Wednesday, 30 September 2015

RMA in the Indian Context

By Lt Gen Prakash Katoch
30 Sep , 2015

Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) can be defined as “A major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of technologies, which combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of operations.” Transformation is essential to cope with these changes and most countries have put in place organisations dedicated to conceptualising and implementing transformation.

Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) can be considered a phenomenon that is some four decades old. Soviet Military thinkers during the period 1960 to 1970 first dabbled with RMA (though the term ‘RMA’ was not coined by them). The Soviet experiment was primarily with respect to the impact of nuclear weapons and Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Their focus was to dovetail the employment of nuclear weapons into their war-fighting doctrine, giving them the cutting edge in future wars. More than a decade later, in the mid-eighties, Chief of Soviet General Staff Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov revived the debate about RMA with reference to precision guided conventional weapons. The concept caught the fancy of the US much later, who actually coined the term RMA.


Militaries worldwide have been experimenting with and adopting RMA. Chinese interest in RMA in the structure of future US armed forces remains strong and is adequately incorporated into the Chinese strategic military doctrine. Their interest in the RMA theory and practice was accelerated due to the dramatic and speedy US victory over Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War wherein US dominance was achieved through precision weaponry, satellites and superior information and communications technology. The power of technological advances coupled with matching strategy and concepts, organisations and training was fully apparent. This was a catalyst for the Chinese PLA to get going on the path to ‘informisation’.

RMA results when a nation seizes an opportunity to transform its military doctrine, training, equipment, tactics, operations and strategy in a coherent pattern…

Throughout history, advances in technology and strategy have revolutionised the way wars are fought. Many definitions have been coined to describe the nuances of RMA. Wikipedia says that “The military concept of RMA is a theory about the future of warfare, often connected to technological and organisational recommendations for change.” RMA results when a nation seizes an opportunity to transform its military, doctrine, training, organisation, equipment, tactics, operations and strategy in a coherent pattern in order to wage war in a novel and more effective manner.

RMA can be defined as “A major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of technologies, which combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of operations.” Transformation is essential to cope with these changes and most countries have put in place organisations dedicated to conceptualising and implementing transformation.

Global debate on RMA is centered on the following perspectives: one, this perspective highlights the political, social, and economic factors worldwide, which might require a completely different type of military and organisational structure to apply force. It focuses primarily upon changes in the nation state and the role of an organised military in using force; two, this most common “System of Systems” perspective on RMA highlights the evolution of weapon technology, information technology, military organisations and military doctrine including three overlapping areas for force assets – Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) and Precision Force and three, this portrays the pessimistic view that a ‘true’ RMA has not yet occurred or is unlikely to occur since much of the technology and weapon systems ascribed to contemporary RMA have been under development for quite some time. However, the bottom line is that RMA is an ongoing phenomenon with no specific start or end point. Perhaps it is akin to the pursuit of excellence which is a never ending process.

Militaries need RMA to create positive asymmetrical capabilities and comprehensive competitive edge over adversaries…

Why RMA?

Militaries need RMA to create positive asymmetrical capabilities and comprehensive competitive edge over adversaries plus transforming their current perception and thinking. Technological advances enable precision delivery of enormous firepower of hundreds of mega tonnes on a given target thousands of kilometres away. Destruction of satellites in orbit is possible.

The capability has increased phenomenally in ‘mass’ and ‘range’ but the ‘time’ factor is frighteningly compressed; battle is being viewed and decided in near real time. Real time communication links and the advent of aggressive media coverage enable viewing the battle from the bedroom. Everyone from the man on the battlefield to the entire chain of command and control right up to the chief political executive and the populace are on the same real time grid. The implication for the military is that decisions have to be taken with great swiftness and efficacy – and the entire, consultation-decision making process has to be radically reviewed. This calls for radical changes in our organisational structures, work culture, war fighting capabilities, doctrines and operational concepts.

Nuances

RMA involves a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations which creates new core competencies in dimensions of warfare that render obsolete or irrelevant one or more core competencies of erstwhile dominant players. The Blitzkrieg of Germany created new operational and tactical level models for land warfare, rendering the static lines of defence obsolete. During the World War II, Carrier Warfare created new tactical and operational level models for battle at sea, rendering large battleships obsolete. The introduction of ICBMs has created a new dimension of warfare initiating a new core competency of long range, accurate delivery of high-yield nukes. Anti-satellite capability, Space Warfare and Cyber Warfare have ushered in yet more core competencies. Rise in RMA has also enforced antidotes in the shape of asymmetric and fourth generation wars, the application of which is countering the RMA of the US Military in Afghanistan and Iraq to a considerable extent.

It is generally opined that RMA is driven by technological advancements made in recent past in Information Technology (IT) and changes in the fields of communications, computers and networks. This is only partly true; limiting RMA to only systems would be highly incorrect. Recent technological advancements actually require revolutionary changes in the manner in which we conduct our military business since RMA encompasses the entire military organisation.

RMA involves a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations which creates new core competencies…

There are four basic tenets. First, RMA is not simply technological but concerns significant progress and change in at least the important military related areas of technology, organisation, doctrine and operational concepts. Second, changes or progress in the above areas of technology, organisation, doctrine and operational concepts by themselves do not represent a true RMA, but rather it is the synergistic combination of these developments, which forms true RMA and alters the nature of warfare. Third, RMA emerges from revolutionary changes of historic magnitude within the broader social, economic and political environment of national and global societies, which in turn offer the conditions for RMA to be recognised, appreciated, internalised and exploited. Fourth, the smooth and successful process of recognition, appreciation, internalisation and exploitation requires flexibility, acceptability, innovation and openness to change particularly on the part of the military.

Force Application

Factors that are relevant to RMA are time, technological capabilities, percentage adaptability of technology, Human Resources (HR), inertia of the organisation, net-centric culture and security vulnerabilities. Increasing use of high technology, well-trained HR that understands the requirements of RMA and a net-centric culture, which refers to organisational policies and strategies, favour growth in RMA. Conversely, non-adaptive technology that does not lend to innovation and upgradation which can occur with a large import content, larger mass and poor security in implementation reduces the capability for RMA.

Increase in network-centric culture (largely a state of mind) causes an exponential rise in RMA. Measures for enhancing RMA include development of long range precision attack capability, integration of civilian hardware industry for defence production in common use technological areas and specific security measures particularly in the telecommunication sector to ensure proprietary protocols and standards through which they would have full control over the networks.

