Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts

Friday, 2 October 2015

Bottom Line: America Needs a Smarter Russia Strategy

September 30, 2015

For all of the understandable focus on the future of U.S.-China relations, no bilateral relationship is more important to the United States in 2015 than the relationship with Russia.

Moscow’s foreign policies exacerbate—and, in some instance, are the very causes of—several vexing issues currently facing U.S. decision-makers, fromMoscow’s 18-month old intervention in Ukraine to its harboring of EdwardSnowden to its military support for Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. Yet if the Obama administration has a coherent strategy for dealing with Russia then it is certainly well hidden from public view.


When Obama came to office, relations between the U.S. and Russia were perhaps the poorest they had been since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Relations were plagued by Russian opposition to a missile defense system in Eastern Europe; Kosovo’s recent declaration of independence from Russia’s historic ally Serbia; and lingering uncertainty over whether NATO would continue to expand eastward, a question brought to the fore by the Russo-Georgian War of August 2008.


An early goal of Obama’s presidency was to put U.S.-Russia relations on a sounder footing, an ambition announced in public just two months into his first term when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton famously presented her Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov with a button emblazoned with the word “reset” (in English, at least). By spring 2010, the diplomatic offensive was beginning to bear fruit: the New START arms control agreement was formally signed in April of that year and Bush-era sanctions against Russia were lifted the following month.

Obama’s rapprochement with Russia proved to be relatively short lived, however. In particular, Russian fears about possible NATO expansion were never fully allayed. When Vladimir Putin returned to the Russian presidency in May 2012 he made no secret of his plans to pursue a Russia-dominated “Eurasian Union” as a counterbalance to the West. And although Obama had succeeded in bringing Moscow to the table over nuclear arms control, Russia’s conventional forces were heavily bolstered under both Putin and the caretaker presidency of Dmitry Medvedev.

Setbacks to the relationship abounded throughout 2012. Not only did the Russian navy and air force conduct provocative military exercises in the Pacific and the Gulf of Mexico, but a high-profile diplomatic fallout saw Putin introduce a ban on U.S. citizens adopting Russian children in response to the Obama administration’s sanctioning of Russian human rights abusers. By July 2013, when Russia agreed to grant asylum to Edward Snowden, few could disagree that the “reset” had been a comprehensive failure.

Russia’s invasion of Crimea in March 2014 and subsequent interventions in Eastern Ukraine have been the dramatic climaxes to this breakdown in relations, making it terribly difficult (although perhaps not impossible) for Obama to publicly pursue a renewed rapprochement with Russia for as long as Ukraine’s territorial integrity is being violated. But at the same time, the Ukraine crisis is really a symptom of the badly deteriorated U.S.-Russia relationship and not an independent cause of it. If U.S.-Russia relations had been sturdier in late 2013 and early 2014—if Russia believed that the U.S. would be willing and able to halt its aggression against Ukraine, for example, or alternatively if the two countries were operating on a cordial basis—then the political crisis in Ukraine might never have happened, and certainly could have been contained more easily than it actually was—or wasn’t, as the case may be.

The truth is that, on Obama’s watch, the United States has been relatively ineffective at shaping the decision-making calculus of Putin. Certainly, Putin will have given little thought to American sensibilities or interests when he sanctioned the annexation of Crimea. Of course, the point is not that President Obama ought to be blamed for not exercising complete control over his counterparts in foreign capitals. No president can or should be held to such an unfair standard. But it is the job of the U.S. government to adopt a coherent policy towards even the most antagonistic of adversaries. So how should Obama deal with Russia now that his initial preference for a cooperative relationship has been frustrated by Russian intransigence?

Analysts offer competing answers to this question. Some argue that Putin, while volatile, is nevertheless the president of a state in steep decline. With the price of oil having tanked, the gap will continue to grow between Russia’s corrupt and undiversified economic system and the more dynamic economies of the United States and Western Europe (not to mention India and China). Waging an all-out confrontation with Russia now is therefore ill-advised because a better bargain could be struck with Moscow tomorrow than can be reached today. Strategic patience is the order of the day, especially in Ukraine, where Russian power (and willpower) will inevitably evaporate even without serious prodding from the West.

On the other hand, Russia’s relative decline might actually be the cause of Moscow’s aggressive foreign policies. For if Putin believes that he is in command of a declining state, then he might reasonably conclude that now is precisely the time to “lock in” strategic gains along Russia’s periphery. If Putin can succeed in establishing “facts on the ground” in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, and perhaps further afield, then this will make it difficult for Russia’s adversaries to rollback Russian influence in the near future.

Moreover, Russia’s overall economic decline—even if it continues to be borne out—does not mean that funds for ambitious military policies will automatically become scarce. Nor does it mean that the motivation to pursue expansionist policies will recede. On the contrary, in fact, there is ample evidence that Putin’s lack of success on the domestic front actually makes his foreign policy “achievements” all the more critical to maintaining his grip on power.

The United States cannot wish away Russian bellicosity, then, but instead must orchestrate a foreign policy that both contains Russian aggression and deters future acts of expansionism. So far, the Obama-led diplomatic isolation of Russia—aided by European anxieties about their eastern neighbor—has been somewhat successful in this regard, and economic sanctions have shown signs of significant “bite.” But history shows that cordons sanitaire of this nature are difficult to maintain over the long term, and might well fall far short of inducing Putin to alter his foreign policy trajectory.

Recognizing this, the Obama administration announced this summer that diplomatic and economic moves against Russia would be matched by the deployment of heavy arms to Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. The rationale was that America’s NATO allies would not feel safe from Russian predation unless there was a credible guarantee that the full force of the U.S. military could be relied upon for their collective defense. In the eyes of most security analysts—and in the view of the America’s allies—this military component was a welcome addition to U.S. foreign policy towards Russia, a critical move designed to impose real costs to future Russian adventurism.

