Thursday, 1 October 2015

Keep Talking, We’re Listening: Multinational EW Operations at JMRC

September 28, 2015 

Keep Talking, We’re Listening: Multinational EW Operations at JMRC

During a recent training rotation at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, I had the privilege and pleasure of leading the Observer/Coach-Trainer (O/C-T) team assigned to the Czech Electronic Warfare (EW) Company under the 7th Czech Brigade's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Battalion. The Czech 7th Brigade was the Multinational Brigade headquarters unit providing mission command for US, UK, and Czech Battalions. Units from Canada, Hungary, and Serbia provided additional forces and capabilities. The unique aspect of this rotation was the organic EW Company which enhanced situational awareness and targeting capabilities for the BDE. This can serve as a useful template for US Army EW systems acquisitions to enhance future BCT capabilities.

ALLIED SPIRIT II was a Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) exercise. The threat forces (OPFOR) included conventional, special purpose forces, irregular (militia) forces, insurgents, and criminal organizations. Civil considerations were extensive with internally displaced persons (IDPs), government corruption, fomenting insurgency, crumbling infrastructure and civil services. This allowed the decisive action doctrine of “Offense, Defense, Stability” to be fully trained with the assigned mission of restoring the international border and stabilizing fictitious area of Agjabadi province, Atropia. It is in this challenging and time constrained training environment that the Czech 7th Brigade led the coalition to good success.


In the multinational brigade the EW Company was responsible for; signals intercept, detection, geo-locations, and radio network analysis. The EW Company task organization consisted of 40 personnel, a RUP-FM-M1 (Pasivní Průzkumný System or Passive Reconnaissance System, Frequency Modulation, Mobile) system with two nodes, an MPRS2 (Mobilní Průzkumně Rušící Systém or Mobile Reconnaissance Jamming System) mobile unit, and MRTP3 (Malý RadioTechnický Pátrač or The Seeker Small Radio) signals analysis unit. In comparison EW personnel assigned to a US BCT have no organic Electronic Support (ES) systems and serve as advisors and integrators. Organic SIGINT assets assigned to the Military Intelligence Company such as the PROPHET or WOLFHOUND can provide ES if tasked to do so. My experience operating a ground based EA/ES platform in Afghanistan allowed SIGINT and EW to work together to maximize effects without ES being a distraction to the SIGINT mission. An equipment operator can only listen to one detection at a time, and the SIGINT mission is to understand the message. ES operations monitor all of the spectrum possible looking for frequency, modulation, and effective emitted power. As an analogy ES cares where crowds of people are talking, and SIGINT cares what people are talking about in crowds.

The EW company provided fixed site electronic support using three systems; RUP-FM-M, MPRS, and MRTP. The RUP-FM-M system can remotely link detection shelters employed on the ground or on the back of a vehicle. An antenna mast system must be employed and staked down with guy wires. The MPRS is a mobile system in an IVECO 4x4 vehicle which provides line of bearing to the strongest signal source within the frequency range of the equipment (tactical FM radios) and can provide jamming effects. The MRTP is a fixed site system that gives a line of bearing to a detected emission. The Company was divided into two locations connected by radio data link. A RUP-FM-M was on each site with the MRTP at the main site, and MPRS at the second site.

This combination of dedicated EW equipment and personnel allowed the EW Company to monitor the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) from 20 megahertz (long range analog radio) up to 18 gigahertz (digital satellite and RADAR signals). Due to the restrictions of German law and equipment the EW Company focused on unencrypted analog radio and RADAR signals during the exercise. The EW Coy has both the knowledge and equipment necessary to detect digital transmissions whether encrypted or not. The demodulation and decryption of digital traffic falls in the SIGINT realm and was not a training objective for the EW Company. The necessary ingredients for successful Electronic Support operations came together during the exercise. Ranging from functional detection equipment, through trained operators, to the ability to quickly communicate information from detections to decision makers. The bigger challenge lay in the human dimension, ensuring that “staff stovepipe” or compartmentalization did not stop the information flow from detector to decision maker. On the first day of force on force training the EW Company detected the OPFOR IL-220 fire finding radar. The IL-220 was priority target number one for both Brigade and the “NATO Rapid Deployment Corps, Hohenfels” (NRDCH). However, the azimuth detected was not used to refine the IL-220 targeting effort. The failure to prosecute that target further illustrates the importance of staff synchronization and Mission Command in the multinational brigade.