Increase in network-centric culture causes exponential rise in RMA…

Emerging trends of warfare have greater emphasis on the sub-conventional. Force application throughout the war continuum must be at the locus of engagement with the enemy. It must be ‘joint’ and could be virtual not necessarily physical, but it may include operations in the diplomatic, economic, information and military domains. These national level applications must be in place 365 days and 24×7 and even during ‘peace time’ since the military continues to be engaged in low intensity operations. The Army would require to continue as a manpower intensive and has to be equipped and networked for such operations with the internal security organs of the state. The Navy is similarly faced with low-intensity maritime threats, heightened after 26/11 Mumbai terror attack and requires addressing at a different plane. The Air Force in support role will need its own force multipliers, inter-operable with sister Services. Moving up to higher levels of the war continuum even the Army will need to be more and more machine intensive.

At the tri-Service/national levels, the far end of war would deal with the application of Ballistic Missiles, Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence and Nuclear weapons. Each zone of the war continuum requires transformation and synergy with different instruments of state power and a differential in the level of man-machine interface requirements. Inter-Service jointness simply has to be enforced as fait-accompli. Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is perhaps the most important component of RMA. The challenge is to do it within an organised framework and with full security.

NCW allows us to move from an approach based upon the massing of forces to one based upon the massing of effects. This allows us to reduce our battle space footprint which, in turn, reduces risk because we avoid presenting the enemy with attractive high value targets. Empowered with knowledge derived from a shared awareness of the battle space and a shared understanding of the Commander’s intent, our forces can display initiative to meet the Commander’s intent and be more effective when operating autonomously. Increase in NCW capabilities will exponentially enhance RMA.

Globally, militaries have researched and considered RMA as an organisational concept…

Political Direction

Globally, militaries have researched and considered RMA as an organisational concept. The nations which have capitalised on RMA have possessed very strong and focused political direction and legislation to enforce systemized programmes for its implementation. Axiomatically, the infrastructure and investment demands are heavy and many countries have not invested required sums in defence, especially where the potential of RMA is not grasped by the establishment.

A successful revolution also requires key bureaucracies to possess certain institutional characteristics that enable them to direct technological advances to dramatically improve military efficiency and efficacy. Developed countries that have had exponential increase in RMA, have adopted a Top Down approach emanating from the political apex. They made organisational changes necessary to accelerate synergy in the Armed Forces. This despite critics pointing out that a ‘revolution’ within the military ranks might carry detrimental consequences, produce severe economic strain and ultimately prove counterproductive.

RMA in China

China is actively promoting RMA with Chinese characteristics and making focused advancements in national defence and armed forces modernisation. Top Chinese military and civilian officials have periodically affirmed the importance and relevance of RMA to China’s military modernisation. Inspired by the 1991 Gulf War and subsequent US actions in Kosovo, China is shaping the modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army in the context of global trends in military transformation. To some Western analysts, the Chinese RMA is limited to ‘pockets of excellence’ only, since large amount of weaponry and technology is still imported.

A successful revolution also requires key bureaucracies to possess certain institutional characteristics…

It would be prudent for India to take note and monitor the Chinese RMA experiment. Chinese military technologies and production capabilities are impressive. Massive technological progress has been realised in short span incorporating sophisticated foreign technology and enabling the PLA to take advantage of an RMA of leading foreign militaries. China has hitched its technological evolution to the global train by committing itself to a more open economy and breaking the paradox of the snail paced ‘self-reliance only’ concept.

In terms of field of force structuring, the PLA has achieved growth in asymmetric capabilities. They have invested heavily in submarines and guided missile destroyers to counter a probable US Carrier Battle Group in the stand-off against Taiwan, making sea capability the answer to a superior US forces sea control capability. The Chinese are not only investing in PLA and military hardware but in all aspects of Diplomatic, Information Operations, Military and Economic (DIME) including foreign governments in India’s immediate neighbourhood and the Indian Ocean Region.

The PLA is being ‘informised’, downsized and the older leadership is being replaced with a younger and more technological aware force. Thousands of all ranks are being put through advanced studies in RMA related subjects on a yearly basis. Specific appointments for General Officers are tenable by those having had tri-Service experience or satisfying laid down technological criteria. Other measures include advanced ICBMs, nuke delivery systems and an undeclared chemical weapons capability; advanced satellite and anti-satellite capabilities; extensive third dimension capability, Rapid Reaction Forces, expanding Blue Water Navy and a formidable Air Force; potent Cyber warfare capability, political will to use it and increasing offensive potential in this context; large chip manufacturing capability; ongoing organisational adjustments in addition to mere downsizing. Reorganised logistics organisations are being put in place; development of sub conventional/asymmetric warfare capabilities. Media reports of support to the ULFA (including Paresh Barua’s base in Chinese territory), Maoists in Nepal and many such measures are indicative of this.

It would be prudent for India to take note and monitor the Chinese RMA experiment…

RMA in the Indian Military

Our military requires organisational changes that are necessary to give an impetus to synergising the Armed Forces towards integration and achieving RMA. These changes have to be driven from the top political leadership of the country. In the USA, the catalyst for the transformation process commenced with former Secretary of Defence, Donald H Rumsfeld; the US Department of Defence created US Joint Forces Command as the transformation laboratory of the US Military to force the US Armed forces into jointness. The Goldwater Nichols Act brought about revolutionary changes in the US Armed forces, accelerating synergy and boosting RMA. In China, the change was ushered in by Jiang Zemin and its implementation overseen by the Central Military Commission and Chief of General Staff of the PLA. In Germany, the transformation process was initiated by the Berlin Decree which aimed to integrate the Armed forces ensuring reaping full benefits of ongoing technological advancements. The German Chief of the Defence Forces is overseeing the transformation of the Armed Forces in was appointed. In India, even a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), though recommended by the Kargil Review Committee has yet to be appointed. Jointness in Services simply has to be forced from the top. Perhaps only an Act of Parliament can enforce this.

RMA can hardly be de-linked from the Indian State. Aside from lack of political direction, complete lack of military professionals in the MoD and the defence-industrial complex (DRDO-DPSUs-OF) has brought us to a sorry state, some of the indicators being – void of a National Security Strategy and Comprehensive Defence Review; the military lacks the required synergy including joint war fighting doctrine and organisations that facilitate implementing jointness. HQ IDS has not been integrated with the MoD and lacks operational responsibility and authority.

RMA can hardly be de-linked from the Indian State…

A CDS is yet to be appointed despite specific recommendations made by the Kargil Review Committee a decade ago. The Tri-Service NCW Doctrine and Enterprise NCW Architecture are yet to be evolved. Tri-Service net-centricity is absent. A large number of command and control equipment and networks are being established but lack common standards and protocols. Several inter-operability constraints exist both intra-Service and inter-Service. Long-range stand-off precision attack capability against land targets is limited though being built up; procurement of weapons platforms and equipment need to cater for technological adaptation; the ability of technological entities to be integrated for synergised joint operations and the scope for innovation.