What is unclear, however, is how credible this military balancing against Russia will prove to be in the long-term. The biggest threat to American resolve could turn out to be Russian involvement in Syria, where Russian hardware—including fighter jets—is already being supplied to Assad loyalists with Moscow already attacking targets from the air. The prospect of the U.S. and Russian militaries being at close quarters in Syria is one that the ever cautious President Obama is right to balk at, and undoubtedly helps to explain his recent change of heart in deciding to meet face-to-face with Putin in New York.

Ever since he announced in 2009 that the United States would withdraw from Afghanistan, President Obama has studiously avoided taking ownership of international crises that involve serious military investment. From Libya to Crimea to Syria, the president’s modus operandi has been fairly clear: do the bare minimum to avoid an absolute catastrophe from the U.S. perspective but never invest enough to resolve the underlying issues. Assuming that this pattern holds—and there is nothing to suggest that it will not—Obama can probably be counted upon to seek some sort of diplomatic understanding with Russia over the security situation in Syria. His overriding goal will be to minimize the risk of the U.S. being dragged further into the conflagration.

Might Eastern Europe come up in these bilateral talks over Syria? To be sure, a grand bargain involving Ukraine, Syria and other security issues is extremely unlikely to emerge at this time. But in order to reach a compact with Putin over Syria, a variety of short-term fixes will surely be on the table. Putin will be probing Obama’s resolve, looking for ways to expand his freedom of maneuver in international affairs. And herein lies the risk: any whiff of U.S. concessions over Syria will bode ill for maintaining a firm deterrent in the European theater. The cordon sanitaire will have been breached; Putin will have been confirmed in his belief that militarism “pays.”

As Henry Kissinger has written, America’s long-term goal vis-à-vis Russia must be to accommodate Moscow within a political and security order that satisfies the legitimate interests of both sides and their major allies. President Obama is likely in enthusiastic agreement with this sentiment, and indeed began his presidency with the stated aim of reducing tensions with Russia—part and parcel of the president’s broader desire to clear his desk of foreign policy problems in order to focus on domestic issues. The problem is that there are no straightforward ways of moving towards a modus vivendi with Russia in light of current events.

Again, this unhappy situation is certainly not of Obama’s sole making. But the administration cannot be absolved of its responsibility to replace its old strategy of accommodation with something new: a firm foreign policy that mitigates the worst effects of Russian belligerency while holding out the prospect of improved relations in the future. This means standing firm on both Ukraine and Syria—not seeking to divorce the two issues, and certainly not condoning Russian power-projection abroad. Simply engaging in damage limitation will not do; a comprehensive strategy is in order. So many long-term security issues depend upon it.

Peter Harris is an assistant professor of political science at Colorado State University. You can follow him on Twitter: @ipeterharris.













Russia's Air War in Syria Begins: Can 32 Planes Really Make a Difference?

September 30, 2015

The Russian air force has started its air campaign in war-torn Syria against rebel forces around the city of Homs. But the scope and duration of the Russian air campaign is an open question. The Russian force of 32 fixed-wing combat aircraft at its airfield in Latakia is not large enough to sustain a prolonged air war.

“It's a token force, but they do seem problematic for our anti-Assad stance,” one Air Force told me. “Putin is clearly a pro-Assad guy. So it will be interesting to see whether the Russians attack U.S.-backed anti-Assad groups.”

The Target:

The initial Russian airstrikes do seem to have been directed against Syrian rebels seeking to topple the Assad regime rather than ISIS forces. But it is not clear if those were U.S.-trained rebels or not. Nonetheless, the strikes do suggest that Russian president Vladimir Putin is seeking to shore up the beleagueredAssad regime against both the rebels and ISIS.


Earlier in the day, the Russian Federation Council gave its consent to using force in Syria. “The Federation Council unanimously supported the president’s request—162 votes in favor [of granting permission],” Kremlin chief of staff Sergey Ivanov told ITAR-TASS on Sept. 30.

Interestingly enough, according to Ivanov, the Russian campaign is solely directed against ISIS rather than an attempt to bolster Assad’s beleaguered forces. “The operation’s military goal is exclusively air support of the Syrian armed forces in their fight against the IS [Islamic State],” Ivanov told the Russian media. Ivanov added that the Russian operation is of limited duration, which seems to be consistent with the relatively limited size of Russia’s expeditionary force in Latakia.

What Can Russia Actually Do?:

While much of the media attention has focused on advanced Russian warplanes like the Sukhoi Su-30SM Flanker-H multirole fighter and Su-34 Fullback, U.S. Air Force officials note that there are only four each of those late-generation jets present in the theatre. Russia’s real combat power in the region comes from its force of two-dozen Su-25 Frogfoot close air support aircraft and Su-24 Fencer bombers.

Having four of each type would not allow the Russians to sustain airstrikes over a long period of time even with a well oiled logistical train comparable to the U.S. military. Thus the presence of the Su-30SM and Su-34 doesn’t add significantly to Russian combat power. “Combat turn patterns with four aircraft are not generally sustainable for long periods of time,” a senior U.S. Air Force official added.

Another recently retired U.S. Air Force official said, “Four jets might buy you eight to twelve sorties in a twenty-four hour period for a few days, but the pace wouldn't be sustainable,” the former official said. A typical squadron needs a minimum of six aircraft to sustain operations. “More likely they brought four to launch, plus two reserves—one spare and one in repairs.”