As an O/C-T I evaluated the Company’s ability to perform their assigned mission. The training scenario stressed commanders and staffs with a large amount of information to process in little time. When EW detections were reported their role in the targeting cycle was complete. The decision to confirm or deny information gathered through a detection falls on the commander. If a detection represents a lower priority than other operations the choice to take no action is valid. The EW Company clearly enhanced the MN BDE commander’s ability to visualize the battlefield and maintain situational awareness of events. Enabling the commander to make informed decisions that maximize the effectiveness of the MN BDE operations was the EW Company’s job, making decisions is always the commander’s responsibility. A detection system capable of looking at a large portion of the spectrum makes it easy to “drown in a sea of data.” This highlights the need to incorporate enablers early into the planning process. Fully developed PIR and targeting products will avoid “paralysis by analysis.” Having a robust Liaison Officer (LNO) system in place ensures the right people know at the right time to make informed decisions.

The Czech EW Company's classified detections as “immediate” or “routine” in nature. This ensured a manageable vertical flow of information. Immediate detections were reported to higher headquarters as soon as there was enough information to spur a decision by the commander. The priority information requirements (PIR) set the standard for classifying a detection as immediate. Routine detections were summarized into a multiple hour report sent to the Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell (EWCC). The EWCC input routine detections into a database for further analysis. This approach ensured immediate information passed to the Battle Captain quickly. The NATO SIGINT Electronic Warfare Operations Cell or “SEWOC” doctrine places the EW cell into the Intelligence section instead of under Fires. The Czech EWCC in the BN TOC followed NATO doctrine and was located in the Intelligence section. This proved more responsive at informing the commander of ES detections than US units who place the EW cell into the Fires or Effects sections. This difference also came with the price that the Czech BDE requested and used jamming sparingly where US units are much more aggressive in the use of Electronic Attack. U.S units should become familiar with the SEWOC doctrine to enhance interoperability with NATO allies.

During lulls in operations the EWCC could query the database by time, frequency, or location. The ability to data mine proved useful in supporting longer term lines of effort such as mapping different communications networks used by various groups in the exercise. Maintaining an ES detection database is a TTP that maximizes automation to analyze long term trends and ensures information is not lost. Database operations should be considered a best practice for units conducting ES operations.

The OPFOR at JMRC provide a world class training experience. They are products of a technology dependent culture. Readily available communication devices create a target rich environment for EW operators on the modern battlefield. Soldiers and civilians alike are used to electronic devices on their person interacting with the spectrum at all times. This constantly connected generation creates both cyber and EW vulnerabilities for exploitation. A lesson learned is that it will take very serious training to instill the need for strict radio discipline to a generation accustomed to being constantly connected. 

Peer and near peer adversaries have invested heavily into EW capabilities for ground maneuver forces. This investment provides an opportunity to gain an asymmetric advantages over forces dependent on wireless communication. Electronic warfare capabilities are viewed as an ability to nullify American combat power. Some recent examples demonstrating asymmetric advantages include the capture of an RQ-170 stealth drone in Iran4 using a combination of jamming and GPS spoofing as well as recovered ground station receivers in Iraq that insurgents used to receive Predator video feeds5. To use Russia as an example of a peer nation with extensive EW capabilities I offer the following statement:

The Russians have continued to move forward with their EW modernization. They have demonstrated the ability to completely shut down everything the Ukrainians are using in terms of communications. OSCE has reported that the drones they use for monitoring are being interfered with. Again, this is not something you can craft in your basement. There is imagery, public pictures of Russian systems in Crimea that are absolute state of the art.