Air Defence capability is limited and differences between the Services as to who controls the Air Space remain unresolved; establishment of army’s Tac C3I and TCS systems are inordinately delayed; no dedicated Defence Band has been allocated in the spectrum – adequate bandwidths are not available to exploit technology; development of HR for is largely being done on individual Service basis; Cyber Warfare capabilities in the Military and National level are at nascent stage with little offensive capability; no policy for countering asymmetric/fourth generation war has been evolved. National Information Grid is yet to be established and no national policy evolved for Employment of Special Forces strategically on politico-military missions; negligible indigenous chip manufacturing capability exists; enormous security vulnerabilities exist with practically all computer and communications equipment parts and large amount of hardware and software continues to be being imported while little capability exists for detecting and eliminating malware embedded at manufacturing stage, and defence imports continue at over 70 per cent though the new government is resolved to address the issue on priority.

An evolutionary approach that we have been following past decades can hardly suffice. At the National/Military level, we need to do the following – make a blueprint for RMA and legislate it through the Parliament as advanced countries have already done. The draft would need to be prepared by the Military integrating Diplomatic, Information Operations and Economic aspects; replace the MoD with a Department of Defence staffed by military professional directly under the PM; allocate Defence Budget in sync with the approved RMA blueprint, prohibiting the surrender of Defence Budget and permit carriage of unutilised funds to the next financial year; appoint a CDS with full operational powers without further delay; make jointness in the Services a fait accompli, initiating establishment of an Integrated Functional and Integrated Theatre Commands; charge the CDS to implement the RMA under the directions of the Prime Minister, including synergising military and developing NCW capacity; inject military professionals in DRDO-DPSU-OF at all levels including for management and decision making; evolve comprehensive policy for military diplomacy; allot a dedicated Defence Band from the spectrum considering the security requirements; establish a Cyber Command, develop offensive capabilities and make information dominance an integral part of the cyber warfare doctrine; enunciate a Policy for Countering Asymmetric/Fourth Generation War and a National Policy for Strategic Employment of Special Forces particularly for countering these forms of war; establish comprehensive indigenous modern chip manufacturing capability on fast track progressive basis; ensure self reliance in software, hardware, production of hardened active network components including storage area networks and in the interim develop testing capability for malware; focus efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in critical areas like space technology and development of modern weapon systems including comprehensive ‘System of Systems’; accelerate education and joint training of military personnel to support and promote the new RMA with Indian characteristics and speed up establishment of the Indian National Defence University (INDU) and ensure that our procurement process is able to absorb and leapfrog technology.

RMA in the Indian Military is ongoing but needs to be drastically focused and accelerated. The political hierarchy must enforce jointness in the military and ensure organisational changes that are necessary to give an impetus to synergising the Armed Forces into total integration. Advancements in military technology will enable military operations to be conducted with such speed, precision and selective destruction that the nature and way in which future wars are fought and their consequent political impact will fundamentally alter the way in which military and political affairs are conducted.

In order to respond to this imperative, as also to fully exploit the potential offered by these technologies, our organisation and processes, concerned with the whole business of producing military/security capability will need to be re-structured accordingly. We must be able to protect own information systems, attack/influence information system of adversaries and leverage own strengths to gain decisive advantage in a battle space where national security is threatened. Future threats require us to leapfrog into total transformation through the application of RMA.
© Copyright 2015 Indian Defence Review













Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir: The Future Trajectory

By Dr. Priyanka Singh
30 Sep , 2015

Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) historically belonged to the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Soon after the partition of India in 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir signed the Instrument of Accession, thereby acceding to the Indian Union. Hence, POK is legitimately an inherent part of India. This territory has been under Pakistan’s unlawful control ever since the Pakistan Army orchestrated the tribal invasion of the territory in October 1947.

POK comprises the so-called Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan (earlier named as Northern Areas) and has remained an amorphous entity for six decades now. The Trans Karakoram Tract, comprising Shaksgam from Baltistan and Raskam from Gilgit, which Pakistan ceded to China in 1963, is also a part of POK. China promised to assist Pakistan in building the Karakoram Highway as a payoff.

The terrorist attack in Mumbai on 26 November 2008 added a new dimension to the existing discourse on the training camps in POK.


The so called Azad Kashmir (AJK) is governed under the Azad Kashmir Interim Constitution Act passed in 1974. Even though AJK has a President, Prime minister, and a council, the governing structure is totally powerless and dependent on the Pakistani establishment for the smallest issue at hand. Very often AJK is described as a “constitutional enigma” with “trappings of a country”. The Karachi Agreement, which governs the rule of Pakistan over Gilgit-Baltistan, was signed between the President of Azad Kashmir, the Muslim Conference and a minister without portfolio from Pakistan, Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani. Even though there was no formal merger between AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan, the fate of the latter was decided by Prime Minister AJK and Pakistan with no local representative participating in the matter.

The Government of Pakistan announced the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self Governance Order on 29 August 2009, which reversed the nomenclature of the Northern Areas to the original Gilgit-Baltistan. The order has been widely criticized as it failed to address the basic questions of the rights of the people and the critical issue of provincial autonomy. The order introduced elements that brought Gilgit-Baltistan closer to the structure in AJK in spirit and form but with no impact, as the strings of power were placed with the Government of Pakistan. The order was rejected by the political groups in Gilgit-Baltistan, the pro-independence groups, and the pro-Indian groups. There have been allegations that the order was designed to secure increasing Chinese interest in POK. The development works in POK are heavily dependent on Chinese investments.

POK has been in the news during this decade for wrong reasons. In the wake of the events of 11 September 2001, when the United States launched a massive hunt for the Al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden, there were reports that he was in Muzaffarabad, the capital of AJK. On 8 October 2005, a devastating earthquake measuring 7.6 on the Richter scale hit the region; AJK is yet to emerge from the colossal damage. The region also harbours militant training camps. The terrorist attack in Mumbai on 26 November 2008 added a new dimension to the existing discourse on the training camps in POK.

The Government of Pakistan would find an outsourced option to contrive cross-border terrorism in India, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir.

The terrorists travelled from Bait-ul-Mujahideen, the operational headquarters of Lashkar-e-Toyyaba (LeT) in Muzaffarabad, via Karachi to Mumbai. The chief of LeT, Zaki ur-Rehman, the nodal person in the Mumbai conspiracy, was arrested by Pakistani authorities from Muzaffarabad.

Why POK’s Future?

As a case for future scenario building, POK is immensely significant. POK’s strategic geographic location has consistently been “leveraged” by Pakistan to fulfil its “strategic and economic objectives”. POK shares its borders with several countries – the Punjab and NWFP provinces in Pakistan to the west, the Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan in the north-west, Xinjiang province of the People’s Republic of China to the north and India’s Jammu and Kashmir to the east. It is situated in the vicinity of the two fastest growing economies of the world, but remains extremely backward.

The key actors in POK are India, Pakistan and China, which during the last few years has developed considerable stakes in the region. This paper, attempting to draw future projections for POK, is divided into four sections: (I) identifying and describing the key drivers; (II) envisaging future trends in the key drivers; (III) determining alternative scenarios; and (IV) Prognosis.