Russia’s real striking power in the region does not come from the advanced Flanker derivatives but rather the older and much less glamorous Su-25 Frogfoot and Su-24 Fencer. The Russian air force has a dozen of each type at Latakia, which could be used to sustain air strikes for a while—assuming Russia can sort out logistical, maintenance and spare parts issues. The Russian military has not conducted an overseas deployment like this in recent memory—and even then, the total Russian presence offers less combat power than an a single U.S. Navy carrier air wing.

While the Su-25 and Su-24 are still capable strike aircraft, it remains to be seen if the Russians have the ability to sustain those jets away from home. Further, it is not clear if the Russian aircraft are equipped with the types of sensors and precision-guided munitions required for this kind of a fight—and, moreover, if they have enough stocks of those precision weapons. There is also the unanswered question of how proficient Russian aircrews really are and if they will be working closely with ground controllers to identify targets for them. Only time will tell.

Dave Majumdar is the defense editor for The National Interest. You can follow him on Twitter: @davemajumdar.














The Russian Navy Is Back

September 30, 2015
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-russian-navy-back-13974

Considering that he earned his spurs in the culture of the KGB, Russian President Vladimir Putin has demonstrated surprisingly strong navalist tendencies over the past eighteen months. Adding irony to this new focus on the sea, his presidency began with allegations that he mishandled the disaster of the sinking of the “Kursk” submarine in 2000, just three months after he was inaugurated as Russian president. However, last week’s deployment of Russian military forces to Syria confirmed that maintaining naval access has become a centerpiece of President Putin’s foreign policy and may shed light on future Russian foreign policy goals. Two other recent developments confirm this trend of restoring Russian naval power: the annexation of Crimea in March of 2014 and the release of the Maritime Doctrine of Russian Federation 2020 in July of 2015.

The Russian annexation of Crimea restored firm Russian control over the port city of Sevastopol, which is the home of the Russian Navy’s Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol Shipyard. Sevastopol Shipyard played a key role in modernizing the Russian Navy over the past decade—even though it was located on sovereign Ukrainian territory but leased back to Russia under the Black Sea Fleet Agreement of 1997.


The Maritime Doctrine of Russian Federation 2020 leads off with the provocative phrase: “Historically, Russia—the leading maritime power…” and goes on to divide Russian naval policy between six regions: the Atlantic, Arctic, Antarctic, Caspian, Indian Ocean, and Pacific. Upon release of the Maritime Doctrine in July, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin told IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly that “…the Atlantic has been emphasized because of NATO expansion, the need to integrate Crimea and the Sevastopol naval base into the Russian economy, and to re-establish a permanent Russian Navy presence in the Mediterranean.”

That last phrase (“…to re-establish a permanent Russian Navy presence in the Mediterranean”) serves as a clear signal of one of the principal policy objectives of Russian military forces to Syria last week—the preservation of Russian naval access to the Syrian ports of Tartus and Latakia. During remarks at the German Marshall Fund in Washington, DC on September 28, General Philip M. Breedlove, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), said he believes Putin’s top priority is to protect Russian access to airfields and warm water seaports in the Eastern Mediterranean. The second priority, in service to the first, is to prop up Russia’s host, the embattled regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Then third, he said, “After all of that, I think that they will do some counter-ISIL work to legitimize their approach to Syria.”

After Russian defense spending hit rock bottom in 1998, a decade of increased investment in modernization and maintenance has renewed Russian aspirations of exerting global influence with a similarly global navy. Although that navy is ready to sail, it still needs access to bases for logistics support for sustained deployments abroad. While the Russian Navy does not yet have the capacity to generate the scope and scale of Soviet Navy deployment patterns during the Cold War, it has restored its capacity to maintain presence where core Russian interests are at stake—such as in Syria.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Navy enjoyed access to bases in Algeria, Libya, Egypt, and Yugoslavia to sustain continuous naval influence in the Mediterranean Sea. The recent trend toward Russian maritime expansion could serve as a harbinger for future Russian foreign policy initiatives. In late August 2015, the Russians persuaded Spain—a member of NATO—to allow a Russian Kilo-class diesel submarine to refuel and re-supply on the Spanish island of Ceuta as it transited from the North Sea Fleet to the Black Sea Fleet.

Moving forward, keep an eye on Libya as another potential focus area for restoring Russian naval access. While the current political situation in Libya is tenuous, the conditions are set for Russia to attempt to restore its access to naval bases and further sustain naval presence in the western Mediterranean and eastern Atlantic oceans—all under the cover of “fighting international terrorism.”

Captain Sean R. Liedman, U.S. Navy, was the commander of Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing Eleven operating the P-8A and P-3C maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft. He has twice served in the Air Warfare Division on the Chief of Naval Operation’s staff and also as the executive assistant to the deputy commander of U.S. Central Command. The conclusions and opinions expressed are his own and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. government. This piece first appeared on CFR’s website here













Why a new Cold War with Russia is inevitable

Andrej Krickovic and Yuval Weber 
September 30, 2015 

This is a critical moment in U.S-Russia relations. Thecivil war in Ukraine is settling into a mutually hurtful stalemate; a workable nuclear deal with Iran has been concluded; and Russia is ramping up its presence in Syria, which increases the danger of confrontation with the United States but also opens up the potential for cooperation against the Islamic State (or ISIS). Before a more hawkish U.S. administration comes to power—and before anti-Americanism becomes further entrenched in Russia as evidenced by the latest Levada Center public polling data—perhaps there is an opportunity for Washington and Moscow to overcome their current impasse.