-LTG Ben Hodges, USAREUR Commander6

Electronic Warfare works both ways. A cunning opponent can adopt measures to mislead a BLUFOR commander to chase false leads or adopt multiple redundant networks to create the impression of a larger force. These two simple examples illustrate why Electronic Support information is not directly targetable, and must be confirmed/denied by another asset such as UAV, scout, or other sensing system. However ES information is rapidly available for real time queuing of assets across the multinational brigade. The absence of filtering through intelligence sanitization processes and made EW the most responsive detector in the ISR Battalion during ALLIED SPIRIT II.

Dedicated ground based electronic support assets require the multinational Brigade staff rapidly process detections to gain an information advantage. The lack of familiarity with a “new” asset was the largest limitation to the effectiveness of EW supporting information driven operations during ALLIED SPIRIT II. This limitation was overcome but highlights the need to have the right persons and institutional knowledge base in place to synthesize information from all ISR assets to drive operations. The targeting cycle; decide, detect, deliver, assess (D3A) must be a robust staff process to take full advantage of EW detections. The relationships and communication among the staff elements is the key to maximize efficient use of ISR assets. Efficient use of ISR allows the commander to leverage the advantages of superior situational awareness.

The use of Liaison Officers (LNO) is a best practice for all enablers. LNOs can provide subject matter expertise to commanders and staff who are not familiar with new capabilities. The EW Company employed this with their higher headquarters through the EWCC. The ISR BN S2 used the information gained from the EW Company to request a jamming effect on OPFOR communications during a deliberate attack. An EW LNO was not embedded with the brigade headquarters so the same level of success was not replicated across the entire multinational brigade.

The use of LNOs can be counterintuitive. Giving up competent individuals leaves the organic unit lessened but the overall capabilities of the multinational brigade enhanced. Headquarters units without habitual relationships to subordinate units, even from the same military, should embrace a robust LNO capability to provide redundant communications and subject matter experts on unit capabilities to commanders and staffs. Since the US Army EW community is small, it will hurt to give up a high performing NCO, Warrant Officer, or Officer to serve as an LNO to an allied EW unit or HQ. The gains in information sharing, shortened learning curve, and overall multinational Brigade effectiveness is the payoff from high quality LNOs.

The takeaway from this exercise extends beyond the tactical employment of electronic warfare assets in a multinational environment. Each nation brings unique capabilities to the team and learning how to maximize the effectiveness of these capabilities requires consistent training among the different militaries. It is my experience that multinational maneuver elements adapt quickly to the tactical situation which is due to familiarity with combat arms formations and capabilities across nations. However, the use of enablers such as EW require additional training and education across the force for effective employment as they cannot be intuitively understood by a combat slant with a few caveats. Given the EW capabilities of potential adversaries it is imperative to continue training the force on how to quickly integrate allied EW assets into the multinational brigade. Furthermore, the US military can learn a lot from ALLIED SPIRIT II when configuring our own BCTs in the future with respect to what assets are organic and which are not to enable future formations to successfully execute operations.

End Notes








James Armstrong is an Electronic Warfare Officer serving in Europe. Previous experience includes conducting electronic warfare in support of a Brigade Task Force in Regional Command South, Afghanistan.

US Air Force’s New Top-Secret Bomber Faces Further Delays

September 30, 2015

This Tuesday, during a hearing of the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee’s Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee, the U.S. Air Force announced that it will delay awarding a contract to develop the top-secret Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B)military.com reports.

In his testimony, Lieutenant-General Arnold Bunch, military deputy for the office of the assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisition said that “[t]his is a case, sir, where we need to go slow to go fast. We’ve got a fair, deliberate, disciplined and impartial process anytime that we do a competition. And we’ve been transparent and working with industry trying to get this thoroughly done and documented so we can make that decision. It’s coming soon. That’s about as good as I can give you.”

The hawkish chairman of the House Armed Services Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee Randy Forbes, however, was clearly not impressed with the general’s opaque answer: “Do we have any idea whether that’s going to be two months, 10 years? When what do we think?” To which Bunch replied that a decision will be made “within the next couple of months.”