Key Drivers in POK

The Taliban Threat

Over the past few years, the Taliban have seized power in some parts of Pakistan. Few reports hinted at the possibility of Shariat law being imposed in POK; it has already been implemented in Swat in the heartland of Pakistan. The Taliban would attempt to gain strategic depth in this strategically located region. The presence of Afghans in POK would further facilitate the Taliban interests, enabling the militants to amalgamate with the local Afghans and carry on dubious activities under a suitable camouflage. The Government of Pakistan would find an outsourced option to contrive cross-border terrorism in India, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. Recently, the Pakistani authorities arrested and deported from Bagh and Muzaffarabad at least 200 Afghans who were living there illegally. Developments such as the suicide bomb attack in Muzaffarabad on 26 June 2009 have strengthened claims of Taliban presence in POK; the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) was eventually implicated in the incident.

Due to the US-led War on Terror, the Afghan youth were pushed into these camps by the ISI, which was facing dearth of mercenaries after American pressure compelled men from Sudan, Kuwait and Lebanon to leave Pakistan

Two soldiers of the AJK regiment were reportedly killed and three others injured in the attack.

Militant Training Camps

POK has for long provided safe haven to home-grown terrorists of Pakistan – both those operating in Kashmir Valley and those having close links with al‑Qaeda and Taliban. The LeT operates freely in the area as Jamaat ud-Dawa (JuD). People in POK have faced neglect from the Pakistan government for decades and they look up to these groups for help. JuD played a significant role in the relief and rehabilitation work after the October 2005 earthquake when the state machinery expressed inability in carrying out the same. The increasing number of these training camps could be attributed to foreign mercenaries present in Pakistan.

Due to the US-led War on Terror, the Afghan youth were pushed into these camps by the ISI, which was facing dearth of mercenaries after American pressure compelled men from Sudan, Kuwait and Lebanon to leave Pakistan. A report by India’s Home Ministry in 2004, prepared on the basis of interrogation of militants and interception of wireless messages, came to this conclusion. In March 2008, a status report on India’s internal security by the Home Ministry reiterated that the operation of militant camps in POK was unabated.

Sectarian Divide

The demography in Gilgit Baltistan in POK has changed so much that the Shia, the original inhabitants of the land, have become a minority. Sunnis from Pakistan were given lucrative job offers and other incentives to settle in POK. President Zia intended to shift the demographic balance of POK in favour of Pakistan, primarily a Sunni state, and the orders to this effect were carried out by Pervez Musharraf in the late 1980s.

The Chinese interest in POK dates back to the construction of Karakoram Highway…

Similarly, the Northern Light Infantry, which mainly comprised men from POK (it was deployed in the Kargil War) is increasingly manned by non-locals as the local people are no longer trusted. The ICG report on the State of Sectarianism states, “Since 2001, Shia resentment over the inclusion of Sunni religious rituals and a perceived anti-Shia bias in textbooks for public schools has resulted in school boycotts and occasional clashes and curfews.”

China’s Growing Influence

The Chinese interest in POK dates back to the construction of Karakoram Highway, the highest road in the world, built at a height of 4665 metres (15,397 feet). The highway has yielded tremendous trading opportunities for both countries. It has also been used extensively to transfer arms and ammunition from China to Pakistan, and fissile nuclear and missile material from China. The highway was opened to the public only in 1986 even though it was completed in 1978 and was inaugurated in 1982.

Pakistan and China have also signed several agreements for building dams in POK, the latest being the MoU for building a dam in Bunji in Astore district.

In November 2003, former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf signed a Border Trade Agreement with the Chinese government to “strengthen transport cooperation and promote interflow of personnel and commodities through the Karakoram Highway”. The two countries signed an MoU on 30 June 2006 to widen the highway from 10 metres to 30 metres; the upgradation process was formally inaugurated in February 2008.

China has made substantial investments in POK especially after the earthquake of 2005. Early in 2009, it proffered $300 million for development projects in Muzaffarabad, Rawalkot and Bagh. The agreement to this effect was signed in Islamabad between the Earthquake Reconstruction Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) of Pakistan and the Chinese Ambassador Luo Zhaohui.

Pakistan and China have also signed several agreements for building dams in POK, the latest being the MoU for building a dam in Bunji in Astore district. India, which views such agreements between China and Pakistan as adverse to India–China relations, has sharply criticized this move.

Water Resources

POK is rich in water resources. The Indus and its tributaries render bright opportunities for hydropower generation.

Recently, however, in the overall context of water scarcity in Pakistan, President AJK, Raja Zulqarnain Khan, stressed the need for water conservation. Speaking in Muzaffarabad, Khan “urged people to store rainwater and protect existing sources of water in AJK”. He acknowledged that “roughly half the population of AJK still did not have access to potable water, adding that water sources have all but dried up in some areas”.

A highly controversial hydropower project in POK, because of its ecological implications, is the Diamer Bhasha Dam. It will inundate large tracts of land in the vicinity, rendering thousands of people homeless. According to a report, at least “31 villages will be flooded, 3,115 houses destroyed and 1,500 acres of agricultural land inundated by the reservoir”.

The area has very little in terms of fertile agricultural land, which if absorbed by the construction of the dam could result in serious food deficit in the region. POK has been facing food shortage in the past; only when the federal government issues directives the other provinces supply the required food material. Also, the dam is located in a seismically sensitive zone.

Political Unrest

Political unrest in POK is based on a range of issues, primarily being the denial of basic rights, constitutional and political. People from PoK have migrated to countries like US, Canada and gulf looking for greener pastures as education and job opportunities are not available and political freedom is non existent. There is also a sectarian divide as a result of Sunni ingress in the region. The region has also been linguistically and culturally marginalized. POK does not have a provincial status even though Pakistan has controlled it for nearly six decades. After a great deal of protests, recently the Government of Pakistan announced the Self-Governance Package for Gilgit-Baltistan, which provided the trappings of an AJK-like structure. Ironically, even after the new order, POK does not count as a province of Pakistan. Many in Pakistan view this development as a compromise by Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir.

POK does not have a provincial status even though Pakistan has controlled it for nearly six decades. After a great deal of protests, recently the Government of Pakistan announced the Self-Governance Package for Gilgit-Baltistan…

Reports such as the Human Rights Violation in Azad Kashmir and Baroness Emma Nicholson’s Kashmir Report for the EU depict a distressing picture of the state of human rights in POK. The Human Rights Watch Report opens with a statement from a resident of Muzaffarabad: “Pakistan says they are our friends and India is our enemy. I agree India is our enemy, but with friends like these, who needs enemies?”