This is our hope. But theory and evidence point to a sobering conclusion: Neither side can make the concessions necessary to resolve their current differences and prevent relations from deteriorating even further.
Commitment anxiety

The chief concern of those calling for negotiation between the United States and Russia is that while the current relationship is beset by a number of serious differences, the downside of an openly hostile relationship is even worse. These voices argue that without an updated European security framework to resolve some of the worst tensions (and implicitly to update the post-Cold War settlement), a new Cold War between the two camps will emerge


The competition would not be as encompassing as before, but it would make cooperation on vital issues outside of Europe—including Iran, ISIS, and Syria—unsustainable and lead to an inherently more unstable international order. In turn, they advocate for a mutually acceptable framework for regional order to avoid future conflicts from arising in other areas of the post-Soviet space. 

We are skeptical that such a grand bargain can be reached, because it would suffer from acute commitment problems.

A larger “grand bargain” to regulate the structure of international and regional relations based on mutual accommodation is a worthy goal. Nevertheless, we are skeptical that such a grand bargain can be reached, because it would suffer from acute commitment problems. Russia would have to convince the United States and its allies that it would not push for even greater revisions to the status quo. The United States would have to demonstrate to Russia that it would stick to any bargain and not go back to the policies that threaten it.
Impossible concessions

Among the insights of bargaining theory is that states can overcome commitment problems by accepting costly concessions that signal their resolve to abide by agreements. What hypothetical concessions could both sides make to make the grand bargain stick? 

Russia could atone for its actions in Crimea—which Washington and other Western capitals see as a grave breach of international law and order—by either reversing the annexation or by using economic and other inducements to get Kiev to recognize the new status quo. The United States could address Russia’s fears of encirclement by NATO, either by agreeing to the formation of a pan-European security organization with authority above NATO’s (as Dmitri Medvedev proposed during his presidency). Or, it could formally abrogate NATO’s right to enlarge its membership and recognize the neutrality of the post-Soviet states on Russia’s Western borders. 

A new Cold War...would make cooperation on vital issues outside of Europe—including Iran, ISIS, and Syria—unsustainable.

While these concessions could conceivably make a bargain work, we believe that the domestic political costs of trying to implement such agreements would be too high for leaders of both sides. Any demand for the return of Crimea to Ukraine (as many Western voices have implored) is a non-starter for Russia. The Kremlin has invested so much in the “Return of Crimea” discourse that even minor concessions on this issue would shake the regime’s legitimacy to its very foundations (and perhaps even threaten a nationalist revolt). 

The alternative—inducing Ukraine to recognize de facto the loss of Crimea—is also problematic, with severe domestic blowback almost certain to befall any government in Kiev that made the deal. Moreover, given its current economic difficulties, Moscow may not be able to deliver the economic inducements necessary to win Kiev’s compliance. 

On the other side, any concession that would give Russia a de facto veto over NATO’s policies would be rejected outright by the alliance’s members. The more moderate option, the abrogation of NATO enlargement and the recognition of Russia’s sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space, is unacceptable to American leaders and publics. It would validate a realpolitik understanding of international relations that is fundamentally at odds with their views of international relations—in which every state should be free to choose its alliances.
A downward slide?

As things stand now, neither side can make the concessions necessary to make a grand bargain work. As a result, both now find themselves sliding towards a new Cold War that neither really wants. 

We hope that statesmen on both sides will prove us wrong by finding the courage and foresight necessary to overcome these commitment problems. But it is difficult to be optimistic given the current political climate, as talk in both capitals is dominated by the sort of Russia- and America-bashing, which prevents either side from developing an appreciation of the other’s security concerns.













Obama's Strong Signal to Putin

September 30, 2015

A day after US President Barack Obama met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the United States announced that it will ship long-range counter-battery radars to Ukraine. Obama authorized $20 million to provide the country with radars, bringing US security assistance to Ukraine up to $265 million. Obama's message is clear: the United States will not sacrifice Ukraine in exchange for Russian cooperation against Islamic State in Syria.

The announcement also shows that the United States views the current ceasefire in eastern Ukraine—in place since September 1—as an opportunity to help Ukraine upgrade its deterrent military capability. While Ukraine's request for 1,240 Javelin anti-tank missiles has gone unmet, Washington's willingness to move forward with radars sends a clear signal that the US may consider sending lethal weapons should the Minsk II process fail.

In short, the Obama administration now accepts that deterrence is the best way to maintain the stalemate in eastern Ukraine. A year ago, the United States was reluctant to use military transports to ship medical and humanitarian equipment to the then-embattled country. At a Joint Meeting of Congress on September 18, 2014, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko annoyed the White House by pleading directly for defensive aid. But over time, a rising chorus of voices within the US foreign policy establishment urged the administration to arm Ukraine. Many voices within the administration have supported sending weapons to Ukraine, and Obama is belatedly moving in their direction.


The US posture has shifted in recent months. US Marines have trained Ukrainian national guardsmen in western Ukraine, and the US has dispatched Humvees, armor, communications gear, and other essential systems as well. The United States is considering expanding its efforts to include training for local Ukrainian troops. Of course, the taboo of sending lethal weapons to Ukraine remains in place.

Radars have been a key element on the wish list of Ukraine's military. The US-manufactured Q36 system—which is mobile and can be mounted on armored personnel carriers and Humvees—allows the immediate targeting of the point of origin of missiles from a range of 18 kilometers and rockets from a distance of 24 kilometers. More importantly, it enables operators to precisely locate the enemy's artillery and rocket launchers after just one shot.

These radars could help tip the balance and reduce fatalities on the Ukrainian side. Ukraine's Ministry of Defense says that seventy-five percent of its fatalities are a result of artillery and missile attacks.