The contract was originally supposed to be awarded this September. Northrup Grumman is competing against a Boeing-Lockheed Martin partnership to be the primary contractor for the LRS-B. Both sides allegedly have two very robust designs at hand, which substantially would accelerate the development of the new weapons platform once a winner has been selected, a point that Bunch likes to emphasize.

“What we’ve focused on with LRS-B is trying to make sure the technology is more mature than we’ve ever started a program [with],” Bunch, said at a recent event hosted by the U.S. Air Force Association, according toDefense News. “Based on where we are at and what industry partners have done, we are confident this is going to be more mature, technology-wise, than any new development program we’ve ever started.”

During yesterday’s hearing, Forbes also questioned Bunch and Randall Walden, director of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, about recent calculation errors when compiling total costs of the program. While Walden said that he is “very confident” with the current cost estimates, Bunch admitted that the miscalculation was a “regrettable error” the reasons for which are currently being investigated. (Since the LRS-B project is a special access program it does not report detailed program information in unclassified budget justification documents.)

As I reported previously (See: “Will the US Air Force’s Top-Secret Bomber Cost 3 Billion Per Plane?”) in 2014, the Pentagon’s ten-year budget estimate for fiscal years 2015-2025 for the bomber program was $33.1 billion. However, in 2015 the estimate for fiscal years 2016-2026 suddenly jumped up to $58.4 billion. The U.S. Air Force then stated that both numbers are, in fact, wrong and that the actual ten-year costs (the first installment in the 30-year program) are $41.7 billion for each period.

The U.S. Air Force is expected to buy 80 to 100 bombers. The LRS-B, likely to be designed B-3, is purported to have stealth capability, carry both conventional and nuclear weapons, and will, in all likelihood, be optionally manned (See: “What Do We Know About the US Air Force’s New Bomber?”).













A Dangerous Game: Responding to Chinese Cyber Activities

By Ryan Pickrell
September 29, 2015

Prior to last week’s summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Barack Obama, much speculation centered on the possibility of American sanctions against China for state-sponsored, as well as unmanaged private, criminal activity in cyberspace. China has been accused of engaging in state-sponsored hacking, as well as corporate and political espionage. In many political and academic circles, there is a strong belief that the United States needs to punish China for espionage and cyber attacks against government agencies and American companies.

During the meeting between Xi and Obama last week, the two leaders agreed to work together to establish “international rules for the road in cyberspace” and to avoid engaging in state-sponsored criminal activities in cyberspace. Many wonder whether or not China will uphold its commitments; even Obama said, “We will be watching carefully to make an assessment as to whether progress has been made in this area.” He suggested that if China fails to make good on its word, the U.S. may choose to use sanctions to punish China. Many others believe that the time for talk has come and gone, and that disciplinary action is required now. Fair enough, but how will this play out in the long run?


First, calling China out for cybercrime is essentially the pot calling the kettle black. While it is true that China leads the world in cybercrime, the United States is right behind it. Chinese cyber attacks against government agencies and American companies have had seriously devastating effects and warrant a response, but after theleak concerning NSA activities abroad by Edward Snowden and reports of American espionage in other countries, including several allies and long-time strategic partners, the U.S. hardly has the moral high ground, which means that calling out China for its activities in cyberspace is unlikely to generate significant international support or encourage other states in the international system to rally around the banner.

Moreover, with Europe overwhelmed by economic opportunities linked to cooperation with China and Asia’s fear of China’s newfound military power and potential exclusion from Chinese economic activities, America’s geopolitical influence is not what it once was. The unipolar moment has ended, and the U.S. is required to change the way it interacts with other great powers, particularly assertive powers like China and Russia.