Pakistan’s approach to POK has baffled many as this area is of immense strategic significance. Some have alleged that Pakistan has refrained from granting it legislative autonomy because of this strategic significance, fearing consequences. The establishment has brutally crushed political unrest in POK in the past. None the less, this movement could acquire a violent shape due to continuing impoverishment and lack of hope for betterment. Resort to violence is ingrained in the Pakistani state and society since long: recall the tribal invasions of 1947 and the Mujahideen involved in the Kargil conflict of 1999; according to Pakistan they were freedom fighters well versed in guerrilla warfare.

Envisaging Future Trends in the Crucial Drivers

Most of the drivers in isolation or in combination could be critical in the course of the next two decades in POK.

Larger Threat of Taliban Militants

The War on Terror shoved the Afghan Taliban into Pakistan. The Taliban since then has gained ground in Pakistan. In Afghanistan, the outfit is fighting a bitter battle with the US-led NATO forces, and would benefit greatly by gaining a stronghold in POK. The Pakistani state would rather close its eyes on any such development. In POK, the Pakistani authorities would not even bother to launch a superficial battle. This is because POK is away from the media glare. The region is already deluged with clandestine activities of this nature.

China is giving incentives to the rebels in the form of job opportunities and by making substantial investments in the development of the region while using heavy hand to crush any sign of rebellion.

The United States is fighting Al‑Qaeda and Taliban on Pakistani soil in several ways – providing military aid, drone attacks, and the like. If these groups spread bases in POK, the US would be compelled to expand its target areas and this could lead to a substantial US military presence in POK. China is intently strengthening its ground in POK, especially in Gilgit-Baltistan with pools of capital. This immense economic presence in the region could probably be followed by some sort of Chinese military presence in the region. In this scenario, POK could become a battleground of the Great Empires similar to Afghanistan.

In the event that the Taliban gets a stronghold in POK, it would open the gates for proliferation of extremist activities in the regions bordering POK besides Central Asia and India – the Chinese province of Xinjiang, including Aksai Chin (claimed by India) which is already facing ethnic strife. In Xinjiang, at least 200 people were killed and 1600 injured in ethnic riots in July 2009. Afghanistan has repeatedly urged China to open the borders at Wakhan Corridor, which separates Afghanistan from Xinjiang, so that it could find alternate supply routes in fighting the Taliban effectively. The Sino-Afghan border corridor is 76 km long. It has been closed for more than a hundred years. The United States supports Afghanistan’s plea to open the corridor, but China has declined due its vulnerabilities in Xinjiang province and “fiercely resists any move to open up its Islamic provinces”.

Uighur Muslims are of Turkic origin and developed ties with Pakistan with the opening of Karakoram Highway, which made people-to-people contact viable between the two countries. A large number of Uighurs have enrolled themselves in the Pakistani Madrassas and are training in jihadi ideology. Even though Pakistan does not support the Uighur secessionist movement in principle, there are close chances that rampant radicalism may penetrate Xinjiang in the years to come. The possibility has compelled the Chinese to keep a strict check on the developments in Xinjiang and the adjoining areas. China is giving incentives to the rebels in the form of job opportunities and by making substantial investments in the development of the region while using heavy hand to crush any sign of rebellion.

Varying Number of Militant Camps

There could be three scenarios regarding militant camps – either they grow in numbers or decline or are wiped out. For instance, after the 2005 earthquake there were reports that the militant camps had vanished from the region. Later on, it came to be known that these camps were closed temporarily since militants were co-opted in relief work. The drivers for each scenario intersect – if the situation in Pakistan is unaltered in the next decade or so, the number of militant camps in the region will rise, with the Army and the ISI encouraging their proliferation.

Recent intelligence reports in India have disclosed that eight new militant training camps have come up in POK.

However, if the situation improves with international intervention, these camps could cease to operate. In addition, China’s growing interest in POK could induce China to urge Pakistan to rid the area of militant camps to ensure the security of Chinese nationals involved in several construction works. There were reports about Chinese concerns about the security of its nationals in Pakistan and in POK in the aftermath of the Lal Masjid ambush in 2007. China’s resistance to Taliban presence in POK is confined to securing its own interests and not the overall security of region.

Recent intelligence reports in India have disclosed that eight new militant training camps have come up in POK. The local administration has been directed by the Government of Pakistan to “accommodate the Pakistani and other jihadis by all means possible”, a Kashmiri leader based in UK is reported to have said. At least 300 militants are reported to be attempting to infiltrate into Indian territory from POK to conduct Mumbai-like attacks in different parts of the country. Pakistan Army has reportedly given these militants, who are reportedly Taliban, two options: either to infiltrate into India or stay in Pakistani jails.

Entrenched Chinese Control

Pakistan supports Chinese involvement in POK for upgradation of infrastructure and development in the region. It seeks to capitalize on Chinese presence in POK to counterbalance India in a warlike situation with India. The Chinese role in the Kargil crisis is a matter of debate even though in the later stages of the conflict China urged Pakistan to withdraw forces to the pre-conflict situation. More than a decade thereafter, the geo-strategic priorities have altered and are likely to change much more before 2030.

The violence in Kashmir Valley would then abate, since Pakistan is likely to be caught up in a civil warlike situation in POK, with inadequate resources and time to manage cross-border militancy.

China has no qualms about its expansionist goals, as has been the case in claiming territories under India’s sovereign control. Its inroads in POK are part of a larger game plan to expand its influence spanning almost entire South Asia encircling India – Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Pakistan.

Misuse of Natural Resources Resulting in Another Calamity

Despite protests from all quarters and most of all from the residents of the adjoining areas, the Government of Pakistan has relentlessly carried on construction work in POK. In the years to come, the region could witness another natural calamity of the kind of earthquake witnessed in 2005. A huge water reservoir in the event of an earthquake would inundate almost all the adjoining areas.

Violent Political Unrest

The possibility remains that the oppressed population in POK takes up arms against Pakistan. The Pakistan establishment would then have to open another front in POK, which otherwise is a peaceful area despite the presence of innumerable terrorist camps and other clandestine activities.

The violence in Kashmir Valley would then abate, since Pakistan is likely to be caught up in a civil warlike situation in POK, with inadequate resources and time to manage cross-border militancy.

POK 2030: Three Alternative Scenarios

In the light of the various drivers studied, it is inevitable to assume that the situation in the region will not improve as long as it is controlled by Pakistan. The first scenario revolves around the restoration of POK to the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir; the second, it remains with the usurper Pakistan. In case of status quo, the region will be subject to geo-political quest between the adjoining states seeking their own strategic priorities and objectives.

POK Under India’s Control

Since the region legitimately belongs to India, taking this case first is justified. The case of POK’s reunion with India is argued on the basis of close cultural ties that people in this region share with the people in India. The Shias and Ismailis of Gilgit-Baltistan have close bonds with the Ladhakhis on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC). Pakistan’s lack of faith in the local population strengthens India’s case for reclaiming the occupied territory.