In the long-term, the West must help Ukraine's arms industry modernize, which can be modeled on the successful efforts undertaken in Poland and other Central European states whose rich experience of converting Soviet-era military production facilities into modern-day weapons industries is readily transferable.

Ukraine has significantly upgraded its armed forces in the last year. It modernized and refurbished a wide array of artillery, tanks, and other weapons. It has begun to successfully rebuild its military to the point that a battle capable force of 40,000 fighters is now deployed along the line of contact between Ukraine and its occupied territories.

Ukraine's newly vigorous defense capability cannot deter an all-out Russian attack. But a major offensive is unlikely now, as the costs on both sides would be massive. The conflict is unlikely to fade, either. The stalemate in Ukraine's east underscores the importance of bolstering the country's deterrent capabilities. And there are signs that the United States and an increasing number of Ukraine's western neighbors are coming to accept this logic.

Adrian Karatnycky is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council's Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center and Managing Partner of Myrmidon Group LLC, a New York-based consultancy that works with investors and corporations in Ukraine and Eastern Europe.













Washington Should Reconsider Russian Satellite Navigation

September 30, 2015


Few Americans are aware of the brewing battle between Russia and the United States over global navigational satellite systems–and Washington would like to keep it that way. When Russia’s Global Navigational Satellite System (GLONASS) became operational in 2011, the Obama administration and several congressional members characterized it as a threat to national security. This assessment is both short-sighted and misleading, at a time when heightened tensions with Russia underscore the need for pragmatic, reason-based solutions and not the politically motivated stalemating of a new Cold War. Instead, the Obama administration’s current stance presumes, unrealistically, that ignoring Russian satellites will somehow prevent them from gathering U.S. geospatial data, and it also prevents U.S. consumers from unlocking greater navigational efficiency by supplementing existing data with GLONASS systems. 


While GLONASS, like its U.S. counterpart, GPS (Global Positioning System), is rooted in its home country’s military community, the navigation system has been available for public and commercial use since 2007. The project has been a Russian government priority since Soviet scientists began developing it in the 1970s. The collapse of the Soviet Union saw the GLONASS program placed on hold in the early 1990s. President Vladimir Putin resuscitated it in 2003 with an eye toward producing a competitor to GPS. With 24 satellites in orbit, GLONASS achieved full positioning coverage of Russia in 2010 and the rest of the world in 2011. Today, the service is ubiquitous in Russia. Many regional governments require school buses and taxi drivers to use GLONASS in their vehicles to promote road safety, and Moscow levies fines for taxis that do not have some form of navigation system. 

Few outside of Eastern Europe have ever heard of GLONASS. GPS’s earlier arrival in 1995 certainly accounts for some of the lukewarm response, but Washington has played an active part in keeping it from taking root in the United States. For instance, the Obama administration slipped language into the 2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that effectively banned Moscow from constructing GLONASS stations on U.S. soil unless it could be proven that they were unusable for military purposes. The U.S. government, which already has 11 GPS stations placed throughout Russia, is well aware of the dual-use implications of a navigational system that can send signals to a car just as easily as it can to a missile. 

Prohibiting the placement of GLONASS stations, however, does little more than reduce signal quality for consumers with GLONASS antennas who are simply looking for an alternative to GPS. The NDAA ban on GLONASS stations is enormously ineffective as it assumes that GLONASS stations–not the satellites themselves–are the origin of potential Russian espionage. These stations simply correct signals that have already reached the United States, and there is little Washington can do to prevent Russian satellites from bouncing signals wherever their operators see fit. To be sure, a handful of GLONASS antennas and receptors already exist in the U.S. market, allowing scientists and technology enthusiasts to explore the benefits of joint GPS-GLONASS navigational input. 

Alternatives to outright bans do exist, even if satellite stations are found to be feeding military intelligence to foreign governments. Moscow demonstrated as much in June 2014 when, in response to the Obama administration’s ban on GLONASS stations inside the United States, the Kremlin announced that it was taking steps to ensure that the Washington could never use its Russia-based GPS stations for military purposes. Stopping short of declaring that GPS would cease to function on Russian territory, Moscow instead announced that it was implementing a delay in the information relayed between GPS stations and satellites, ostensibly eroding the value of positioning data for Washington’s military and intelligence communities. Both GLONASS and GPS remain operational inside Russia despite rising rhetoric and ongoing tensions between the two countries.

The Obama administration’s opposition is shortsighted, failing to recognize that other countries are developing their own global navigational systems. In addition to GPS and GLONASS, the European Union’s Galileo system, and China’s Beidou may one day achieve global coverage and offer an even greater range of services to consumers around the world. Opposing space and telecommunications cooperation with Russia is easy for Washington today amid heightened tensions over the conflict in Ukraine and myriad other foreign policy disagreements. Should it maintain its current posture, however, the United States may soon find itself fumbling to justify opposition to the Europe’s Galileo, capable of transmitting the very same military-grade data as GLONASS.

Even if it means allowing the construction of GLONASS stations on U.S. soil, the Obama administration must reconsider its opposition to GLONASS. To start, President Obama can voice support for telecommunications giants like Sprint, Verizon, and T-Mobile, who have lobbied in favor of using GLONASS satellites to promote efficiency in routing emergency calls to first responders. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) originally demonstrated support for the initiative, but succumbed to pressure from Congressmen such as Representative Mike Rogers (R-AL), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, and by failing to include non-GPS options as emergency response alternatives in the February 2015 update to the Enhanced-911 (E-911) framework. The FCC’s E-911 framework is responsible for governing geolocation and emergency response services, and was last updated in 2010. 