Second, because the United States does not have evidence that proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that China committed the crimes of which it has been accused, sanctions are likely to be perceived not as a punishment, but as the desperate act of a critically wounded superpower in decline. Realist theory argues that conflict between an established power and a rising challenger is inevitable, for if the hegemon, feeling a need to protect its power, does not preemptively attack or move to contain the power of the rising challenger, then the rising challenger, motivated by a need to become the dominant power, will, assuming the benefits outweigh the costs, move to cripple or weaken the established power. China regularly claims that it is a rising state, but one that is rising peacefully and poses no threat to other states, including the United States. Chinese officials have been promoting the “peaceful rise” rhetoric for a little over a decade now. If the U.S. chooses to sanction China, China is guaranteed to claim that the U.S., caught up in its outdated “Cold War mentality” and motivated by numerous insecurities and feelings of increasing vulnerability, is trying to cripple China and contain its rise. Considering the budding Sino-Russian friendship, Russia’s strong desire to bring about the emergence of a multipolar world order, and current tensions between Russia and the U.S., Russia will surely offer its support to China and criticize American sanctions. Additionally, it is likely that China will increase reports, both at home and abroad, of American cyber attacks against China. Regardless of whether or not these reports are true, there will be countries that believe the rhetoric, and this will definitely affect America’s image abroad

Third, in mainland China, American sanctions will likely go a long way towards bolstering support for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Chinese nationalism is based on feelings of humiliation, fear, and pride. China is proud of its long history, for much of which China was the dominant power in Asia, and is very aware of its fall from glory in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. China is primarily motivated by the “Century of Humiliation” national narrative, a tale of victimization at the hands of imperial powers that simultaneously promotes a fear and a distrust of the international system, the liberal world order, and the United States, which is seen as the last of the imperialist powers. This story encourages the widely held belief that China should take steps to correct past mistakes and reclaim its position atop of the Asian hierarchy. The government often uses external enemies to bolster support for the party. Chinese government officials have convinced the people that China has never done anything to harm another state and that all actions that negatively affect China are nothing more than attempts to once again humiliate China; this increases domestic support for party leadership and presents the party as the savior and protector of the Chinese nation. As a result of domestic censorship, patriotic education initiatives, and state control over the media, the Chinese people view the world and the actions of other states through this lens. China always plays the victim, and it will be no different this time around. If the United States imposes sanctions against China, it will be presented domestically as an attempt by the United States to humiliate China and prevent it from rising to great power status. Rather than make political reform in China, which has long been an American aspiration, more likely, it will actually strengthen party leadership and make reform, already unlikely, an impossible dream.

‘Punishment Diplomacy’

Four, “punishment diplomacy,” a dangerous yet popular expression that is already quite prominent in China and appears every time the United States sells weapons to Taiwan, meets with the Dalai Lama, flies spy planes through what is perceived as Chinese air space, and sails naval vessels through Chinese waters, is likely to become even more popular, which will increase domestic support for assertive and aggressive Chinese actions abroad. Since Xi Jinping stepped up in 2013, China has become increasingly assertive; however, public opinion in China, which encourages peace and restraint in most state-to-state interactions, excluding those with China’s long-time enemy Japan, has actually helped to keep Chinese assertiveness in check. Since the decentralization of Chinese foreign policy, public opinion, especially online, has had a greater effect on Chinese foreign policies. If Chinese citizens feel that the United States is threatening China, which is, considering China’s culture and history, exactly how Chinese citizens will feel, public opinion will shift, and the public will start to encourage government officials to take a tougher stance against the United States. Without public support for restraint, the world may see the emergence of a China that is significantly more assertive than anything seen previously.

Five, the United States must never overlook the fact that China is a master of moves and countermoves. Just as is true in physics, in international politics, for every action, there is an opposite reaction; however, it may not be equal. In response to the U.S. rebalance, China launched the Asia-Pacific Dream, which proposed that Asian affairs be handled by Asian states. When Obama promised to strengthen alliances in the Asia-Pacific, China nearly started a war over territorial issues with Vietnam. In response to America’s Trans-Pacific Partnership, China launched its massive “One Road, One Belt” initiative. When the United States and Japan failed to respect China within the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, China started the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. All previous actions were simple moves and countermoves in a geopolitical power struggle; sanctioning will, however, be perceived as a direct attack, and China will not respond well to being publicly shamed. It is difficult to say how China will respond to sanctions against it, but it will respond, and the result may very well be more than the United States can handle.