POK would prove India’s gateway to Central Asian markets, which could provide new vistas for the growing Indian economy.

If POK is restored, it would be amalgamated into the state of Jammu and Kashmir and subjected to a similar status, which defines autonomy and equal treatment that the state of Jammu and Kashmir has been accorded over the years. In this scenario, it would no longer be possible for Pakistan to misuse the territory for clandestine activities and raising militant training camps there.

The entity would largely be free of violence. Assistance from the Union budget for the state of Jammu and Kashmir is usually the highest amongst the states in India on a per capita basis and this gives a fair chance to POK to gradually overcome decades of underdevelopment and miserable conditions of living. POK would be well integrated in the process of the economic development in India, which is expected to maintain at least 7 per cent growth rate even against the global recession.

India would in that case share the border with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa of Pakistan on one side and the Wakhan Corridor with Afghanistan. POK would prove India’s gateway to Central Asian markets, which could provide new vistas for the growing Indian economy.

The Chinese aspire to access Gwadar port in Balochistan province as a bulwark against India. Gwadar port would also provide China opportunities to harness benefits of the sea-lanes there. China plans to build a railway line from Kashgar to Gwadar as a part of this strategy. These designs to besiege India would be automatically shelved once POK comes under India’s control.

Status Quo

POK’s future association with the state of Pakistan, on the other hand, would be no good especially for the local population with the abysmal sense of deprivation continuing in the years to come. Pakistan’s security situation is grave even under a civilian government and is worsening. Pakistan’s control of POK would continue the era of deprivation and duality on a false pretext of UN Security Council resolutions. In fact, Pakistan has never adhered to Resolution 47 of 21 April 1948, which called for “the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein”.

Senator John McCain has lately suggested that Pakistan should move the “significant numbers” of troops from POK to the areas threatened by Taliban militants inside Pakistan. McCain lost the presidential polls to Barack Obama but this statement substantially hints at a plausible course of US foreign policy towards Pakistan in future: to urge Pakistan to withdraw its forces from POK in large numbers and concentrate them on the restive belts of Swat and Waziristan and the western border.

POK at the Crossroads of Conflicting Interests of India, China and Pakistan

This scenario flows directly from status quo in POK. Viewed from the regional spectrum, POK is likely to become the geo-strategic chessboard between India, China and Pakistan. Recent exchange of diplomatic statements amongst the three states strongly indicates such a possibility, where each is vying to promote its own political, economic and strategic pursuits.

The elections in Gilgit-Baltistan are just another cosmetic exercise intended to camouflage the fact of Pakistan’s illegal occupation of areas of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

A report published in Xinhua described China’s plan to undertake infrastructure projects with Pakistan in POK. India has reacted sharply, with the Ministry of External Affairs making it clear that the future of Sino-Indian relations could be held hostage to China’s intervention in POK. The ministry stated:

We have seen the Xinhua report quoting the President of China as stating that China will continue to engage in projects with Pakistan inside Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. Pakistan has been in illegal occupation of parts of the Indian State of Jammu & Kashmir since 1947. The Chinese side is fully aware of India’s position and our concerns about Chinese activities in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. We hope that the Chinese side will take a long term view of the India-China relations, and cease such activities in areas illegally occupied by Pakistan.

The Chinese government in response said that “it was a matter for India and Pakistan to resolve and that China had no reason to change its policies on Kashmir.” Similarly, India registered a protest in the wake of the Gilgit-Baltistan Self-Governance Package 2009, stating that Pakistan has no right to legislate on Gilgit-Baltistan as it is a part of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Rejecting the demarche of protest that India handed over to the Pakistani High Commissioner in New Delhi, Pakistan stated that India has no locus standi on POK. Regarding the elections in Gilgit-Baltistan, India’s Ministry of External Affairs has categorically rejected their validity stating, “The elections in Gilgit-Baltistan are just another cosmetic exercise intended to camouflage the fact of Pakistan’s illegal occupation of areas of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.”

Prognosis

The next twenty years in all probability will see India playing a much larger role vis-à-vis POK. This is evident not only from several statements of the Ministry of External Affairs of late but also the developments with respect to China. China is playing a larger role in India’s neighbourhood and the next few years would compel India in all likelihood to revitalize its claims over its lost territory.

India and Pakistan last fought in the Kargil War in 1999, which was Pakistan’s futile attempt to establish control on Kashmir. The terrorist attack in Mumbai on 26 November 2008 was a high point, with an impending warlike situation. However, India exercised restraint and concentrated on strengthening its internal anti-terror structure. An incident like this if repeated could lead to retaliation from the Indian side. The repeated failure of diplomatic exercises with respect to Pakistan has aroused anti-Pakistan sentiments amongst Indians. If public opinion begins to support some sort of military offensive against Pakistan, there would be few options left before the government.

Pakistan is fighting a bitter battle against its own home-grown terror network. The present situation is serious and is likely to worsen in times to come.

Militancy in Kashmir Valley is on the downtrend (with a few exceptions) and as a result the Indian government is expected to engage in a meaningful and consistent diplomatic manoeuvre to reclaim POK. Pakistan is losing trust with the international community, including its major ally the US. This would give India leverage to put its case more forcefully.

The premise of Taliban presence in POK provides an indication to initiate a policy debate on how to tackle the situation in case the Taliban reaches the threshold limits of India. Even though the percolation of Taliban in India is not going to be easy in view of the openness and plurality of Indian society, these militants could successfully stage terror and violence inside the country.

Pakistan is fighting a bitter battle against its own home-grown terror network. The present situation is serious and is likely to worsen in times to come. If so, the secessionists in China would find a suitable ground to gratify their extremist intents and methods. This possibility could adversely impact the otherwise smooth and friendly relations between Pakistan and China.

The geo-strategy of South Asia would undergo a sea-change if there is a shift in the existing equation of China-Pakistan relations. With the increasing realization in the US about the terror network in Pakistan and a slightly stern approach in its dealings with Pakistan, it is probable that Pakistan may be isolated from both its closest allies, with them turning hostile to Pakistan’s policy of nurturing militancy inside its territory, even though it would be for varying interests.
© Copyright 2015 Indian Defence Review













U.S. military launches airstrike on Kunduz after Taliban assault on the key city

September 29 2015

Stunned by a dawn attack from three sides, Afghan troops are engaged in a desperate counter offensive to regain control of the city of Kunduz, in northern Afghanistan. 

KABUL — Afghan forces struck back Tuesday in the besieged northern city of Kunduz, opening potentially risky street-by-street battles seeking to drive back Taliban fighters and reverse a humiliating blow to Afghanistan’s Western-backed government. 

But the counteroffensive met stiff resistance from Taliban units near the airport on the city’s outskirts, touching off intense clashes that blocked Afghan troops from making a push toward the heart of Kunduz. 