By enabling the development of GLONASS in the U.S. market, President Obama will be doing much more than opening up new technologies to the American consumer. He is signaling to both domestic and international audiences that his administration remains committed to pragmatic policy solutions that are in the best interest of his country, and international cooperation. Moreover, a review of GLONASS policy also delineates the administration’s embrace of reason, and opposition to the type of political gamesmanship characterized much of the previous Cold War, and still risks dragging the world into a repeat scenario of the same political divisiveness of the mid- to late 20th century. 

Gary Bearden is a foreign policy professional and current Political Risk Fellow with Young Professionals in Foreign Policy (YPFP). He has professional and living experience in Eastern Europe, North Africa and Latin America, holds three Bachelors degrees from Ohio State University and a Master of Science in Foreign Service from Georgetown University.

Realists, Beware of Russians Making Deals

SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 

Congratulations are due to Vladimir Putin for his shrewd speech at the United Nations General Assembly. The Russian president deftly positioned his country as a key arbiter in the Syrian civil war, doubling down on support for the “legitimate government” of President Bashar al-Assad. (Never mind that neither Assad nor his father ever had to face a real election, so I’m not sure what constitutes “legitimacy” here.) And he did his best to depict Moscow as a loyal adherent to United Nations principles while castigating Washington as a mischief-maker always sowing chaos by dodging the rules of the international community.

We could spend a lot of time unpacking Putin’s presentation. One could easily forget that the Putin who took to the stage in New York is the very same man who personally oversaw last year’s annexation of Crimea — the first time since the end of World War II that a European power has seized land from a neighbor by military force. So much for those hallowed U.N. principles of peaceful conflict resolution and respect for territorial integrity. And the image of the sober statesman at the General Assembly doesn’t square with the less savory picture of a leader who doses dissenters with radioactive poison and raises thugs like Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov to key government positions.


Putin’s speech will undoubtedly meet with rave reviews from his usual fan club — that odd collection of Orthodox homophobes, Hollywood has-beens, and grumpy populists (both left and right). So be it.

But this time around the Russian president was really aiming for bigger fish.But this time around the Russian president was reallyaiming for bigger fish. As befits his grandiose surroundings, he was clearly wooing serious policymakers. He made his plea for an anti-Islamic State coalition by invoking the anti-Hitler alliance of Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt — reminding his audience that defeating big enemies sometimes requires unlikely bedfellows. “On the basis of international law,” he said, “we must join efforts to address the problems that all of us are facing and create a genuinely broad international coalition against terrorism.”

“Putin is right,” immediately declared British commentator Simon Jenkins, who wrote that the “only way forward in Syria” is through Assad and his allies. “That is the realpolitik. That is what pragmatism dictates.” Just for good measure, Jenkins cited Henry Kissinger, who thinks that the West should see Russia (in Jenkins’s words) “as an ally … against Muslim fundamentalism.”

Kissinger, of course, is the patron saint of that school of foreign relations known as “realism,” which argues that we can understand and formulate sound policy based only on a cool appraisal of the competing interests of major powers. For realists, stability and order should take precedence in foreign policy over promoting democracy or advancing human rights.

Putin and the realists often speak a common language. Just like the Russian president, realists tend to bemoan NATO’s eastward expansion as an offenseagainst Russia’s national dignity. A few days ago, ex-New York Timescorrespondent Stephen Kinzer described the end of the Cold War as if the Americans had swarmed into post-Soviet Russia like a new Tatar horde: “Many in Washington believed that the United States had permanently broken Russian power. In their jubilation, they imagined that we would be able to keep our foot on Russia’s neck forever.” Dismissing talk of Russian “aggression” in Ukraine (the quotation marks are his), Kinzer urged his readers to follow Moscow’s example in its efforts to maintain the international peace: “We would benefit from a bit of their realism.”


Yet, in the end, how realistic are the realists?Yet, in the end, how realistic are the realists? At a certain point, the seemingly hardheaded pleas for common cause with Russia tend to veer off into the indeterminate. Sure, let’s sign up for a Moscow-led alliance uniting Assad’s Syrian Alawites, Iranian Shiites, and Lebanese Hezbollah members in order to beat “terrorism” in Syria and Iraq. That sounds like the perfect way to salve the resentment of the millions of Sunni Muslims in the region who back — or at least don’t violently object to — the Islamic State. What could possibly go wrong? (Take a look at some of those members of Putin’s Middle East coalition, by the way, and go on telling me that Moscow is really the sworn enemy of “Muslim fundamentalism.” As Kadyrov’s career so vividly demonstrates, the Kremlin is perfectly happy to tolerate Islamists as long as they’re on its payroll.)

And what about Ukraine? Kinzer, like so many of his colleagues in the realist camp, doesn’t actually say what policy the West should pursue (perhaps because that would involve too many thorny specifics). He merely cites the example of Prince Klemens von Metternich, the Austrian statesman who insisted that post-Napoleonic France should be treated like a great power despite its past transgressions: “He persuaded other leaders that in the interest of future stability, they must invite the miscreant back into the family.” Sounds harmless enough. Kissinger, of course, also celebratedMetternich’s statecraft in a famous book.

There’s a lot that Kinzer glosses over in this account. Yes, the Concert of Europe kept the peace for a generation. But it did so by dividing Europe into spheres of influence that were tightly policed by each of the monarchic great powers, which stomped down hard on even the slightest stirrings of democratic dissent — and thus retarded the continent’s political development for almost a century (ultimately, one might argue, with catastrophic consequences).

The European Union exists today because democratically elected governments wanted it to exist, and it expanded its membership because the new democracies that emerged from the rubble of the old Soviet empire wanted to join. The same applies to NATO. Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill once tried dividing up Europe on a napkin in a smoke-filled room, but those days — I’m happy to say — are gone. Anyone who wants to claim that Europe can go back to the 1940s in this respect is profoundly ahistorical and deeply unrealistic.