Is it necessary for the United States to find a way to deal with Chinese criminal activity in cyberspace? Absolutely. But, this is a very dangerous game. It is important that the United States have no illusions about what it is getting itself into. Some have suggested that punishing China for its unwillingness to adhere to international norms will encourage China to get in line and follow the rules. Considering Chinese culture and past Chinese reactions, this is highly unlikely. Sanctions may very well lead to a serious deterioration of Sino-American relations and increased confrontation and, possibly, conflict between China and the United States. American officials need to approach this situation with the understanding that the end result may be very problematic. For nearly two decades now, China and the United States have maintained a superficial friendship; that era is likely to end if the United States puts sanctions on China. Anyone who thinks that sanctions will bring about a stronger relationship between these two countries and further integrate China into the international system needs to abandon idealism and look at this situation for what it is, a major spark which could start a very serious fire.













how the mysterious dark net is going mainstream


Jamie Bartlett: 

How the mysterious dark net is going mainstream 


There’s a parallel Internet you may not have run across yet — accessed by a special browser and home to a freewheeling collection of sites for everything from anonymous activism to illicit ctivities. Jamie Bartlett reports from the dark net.

Imp Papers

by Rana Banerji, Senior Fellow, DPG

1) Pakistan: Recent Political Developments (September 2015)
Rana Banerji analyzes the latest changes to Pakistan’s political scene and considers developments in its judiciary and the latest military promotions. 
The publication can be accessed here.

2) Issue Brief by Ambassador Jayant Prasad, Advisor, Foreign Policy Program and Sabika Zehra, Research Associate, DPG

Connectivity in South Asia: Transforming the Cooperation Discourse (September 2015)
Connectivity and infrastructure lie at the very core of regional cooperation and integration, their key enablers. This paper first assesses the state of South Asian economies, comparing relevant indices concerning trade and transportation relative to Southeast Asia, and the lacunae in their mutual connectivity, and suggests possible remedial action.
The publication can be accessed here.

DPG is also pleased to present two Issue Briefs on China's One Road, One Belt initiative:

3) Issue Brief by Ambassador Jayant Prasad, Advisor, Foreign Policy Program, DPG

One Belt and Many Roads: China’s Initiative and India’s Response (September 2015)

Analyzing China's One Belt One Road initiative, Ambassador Prasad explores whether there is a consonance between the respective visions of China and India about the future geo-economic and geo-strategic configuration of Asia, and whether the two countries can work together on this initiative. 

The publication can be accessed here.

4) Issue Brief by Ravni Thakur, Senior Fellow, DPG

One Belt, One Road: China’s New Strategic and Trade Policy (September 2015)
Surveying Chinese views, Ravni Thakur considers the goals and implications of China's One Belt, One Road initiative and takes a look at India's policy options in response to the changing geopolitical realities. 
The publication can be accessed here.

Broadband is the key infrastructure for the 21st century


Broadband is coming to be seen as crucial infrastructure for the 21st century, as were roads and electricity for the 20th. But what does a genuinely 21st century broadband network look like?


Earlier this month, the US Broadband Opportunity Council declared that broadband is “taking its place alongside water, sewer and electricity as essential infrastructure for communities”.

Descriptors like “very fast” (Australia), “superfast” (UK), “ultra-fast” (New Zealand) or “ultra-high speed” (Singapore) reinforce the message that speed is an essential component of good broadband.

But what would a genuinely 21st century broadband infrastructure look like? And can the National Broadband Network (NBN) under the stewardship of Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull fit the bill?

High bar

Around the world there are broadband projects that give us a taste of what 21st century broadband might look like. One is Google Fiber, which promises “endless possibilities” along with 1 gigabit per second (Gbps) download and upload speeds in three American cities.

In comparison, the ADSL2+ broadband serving more than 5 million Australian households today has a maximum download speed of about 20 megabits per second (Mbps) and upload of 8Mbps. However, real-world speeds are typically significantly lower.

Today’s fastest NBN plans offer 100Mbps download and 40 Mbps upload, although NBN Co’s original fibre-to-the-premises approach could match Google Fiber’s gigabit speeds.

