awarded to Mitsubishi and Kawasaki would be a major coup as Tokyo moves toward becoming a normal participant in the global defense industry. But regardless of the Australian government’s decision, there is little reason to think that under Turnbull, Tokyo and Canberra will strategically diverge.

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New Ambassador Holds Key to US-Thailand Relations

By Shawn W. Crispin

September 26, 2015

http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/new-ambassador-holds-key-to-us-thailand-relations/

New U.S. Ambassador to Thailand Glyn Davies arrived in Bangkok this week after the senior post remained vacant for nearly a year amid troubled times for bilateral ties. The seasoned envoy, a 35-year veteran in America’s diplomatic corps, will be tasked with steering relations in the wake of last year’s military takeover and rising perceptions that China has stolen a march through overtures towards Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha’s rights-curbing government.

Thai-U.S. ties are arguably at their lowest point in decades, crucially at a time when Washington is bidding to marshal regional support for its China-containing ‘pivot’ policy. Outgoing U.S. ambassador Kristie Kenney staked out a hard line against the coup, a position the State Department has maintained on democratic principle to the detriment of the wider strategic relationship. Kenney’s stance has so far outweighed the views of Thailand specialists in Washington who have called for a more nuanced approach to guard the United States’ considerable economic and strategic interests in the country.

Critical remarks made by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel at a Bangkok university in January saw Thailand’s Foreign Ministry reciprocally summon and upbraid charge d’ affaires W. Patrick Murphy. The diplomatic dressing down, reported widely in local media, was viewed as unprecedented for the long-time strategic allies. Murphy, a Myanmar specialist who has ably acted as the United States’ top envoy in Bangkok since Kenney’s departure in October, has maintained Washington’s drumbeat call for a speedy restoration of democracy and a reversal of curbs on rights and liberties.

Yet some Bangkok-based observers have sensed a softening of Kenney’s line under Murphy’s watch. While high-level strategic dialogue is still suspended, a September 1 meeting between U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) administer Charles Bolden and Science Minister Pichet Durongkaveroj aimed to resume bilateral cooperation. A NASA request in 2012 to conduct a regional climate study from Thailand’s U-Tapao air base was cancelled during the Yingluck Shinawatra government amid partisan accusations of possible ulterior motives involving her self-exiled former premier brother, Thaksin Shinawatra.

Reports at the time also speculated that China had weighed against the project on concerns that U.S. satellites, beyond measuring weather patterns, could be trained to spy on Chinese territory from Thai air space. U.S.-Thai intelligence sharing, ranked by a leaked National Security Agency document as among the U.S.’s top dozen or so partners in the world before the coup, has since been downgraded significantly, according to people familiar with the situation. That was apparent in Thailand’s refusal to accept offered U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation assistance in investigating the still unexplained bombing attack that killed 20 people in Bangkok on August 17.

Davies, a former special representative for North Korea policy and to the United Nations’ International Atomic Energy Agency, is widely respected in Washington for his diplomatic management of high-stakes political imbroglios. His appointment has signaled to some that the U.S. may give higher priority to the relationship, after dispatching a series of less distinguished and sometimes disinterested envoys. Many officials and analysts in Bangkok argue that former U.S. Ambassador to Thailand Ralph “Skip” Boyce, a fluent Thai speaker with top connections across the political spectrum, was the last top American diplomat to see clearly through the country’s complex, personality-driven politics.

Government advisors have bid to manufacture a soft-landing for Davies. Prior to his arrival in Bangkok, Davies received personal calls from Privy Councilors, royal advisors to King Bhumibol Adulyadej, welcoming his appointment, according to a source familiar with the communications. (In one of his first moves as ambassador, Davies on Friday visited the Grand Palace to pay respects and wish good health to the king.) That royal treatment contrasts with Kenney’s initial reception in 2010, where she was scolded by Privy Council President and long-time U.S. ally Prem Tinsulonanda for the leak of confidential U.S. cables, including one that detailed a meeting he and other royal advisors held with Boyce to discuss sensitivities around the royal succession. It’s unclear if that meeting, which Kenney later described to confidantes as among the toughest of her career, colored her diplomacy in favor of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and her family clan’s affiliated ‘Red Shirt’ pressure group.

If Davies aims to recalibrate relations towards more engagement to counter China’s post-coup advances, he will be hard-pressed to justify the policy U-turn. A military-appointed council’s rejection of a draft constitution on September 6 will further delay the junta’s roadmap to new elections from 2016 to 2017, undermining Prayut’s earlier pledge to quickly restore elected civilian rule. While vowing to institute “democratic” reforms, the military is simultaneously building a police state bent on ferreting out and squashing dissent. The recent three-day detention of journalist Pravit Rojanaphruk, where the outspoken scribe was blindfolded and held incommunicado by surgical mask-wearing plainclothes commandos, signaled a turn towards more hard-knuckled repression of critical voices.