It’s striking how coy the self-described realists become when it comes to mapping out the specifics of what they think should happen with Ukraine today. Are we really going to draw a line on a map and declare that all the peoples living to the east of it will henceforth be subject to Putin’s whim? This, in fact, is what the whole notion of “taking Moscow’s interests into account” boils down to.

If we’re really objective about it, I’m not sure that Putin is the cool customer whom the realists seem to take him for. Putin could have adopted very different policies toward those Ukrainian protesters back in 2013 and 2014, offering economic inducements and perhaps a promise of fresh elections in return for, say, a pledge from a new government in Kiev to refrain from seeking NATO membership — something that most Ukrainians, at the time, would have been happy to sign up for. Such a policy would have done far more to serve Russian national interests than all the chaos that has since ensued.

Instead, thanks to his Crimean smash-and-grab and his active support for separatists in the Donbass, most Ukrainians are seeking closer ties with the West than anyone would have thought possible a few years ago. As the direct result of Moscow’s actions, Ukraine is now heading either toward unprecedented integration with Western Europe — or toward complete economic and political collapse. Is either of these scenarios really good for Russia? Probably not. But Putin’s hard line on Ukraine certainly served the aim of boosting his popularity among ordinary Russians, and that’s ultimately what he cared about most.

As a matter of fact, it’s entirely possible to make the argument that Putin’s recent policies, far from advancing Russian interests, have drasticallyweakened the country’s international position. Crimea-related sanctions, coupled with the fall in oil prices, have taken an enormous toll on the economy. Sweden and Finland, neither particularly bellicose toward Russia in recent years, are now increasingly keen to seek NATO protection. And let’s face it — when it comes to allies, no one seems particularly eager to join up with Moscow outside of the Shiite Crescent. 
Putin may be popular at home, but Russia’s public image around the world has tanked.Putin may be popular at home, but Russia’s public image around the world has tanked.

A genuine realist in the Kremlin would have long since seized the opportunity, for example, to forge a new relationship with Japan, a development that would have not only given a huge boost to Russia’s economic bottom line but also undermined Washington’s relationship with one of its most important allies in a key part of the world. Putin, however, just hasn’t been able pull it off — presumably because the territorial concessions involved (over the southernmost Kuril Islands) would dent his reputation as a macho Russian nationalist, thus undermining his hold over the national psyche.

And this, ultimately, is the key to understanding all of Putin’s actions. The Russian president’s policies are shaped primarily by his determination to preserve his personal power. Sometimes this goal overlaps with the aim of safeguarding Russian national interests, but the two are far from identical. And as realists presumably know better than anyone else, personal agendas are far more volatile and hard to predict than national ones. Anyone who aims to make a deal with the Russian president would be well advised to keep this in mind.

In the photo, Russian President Vladimir Putin addresses the United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 28, 2015.

Corrections, Sept. 30, 2015: Simon Jenkins wrote that Henry Kissinger believes that the West should see Russia “as an ally … against Muslim fundamentalism.” An earlier version of this article mistakenly quoted Kissinger as saying the words “as an ally against Muslim fundamentalism.” Also, the article by Stephen Kinzer that was cited in this article was published a few days ago. An earlier version of this article mistakenly said the article was published a few weeks ago.

Thursday, 1 October 2015

Chaos in Syria: Russian Warplanes Conducting Airstrikes on Rebel Targets

NEIL MacFARQUHAR and ANNE BARNARD
September 30, 2015

Russia Launches Airstrikes in Syria, Adding a New Wrinkle

MOSCOW — President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia ordered a round of airstrikes inSyria on Wednesday, adding an unpredictable and potentially destabilizing element to a complex sectarian war that has drawn in the United States and regional powers while creating millions of refugees.

While Moscow’s stated purpose in Syria is to fight Islamic State militants, Russian warplanes and helicopter gunships dropped bombs north of the central city of Homs, in an area held by rebel groups opposed to Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, a Russian ally. The attacks were unleashed hours after Mr. Putin pushed a measure through the upper house of Russia’s rubber stamp Parliament authorizing the use of force abroad.

At a meeting of government officials in Moscow on Wednesday, Mr. Putin defended the Russian intervention as a broad stroke against terrorism. “The only right way to fight international terrorism — and it is gangs of international terrorists that are fighting in Syria and in neighboring countries — is to act preventively,” he said, “to fight and destroy militants and terrorists on the territories that they already occupied, not wait for them to come to our house.”

Western diplomats warned that Russia would be sending a dangerous message if its attacks were aimed primarily against opponents of Mr. Assad, rather than the Islamic State.

“We need the Russians to understand that in coming to defense of the regime to attack ISIL, what they will do is forge a single united force under ISIL leadership against the regime,” said the British foreign secretary, Philip Hammond, using an alternate name for the Islamic State. “That’s the huge danger we face.”

Analysts have warned that Russia’s military activities are likely to prolong and complicate the war, as they could keep Mr. Assad in office and add Russia to the already tangled patchwork of forces deployed there.

John Kirby, a State Department spokesman, told reporters at the United Nations that Russia had warned the United States before the attacks, and that it had requested that American and allied aircraft avoid Syrian airspace during the missions.

Russia has long had a naval base in the coastal city of Tartus.

Russia has deployed warplanes, tanks and marines at an airfield near Latakia.

On Wednesday, Russian warplanes dropped bombs near the city of Homs.