Google has plans to expand Google Fiber to more cities in the US, making it one of the most high profile private sector broadband initiatives globally. But it is far from the only one.

In cities around the world, many companies are building new broadband networks that offer symmetrical gigabit speeds (1,000Mbps downloadsand uploads) and more competitive pricing than incumbent broadband providers.

In the US, more than 100 cities have joined the Next Century Cities alliance, sharing expertise to bring “fast, reliable, and affordable Internet – at globally competitive speeds” to their communities.

A successful example of this approach is in Chattanooga, Tennessee, where the community-owned electric utility company built and operates a fibre network connecting every home and business.

In addition to offering symmetrical gigabit broadband, the network has improved the reliability, resiliency and responsiveness of Chattanooga’s electrical services. It also provides a platform for economic development that drives growth and innovation in the city.

The people of rural Lancashire in England were tired of waiting for better broadband, so they took matters into their own hands. They raised money from the community, and volunteers learned how to install fibre.

Their broadband for the Rural North (B4RN) project now delivers gigabit symmetrical broadband to more than 1,000 households.

Singapore’s Next Generation Nationwide Broadband Network connects all Singaporean homes and businesses to an open access fibre network, meaning that any qualified provider can deliver services using the network. Many ISPs now offer symmetrical gigabit connectivity over this national network, with plans to offer even faster speeds in future.

These initiatives serve different constituencies in different ways, with three very important commonalities. Each project has built, or is building, a new fibre-optical network that connects directly to homes and other premises. Each has developed a business model that allows customers unlimited symmetrical access at the fastest possible speeds.

Speeds can also be increased in future by upgrading networking equipment, allowing for faster data transfer over the fibre. Additionally, these fast, unlimited internet services are offered at a reasonable price, typically less than A$100 per month.

By demonstrating what is possible, these projects are likely to shape expectations of what fixed-line broadband networks can deliver in future. The willingness of local communities, municipal and national governments and private sector organisations to invest in new fibre networks demonstrates that there are business models that work, today.

Bringing it home

Opportunities for using broadband to deliver services to citizens in innovative, economical and convenient ways are well understood. Research also suggests that increased uptake of broadband technologies results in economic growth, providing strong rationale for public investment in broadband infrastructure.

However, when he was Minister for Communications, Malcolm Turnbull instructed the National Broadband Network company (nbn) to meet short-term needs by incorporating existing copper and HFC networks into a multi-technology mix network.

But if broadband is indeed becoming as essential as roads, water and electricity, the current patchwork approach will be insufficient to enable the innovation, productivity and socio-economic activities already possible on the networks described above.

The approaches discussed above show that investment in broadband infrastructure can deliver uniform, affordable, and very high quality service. New models provide services without limits or constraints, enabling innovation and experimentation with the possibility of increasing network capacity to meet demands for services that have yet to be invented.

Embracing broadband

A few days after taking office, Prime Minister Turnbull announced “a 21st Century Government and a ministry for the future”. He called for Australia to become more competitive, more innovative and more productive. He called for increased efficiency in service delivery, and spoke of integration across all levels of government to ensure the prosperity of Australian cities.

He did not mention the National Broadband Network, but he would understand the important role that broadband can play in facilitating his objectives and know that there is enormous opportunity for his government to explore the potential of 21st century broadband.

A good first step would be to articulate the ways that broadband underpins innovation, productivity and integration across his ministries and across the Australian economy, in cities and in rural and remote regions.

With a clear set of outcomes in mind, the government may then reconsider its commitment to a plan that constrains and limits the capacity of the NBN, and may even hinder Australia’s future prosperity.

This article was originally published on The Conversation.

Why the ‘New’ US Trilateral Dialogue With Japan and India Matters

October 01, 2015

On September 29, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry hosted the foreign ministers of Japan and India for the first ever trilateral ministerial meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

The event was no doubt a significant development. While the United States, Japan, and India have been meeting at the assistant secretary level over the past few years, this meeting between their foreign ministers represents an official elevation of the trilateral dialogue.