The showdowns took shape before dawn — less than 24 hours after Taliban militiamen stormed into Kunduz — as Afghan reinforcements poured into the area after a U.S. airstrike helped clear the way. 

The fight to reclaim Kunduz — Afghanistan’s sixth-largest city and a strategic gateway to Central Asia — serves as one of the Afghan military’s biggest tests in the 14-year-long war against the Taliban insurgency and raised questions about the withdrawal timetable for U.S. and other coalition troops. 

It also unfolds in a new and challenging backdrop: an urban setting where hundreds of thousands of civilians are holed up in their homes. The Taliban’s white flag was hoisted over major government buildings. 

A spokesman for the international military coalition in Afghanistan said the U.S. air attack sought to “eliminate a threat to the force.” Coalition officials did not specify the target or whether the airstrikes will be followed up by others. 

Safiullah Ahmadi, a Kunduz official who is helping to oversee the government response, said in an interview that Afghan forces have retaken the Kunduz police station, which the Taliban seized along Monday. 

Kunduz police reported that they regained control of the city prison, where more than 600 prisoners escaped during the Taliban blitz.

But Ahmadi said that Taliban fighters still control large swaths of the city and that “a big operation” was needed to dislodge them. He said warplanes were in the area, but “we would like not to rely on air power in order to avoid civilian casualties.” 

Mirza Laghmani, a Kunduz resident, said “intense fighting” raged near the Kunduz airport, and government forces were facing ambush-style attacks by the Taliban on roads leading into the city center. 

Meanwhile, casualties mounted. The aid group Doctors Without Borders said its trauma hospital in Kunduz has been “inundated” with more than 170 injured patients, including many suffering from gunshot wounds. 

The U.S. military still has 9,800 troops in Afghanistan, but it was unclear whether any American personnel were stationed near Kunduz, about 150 miles north of Kabul. 

Defense officials predicted that Afghan forces, including commandos and special forces, would quickly expel the estimated 500 Taliban fighters. 

But many analysts said the Taliban advance demonstrates that Afghanistan still lacks basic command-and-control procedures for managing its 352,000-member military and police forces. 

Afghan police officers stationed in Kunduz, for example, are thought to have simply abandoned their posts. Questions were also mounting over why more army personnel had not been stationed in Kunduz, which the Taliban had attacked twice this summer. 

Taliban fighters looted banks and office buildings on Tuesday, according to a local police official. Pictures were circulating on social media showing Taliban fighters riding around in Red Cross vehicles. 

Other images showed Taliban fighters gathered around an old Russian-made tank, probably left over from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. One militant ripped off a round of celebratory gunfire. Another barked at him to stop. 

“Do not waste the bullets and create fear,” he said. 

Billboards depicting slain and current anti-Taliban commanders were torn apart. 

The Taliban’s success in seizing the city was a crushing setback for Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, who is struggling to manage the biggest crisis of his year-old presidency. 

“This incident will embolden the Taliban,” said Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, an Afghan senator from Helmand province, where the Taliban controls large swaths of territory. “This government should resign. . . . We had warnings about the fall of Kunduz. No one listened.” 

At a news conference in Kabul, Ghani defended the military response to the crisis, saying the Taliban had infiltrated the city disguised as civilians. They hid in houses and suddenly burst out early Monday, quickly overwhelming security officials, who struggled to differentiate between militants and residents, Ghani said. 

“The problem here is that a traitor enemy had turned the local population into a shield,” he said. “The government of Afghanistan is a responsible government and can’t and won’t bomb its people, its countrymen, inside a city.” 

In a sign of the strain facing the government, the country’s second-ranking leader, chief executive Abdullah Abdullah, announced that he was leaving the U.N. General Assembly in New York earlier than planned and heading home. 

“Afghanistan is suffering, and its people demand solutions that are practical, verifiable and durable,” Abdullah said in his U.N. address on Tuesday, appealing specifically to neighboring Pakistan to crack down on the Taliban and other militant factions. 

In Washington, the fall of Kunduz is raising new questions about President Obama’s pledge that he will withdraw all remaining U.S. troops from Afghanistan over the next 16 months. 

Pentagon leaders have indicated that they may ask Obama to slow the planned drawdown. 

“The fall of Kunduz to the Taliban is not unlike the fall of Iraqi provinces to ISIL,” said a statement from Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-Tex.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, using one of the acronyms for the Islamic State militant group. 

“It is a reaffirmation that precipitous withdrawal leaves key allies and territory vulnerable to the very terrorists we’ve fought so long to defeat,” he added. 

Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), a frequent critic of Obama’s strategy in Afghanistan, issued a statement comparing the fall of Kunduz to rise of Islamic State militants in Iraq. 

“It is time that President Obama abandon this dangerous and arbitrary course and adopt a plan for U.S. troop presence based on conditions on the ground,” said McCain, who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee. 

Kunduz was just one of several flash points on Tuesday. 

In Nangahar province in eastern Afghanistan, local officials reported that hundreds of Islamic State militants attacked several outposts but were repelled. Meanwhile, Taliban fighters appeared to threaten numerous small cities in Baghlan province, which borders Kunduz province. Kunduz city is the provincial capital. 

Haroun Mir, founder of Afghanistan’s Center for Research and Policy Studies, predicted that Afghan forces would quickly recapture Kunduz. 

Despite its rapid advance on Monday, Mir said, the Taliban is still not a fighting force that is equipped to defend ground for extended periods. The Taliban already appears to be ferrying looted ammunition, military vehicles and computers out of the city, local officials said. 

“They are loading up trucks with stolen goods to carry them to their stronghold, because they know they can’t stay in Kunduz city much longer,” said Sultan Arab, a local police commander. 

Still, Mir said, “the damage is already done.” 

“Who is responsible for this — the governor, the police chief, military leaders — is still not clear,” he said. “But it’s clear what happened in Kunduz can happen anywhere. It can even happen in a city such as Kabul.” 

Murphy reported from Washington. Mohammad Sharif and Sayed Salahuddin in Kabul and Daniela Deane in London contributed to this report.

Afghanistan and “Failed State Wars”: The Need for a Realistic Transition

SEP 29, 2015 

The Taliban’s capture of Kunduz does mark its first major capture of a major urban area, but it is only a symptom of a much broader crisis in the Transition process in what has begun to approach a forgotten war. 
























































Afghanistan and the Defeat in Kunduz: The Crisis in Transition

SEP 29, 2015 

The Taliban’s capture of Kunduz does mark its first major capture of a major urban area, but it is only a symptom of a much broader crisis in the Transition process in what has begun to approach a forgotten war.

The Broader Crisis in Afghanistan and a Failed Transition Plan

Afghanistan is now caught up in a much broader series of crises: political, governance, economics, security, and Afghan force development. In each case, the “Transition” since U.S. combat forces left at the end of 2014 is failing.