But Secretary of State John Kerry, speaking at the United Nations, made it clear that U.S.-led airstrikes would not be curtailed, and said that the latest strike against Islamic State targets had been carried out “in the last hour.”

“These strikes will continue,” he told the Security Council.

American officials in Baghdad said the Russian warning came from an official in Baghdad, who informed staff members at the United States Embassy there that Russian military aircraft would begin conducting a mission. They emphasized that the Russians had not provided specific information on the mission or taken steps to “deconflict” the airstrike with American air operations in the region, as the United States hoped.

At a briefing Wednesday afternoon, Josh Earnest, the White House press secretary, confirmed that United States military officials had yet to have any conversations with their Russian counterparts to ensure that the two sides do not accidentally attack or stumble into each other.

As a practical matter, coalition warplanes rarely fly in the area of Syria where Russian jets carried out their strikes, because Islamic State militants do not operate there. However, there have been occasional American strikes against the Khorasan Group, a group of senior Qaeda operatives who American officials say are plotting attacks against the West.

A spokesman for the Russian Defense Ministry, Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov, said its pilots were engaged in precision strikes “against the military equipment, communication centers, transport vehicles, arms depots, ammunition and fuels and lubricant materials belonging to ISIS terrorists.”

Although Russia and Syrian state television both said the attacks were conducted against Islamic State targets, they appear to have hit areas controlled primarily by rival insurgent groups that oppose both Mr. Assad and the Islamic State.

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia said that he believes the only way to deal with terrorists in Syria is to act preemptively.

In a video on YouTube, a rebel commander in Hama Province, Jamil al-Saleh, said that his forces had eavesdropped on communications between Syrian Air Force pilots and their bases, which confirmed that Russian warplanes were aloft. His group, the Izza Gathering, is one of the remaining fragments of the loosely-knit Free Syrian Army, relatively secular groups that have received some Western support.

Mr. Earnest said the Pentagon had not determined who the targets were. “We have a variety of ways, particularly given our presence in the region, to evaluate exactly what Russia’s military operations are resulting in,” he said, “and that’s something our Department of Defense is looking into.”

The attacks, according to state-run television and rebel sources, occurred north of Homs and into Hama Province. Recent advances in Hama by a coalition of insurgents opposed to Mr. Assad as well as to the Islamic State have posed new threats to the coastal Alawite heartland where Mr. Assad enjoys his strongest support. That coalition has a range of groups including the Nusra Front, Al Qaeda’s branch in Syria; less extremist Islamist groups, and relatively secular groups like Mr. Saleh’s.

In his comments, Mr. Putin said that the only long-term solution for Syria was through political change and dialogue between the opposition and the government. “I know that President Assad understands that and is ready for this process,” Mr. Putin said. He said Russia hoped Mr. Assad would make “compromises in the name of his country and his people.”

The United States has long held that Mr. Assad, who has presided over a war that has killed well over 200,000 Syrians, many at the hands of his security forces, must step down before a stable peace can be achieved. Lately, President Obama has added some nuance, saying that Mr. Assad could be part of a “managed transition” to a new government.

In Syria, the state-run news media strongly endorsed the move by Russia. Supporters of Mr. Assad seemed particularly pleased that Moscow was sending military aid because they felt his endorsement at the United Nations two days ago was a bit tepid.

Mr. Kerry said the Obama administration would welcome “any genuine effort” by Moscow to target the Islamic State and Jabhet al-Nusra, a rebel group linked to Al Qaeda. But Mr. Kerry made clear that the United States would have “grave concerns” if the Russians bombed other moderate rebel groups.

He also called for a revival of a stalled United Nations-led peace process, with the understanding that Mr. Assad must “decline to be part of its long-term future.” Any international effort to broker a political deal would be seen as “a farce” if it sustained Mr. Assad’s hold on power, Mr. Kerry added.

The Russian airstrikes came the same day the government announced intensive maneuvers involving Mi-28 attack helicopters and others in southern Russia.

Mr. Putin harbors both international and domestic reasons for interfering in Syria.

On the international front, he wants to restore Russian influence as a global power and try to force an end to the diplomatic and financial isolation the West imposed after Moscow seized Crimea and supported separatists in southeastern Ukraine. He also wants to maintain control over Russia’s naval station at Tartus, in Syria, its only remaining overseas military base outside the former Soviet Union.

Domestically, he wants to draw attention away from the Ukraine conflict and the troubled Russian economy, as well as to burnish his image as an international man of action who solves problems.

“Geopolitics and the desire to protect Russia’s influence in the Mediterranean is the main motive,” said Alexei Makarkin, the deputy director of the Center for Political Technologies. “The second motive is to limit the flow of Islamic State recruiters into Russia.”

Russian surveillance drones have been sighted over parts of Syria where other rebel groups are deployed, specifically those around Aleppo in Idlib Province that threaten Latakia. Drone activity has been absent in northeast Syria, where Islamic State militants controls major urban centers.

To American officials, the drone flights confirmed suspicions that Russia’s primary purpose in Syria is to bolster the fortunes of Mr. Assad’s deteriorating forces, not to fight terrorism. Military experts in Moscow, however, suggested that Russian drones lack the range to reach northeastern Syria, but had to stay within range of their base in Latakia, on the Mediterranean.

The Israeli newspaper Haaretz, quoting anonymous Israeli officials, reported that Russia had also informed Israeli security officials about an hour before the aerial strikes in Syria. Last week Mr. Putin and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel agreed to create a coordination mechanism to avoid confrontation between Israeli and Russian aircraft over Syria.

Russia had already said it would establish an information center in Baghdad so that Iran, Iraq and Syria could pool intelligence about the Islamic State, which controls wide stretches of territory in Iraq and Syria.