For close observers of Asian security affairs, this was a long-anticipated development. Though the idea of elevating the trilateral dialogue has been discussed since 2011, the seventh iteration of the U.S.-Japan-India trilateral dialogue held in Honolulu in June was still at the assistant secretary of state level. But as I reported forThe Diplomat in July, Vice President Joe Biden said in a speech at a Washington, D.C.-based think tank that Washington was “looking to schedule a ministerial level trilateral” this fall (See: “US Will Hold Elevated Trilateral Dialogue with India and Japan”).


That this has finally occurred is testament to the growing role that all three democracies – which represent a quarter of the world’s population and economic production power – have played individually in the Indo-Pacific region as well as the convergence between them. As Kerry alluded to in his remarks to reporters before the meeting, the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific under the Obama administration, India’s new Act East Policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Japan’s reinvigorated role as a ‘proactive contributor to peace’ under its premier Shinzo Abe, have all been powerful indicators of the importance these players attach to the region (See for instance: “Modi Unveils India’s ‘Act East Policy’ to ASEAN in Myanmar”). All three legs of the triangle have also been strengthened recently, with positive momentum seen in U.S.-India, U.S.-Japan and India-Japan ties over the past year (See for instance: “Modi in Japan: Great Expectations”).

The ministerial meeting itself also provided a venue for all sides to make advances on a range of important security, economic and diplomatic issues. On maritime security, it is worth noting that all three countries have already stepped up efforts to boost the capacity of individual Southeast Asian states to tackle various challenges, including China’s growing assertiveness (See for instance: “Japan Gifts Vietnam Patrol Vessel Amid South China Sea Tensions”).

But the big-ticket agenda item, as I have written previously, is Japan’s already confirmed participation in this year’s iteration of the MALABAR exercise, originally a U.S.-India bilateral exercise, which the meeting noted (See: “Japan to Join US, India in Military Exercises This Year”). The key thing to watch moving forward is whether this multilateralization can somehow be made permanent, as some U.S. officials have been calling for (See: US Official Calls for Permanent Expansion of Malabar Exercises with India”). Aside from this, the three countries also agreed to convene an experts-level group on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to enhance capabilities to respond jointly to complex disasters.

On economic issues, cooperation is a bit more challenging. India is the odd one out among the three economically, with it still not being a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and far from eligible for membership in the still-to-be-concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (See: “Finishing the TPP: It’s Not Just About the US Congress”).

However, the meeting did at least attempt to make progress in spite of this. The three ministers launched an expert-level group to identify collaborative efforts on regional connectivity, a critical issue within regional economic integration in general and for ASEAN in particular. Trilateral cooperation on women’s skill enhancement and economic empowerment will also be explored. And to add to the buzz we have been hearing over the past few months about a stronger push for India’s admission into APEC, both Modi as well as his foreign minister Sushma Swaraj mentioned this in the context of the trilateral.

Diplomatically, all three countries are members of the East Asia Summit (EAS), dialogue partners of ASEAN, and interested parties in the resolution of the South China Sea dispute. Little surprise, then, that public statements noted that all three had once again noted the centrality of ASEAN and underscored the importance of international law, freedom of navigation and overflight, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

As I have noted before, there has been talk about Japan in particular becoming more involved in the South China Sea (See: “US-Japan Joint Patrols in the South China Sea?”). But as for the shaping of the regional architecture, including the further institutionalization of the EAS — some desire to cement its place as the premier leaders’ forum for strategic dialogue – the specifics of that will be revealed in November when the meeting is held under Malaysia’s chairmanship (See: “What Did the 26th ASEAN Summit Achieve?”).

Of course, with this being the first trilateral ministerial meeting, there will be worries about whether the momentum can be sustained through next year and beyond. But as Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida noted in his remarks, changes within the region are driving the advent of a new era that make the Indo-Pacific “the epicenter of global prosperity.” For now, it is difficult to see the three Asia-Pacific giants shying away from shaping this epicenter both individually and collectively.