This failure is only partly the fault of the Obama administration. The Afghan government has failed to provide effective leadership in each critical dimension. Many of the problems involved also have their origins in the UN’s failure to play a meaningful role in coordinating any aspect of the civil aid effort, and the erratic politics and programs the Bush Administration pursued – partly because of its focus on the Iraq conflict. .

The fact remains, however, that it is the Obama administration that is now in charge and that created a fundamentally unworkable set of transition policies and deadlines. It is the Obama administration that set transition deadlines for the political purpose of ending the war before the president left office, rather than created plans based on the conditions in Afghanistan and real world level of civil and military development in the country.

It is the Obama administration that steadily cut back on the level of reporting and transparency in the transition process, made exaggerated claims of success, and avoided dealing with problems by failing to address them and the data on their scale and seriousness. It is also only the Obama administration that has the option of reversing its mistakes in time to have any real hope of salvaging the transition process.

These are key issues the Congress must address as it starts to hold hearings on the progress in Afghanistan, and it must look far beyond the military and security dimension. This is made clear in detail in a new report by the Burke Chair at CSIS that uses a wide variety of official, NGO, and think tank data and metrics to address each critical problem in Transition.

This report is entitled Afghanistan and “Failed State Wars”: The Need for a Realistic Transition, and is available on the CSIS web site athttp://csis.org/files/publication/150929_Cordesman_Afghanistan_Failed_State_Wars_1.pdf.

The report is in PowerPoint form so it can show the trends involved in graphic and map form, and provide comparative data from a wide range of sources.

The Crises in Politics, Governance, and Economics

The first part of the report focuses on the political, governance, and economic crises in Afghanistan because these aspects of transition have received far too little attention from the administration, the Congress and outside analysts.

It addresses: 
The reality that the problems in host country leadership and governance have often been as much, or more, of a threat to success as the actions of the Taliban and other insurgents. (pp. 2-6) 
The fact that Afghanistan faces major crises from population growth and demands for economic success and jobs by its youth – an age group that often turns to violence when the Afghan economy fails to provide real options – and from deep ethnic and sectarian divisions. (pp. 7-17) 
The scale of the real world challenges in civil society and human development, many of which have been concealed or omitted in State Department and USAID reporting. (pp. 18-29) 
Key failures in Afghan politics and governance at every level that have undermined popular support for the government and empower the Taliban and other insurgents. (pp. 30-35) 
The problems caused by massive levels of corruption at every level of civil governance and in the Afghan security forces. (pp. 36-43) 
Critical problems in raising Afghan government revenues, over-dependence on aid, and the ability to formulate and execute the government budget with adequate fiscal controls and measures of effectiveness. (pp. 44-56) 
Broader economic problems which have been disguised in the past by 

o Deep structural problems, gross over-dependence on poorly controlled aid and military spending, and unkept promises of reform, (pp. 57-82)

o Weak job creation and a return to growing poverty (pp. 83-89), erratic economic aid projects poorly executed and with minimal benefits, and serious structural problems in the balance of trade and financial sectors. and

o false promises of a “new silk road” and income from mines and minerals (pp. 90-102),

The failure of counter-narcotics programs from 2002-2015, and a sharply growing dependence on a narco-economy – disguised in part by exaggerated claims of success in eradication and seizures and a failure to honestly assess the real world role of narcotics in the Afghan GDP and economy. (pp. 103-123). 

The Crises in Security and Developing Effective Afghan Forces

The second part of the report focuses on security issues and the effort to create effective Afghan National Security Forces – an efforts whose critical failings have helped create the crisis in Kunduz and a much broader crisis in security that the Obama administration can only address by reversing its current transition plans and policies.

It addresses: 
The fact that violence and casualties are steadily rising, and that the surge in Afghanistan – unlike the combination of the surge and rise of local Sunni forces in Iraq, came too late, was poorly executed, and DoD and UN metrics show it had no meaningful benefits for Afghan security. (pp. 124-135) 

The failure to address the most critical metrics of an insurgency: The relative level of insurgent influence and control versus that of the Afghan government, and the fact that unclassified reporting on this subject began to lie by omission after the trends continued to be negative in 2010. (pp. 136-142) 

The fact that the trend in civilian casualties warns that USG and DoD reporting has systematically understated the growth in the scale and breadth of Taliban and insurgent operations in the past. (pp. 143-159) 

The uncertain status of the development of Afghan Army. Police, and Local Police forces, which has been disguised in part by suddenly classifying the capability of given combat units and police elements, but clearly reflects the lack of progress in creating an effective Ministry of Defense and Ministry of the Interior caused by the long post-election crisis in forming an effective Afghan government. (pp. 160-171) 

The failed and premature Transition Plan that did not provide adequate support for any element of the ANSF, reflect the combat conditions on the ground, cut the advisory efforts at the most critical level of combat operations, and now fails to provide adequate advisory support for the Afghan National Army and police forces thrust into paramilitary roles for which they are not properly trained and equipped. (pp. 173-179) 

The fact that the actual manning levels to support Afghan forces are very low, and the U.S. portion is only about two thirds of the U.S forces deployed in the spring of 2015. No reporting or plan has been released showing current and currently planned levels for end-2015, 2016, or 2017. (pp. 180-186) 

The failure to take the lack of progress in developing the Afghan Air Force into account, although air power offers the only clear solution to partial compensation for the limited size and capability of Afghan ground forces, and the severe limits to the air support provided by U.S. and allied air units since 2014. This has occurred in spite of the fact that air power was critical to avoid Taliban victories when U.S. and allied combat ground troops were still in Afghanistan. (pp. 187-191) 

The erratic nature of U.S. military and civil aid plans and funding from 2002 to the present, coupled to major failures to establish adequate civil plans, the coordination of different national aid efforts, sustain funding levels over time, and develop meaningful measures of effectiveness. (pp. 192-200) 

The fact that Pakistan in many ways remains as much of a threat as an ally. (pp. 201-214) 
The security challenges that might be met if the U.S. expanded its train and assist mission and shifted its focus to combat effectiveness rather than force generation and sustainment, provided adequate combat and other air support, and developed a clear longer-term civil and military plan tied to conditions that the Afghan government and forces could actually meet. (pp. 215-219) 

Radically Change the Transition Plan or Accept Near-Certain Failure

This latter point is critical. The present U.S. Transition effort cannot succeed and the U.S. cannot eliminate its military aid mission by end-2016. There also are no guarantees that the U.S. can now help the Afghan government overcome all of its weaknesses and to succeed.

However, the Taliban and other insurgent elements are not united or so strong that the Afghan government and forces cannot counter and defeat them over time if the U.S. develops a realistic transition plan, provides a condition-based level of train and assist effort and develops realistic civil and military aid plans.

Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).