Many fear that style of repression will intensify as the royal succession draws nearer amid mounting signs it may be contested by competing military, political and royalist camps. While the United States has publicly pushed for a rapid restoration of democracy, it has no doubt by now dawned on American policymakers that Prayut intends to stay in power until the succession is secure. While many in Bangkok call for stronger measures against Prayut’s assault on rights, including a new whisper campaign led by pro-Yingluck soldiers calling for an arms embargo, Davies will simultaneously need to counter perceptions in Washington that his predecessor’s style of diplomacy pushed Thailand towards China at a crucial strategic juncture. How Davies strikes that policy balance will go a long way in determining whether the United States is on the right or wrong side of Thailand’s post-succession history.

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A Test of Obama’s Moral Leadership

WILLIAM A. GALSTON

Sept. 22, 2015

The U.S. presidency, Franklin Roosevelt said, is “pre-eminently a place of moral leadership.” There is every reason to believe that President Obama agrees. He now faces a moment in which he will either meet or fail that test.

The flood of refugees battering Europe is a humanitarian crisis. But more than that, it is a moral disaster, and not just for Europe. I won’t soon forget the images of Hungarians and others treating helpless families as less than human. Listening to Hungary’s prime minister, one wonders how much—if anything—the forces he represents have learned since the fascist Arrow Cross Party ruled the country in World War II. If not resolved quickly, the wrangling over national refugee quotas will dishonor the founding principles of the European Union.

America cannot stand by. Sins of commission during George W. Bush’s presidency contributed to this crisis, and so too have the sins of omission by his successor. The U.S., whatever its intentions, has played no small part in making substantial portions of the Middle East unliveable for millions of people. We cannot say that this is Europe’s problem alone. Nor can we make a token contribution and walk away.

The challenge for the U.S. goes beyond even moral responsibility for current ills. It touches on who we are as a people and what we stand for.

On Wednesday, I will be observing Yom Kippur, which Jewish liturgy calls “a sacred time, recalling the Exodus from Egypt.” Time after time in the Torah, Jews are commanded to remember that they were a subjugated and oppressed people in the land they fled. We Jews are often told to do, or to refraining from doing, something that affects strangers, poor people or excluded groups—because we were oppressed in Egypt.

Most Americans are descended from immigrants who left their own Egypt—wherever it may have been—in search of safety, liberty and a chance to enjoy the fruits of their labors. In his famous letter to the Touro synagogue, President Washington paraphrased the prophet Micah when he promised the Jews of America that “everyone shall sit in safety under his own vine and fig-tree, and there shall be none to make him afraid.”

This has long been the promise of America to the persecuted and oppressed everywhere, and this must be its promise today.

In a recent letter, a group of national-security, international-humanitarian and human-rights appointees from Democratic and Republican administrations urged President Obama to support the admission of 100,000 Syrian refugees on an expedited basis and to provide the resources and administrative support to reach this goal.

That should be the floor of the U.S. effort, not the ceiling. After the exodus of the Vietnamese “boat people” that began in the late 1970s, it took an international conference to produce the agreement among Vietnam, its neighbors and the West on a formula for the safe and orderly departure of these refugees from their native land and accelerated resettlement elsewhere. Beginning with next week’s gathering of world leaders for the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. Obama should jump-start the conversations to convene such a conference at the earliest possible date.

The agenda should be comprehensive. On an urgent basis, world leaders should quickly remedy the funding shortfall for humanitarian efforts; relieve the unsustainable pressure on front-line states, especially Lebanon and Jordan; provide agreed-on routes for refugees to leave Syria and Iraq safely, without falling prey to greedy and unscrupulous middlemen; and establish well-defined procedures for receiving, registering, housing and assisting refugees near their point of entry in Europe.

Building on that foundation, the conference should broker an agreement on admissions goals that includes, but goes well beyond, the nations of Europe. If the wealthy Persian Gulf states refuse to accept significant numbers of refugees, as they may well do, they should be pressed to provide at least material support, commensurate with their resources, for the resettlement plan.

The exodus of refugees from the Middle East and elsewhere is only a symptom of underlying disorders. I am not the first to observe that we are witnessing the evisceration of the state system created in the wake of the Ottoman Empire’s collapse. There is no hope of building a new system—one that allows ordinary people to live securely—without forging agreement among the powers, which include U.S. allies as well as adversaries, who are using Syria and its neighbors as the arena for proxy wars.

This won’t be easy. It may fall to the next U.S. administration to organize the multilateral conversation that will be the necessary though not sufficient condition for a comprehensive agreement. This effort may fail. But in light of the unending humanitarian and political crisis, we have little to lose from making the effort. And we have something important to gain: the honor that comes from fidelity to worthy principle.

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